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Few would deny that a nationalist movement can only demonstrate its force 
when it acquires a mass following. Nevertheless, relatively few attempts have 
been made to explain why the masses respond to mobilization by political 
elites. Students of nationalist movements have focused on political elites as if 
they were the only significant agents. However, cases in which political elites 
fail to arouse popular nationalism and mobilize their nations behind strategic 
plans indicate that to understand nationalist movements, an elite-centric 
analysis is inadequate. It is imperative to return agency to the mass 
participants in nationalist movements.  
This dissertation argues that individuals participate in nationalist 
movements to advance self-regarding material interests. However, state-led 
nationalist mobilization is likely to fail if participants are motivated primarily 
by immediate economic payoffs. It is because the goal of nationalist 
mobilization is to increase human and material resources under state control, 
so that state elites can invest in their strategic plans, such as waging war. Yet, 
the distribution of economic incentives among participants constitutes a drain 
on state-controlled resources. Conversely, if participants in a nationalist 
movement are willing to make short-term sacrifices by paying more taxes, 
demanding fewer welfare services, and working more efficiently, mobilization 
is more likely to result in the accumulation of resources by the state.  
Two factors encourage individuals to endure temporary hardship and 
contribute to the success of nationalist mobilization by the state. First, the 
perception of a strong and imminent foreign threat leads individuals to seek 
state protection and reduces their concern for immediate economic payoffs. 
State elites are able to project foreign enemies as the cause of current hardship 
and to suppress people‘s demands for welfare. Second, individuals are more 
likely to find the promise of future payoffs by the state elites credible when 
domestic institutions are more favorable for them. At the aggregate level, 
state-led nationalist mobilization is more likely to succeed when domestic 
institutions favor the interests of the poor majority.  
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To test the above argument, this dissertation considers four cases of 
nationalist mobilization in Chinese history, including the New Life Movement 
(1934-36), Sichuan during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), the lower 
Yangtze region during the Korean War (1950-53), and Sichuan during the 
Great Leap Forward (November 1957-60).   
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
In September 2012, anti-Japanese protests over the disputed islands—known 
as the Diaoyu in China and the Senkaku in Japan—erupted in many cities 
across China. Angry crowds pelted the Japanese embassy in Beijing with 
plastic bottles and eggs, and ransacked sushi restaurants and businesses that 
seemed to have Japanese connection, even if the owners were Chinese. 
Japanese-made cars were overturned and damaged, drivers beaten by their 
fellow-nationals. One banner held by protesters said that ―Even if China is 
covered with graves, we must kill all Japanese.‖1  
If the banner held by the anti-Japanese protesters reflected how individuals 
assess their personal interests against national interests, there would be no 
need to doubt the power of nationalism. This is, however, not necessarily the 
case. In fact, state elites often encounter grave problems in mobilizing their 
nations behind strategic goals.
2
 Popular nationalist sentiments do not 
guarantee that ordinary people will take action and make concrete 
contributions to the nationalist cause, especially when such actions involve 
costs. It might be easy for individuals to express their nationalist sentiments 
online, or even hack into the website of foreign governments. They, however, 
would not necessarily support a policy which requires personal sacrifice, such 
as paying more taxes. Individuals may participate in nationalist protests and 
attack foreigners when the government gives the green light to such behavior. 
This does not mean they will join the army in the event of war. 
The study of nationalism has been heavily influenced by its close 
association with violent protests and brutal warfare. As a consequence, the 
role played by nationalism in rousing the masses to collective action has been 
exaggerated. Conventional wisdom holds that nationalism is a mysterious 
force that encourages irrational behaviors. The standard stories found in 
                                           
1
 Keith Bradsher, Martin Fackler, and Andrew Jacobs, "Anti-Japan Protests Erupt in China 
Over Disputed Island," The New York Times, 19 August 2012. 
2
 See, for instance, Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic 
Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1997); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's 
World Role  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).  
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political science scholarship also emphasize the war causing character of 
nationalism. A nationalistic population enables, even propels, state elites to 
pursue aggressive foreign policies and launch wars.
3
 We seldom consider, 
however, the limits of popular nationalism, and have neglected the failed 
attempts by state elites to mobilize the masses through nationalism. This study 
takes the negative cases of nationalist mobilization seriously. On this basis, it 
attempts to answer the question: What explains state elites’ success in 
mobilizing mass nationalist movements?  
I suggest that, to answer this question, an elite-based analysis is not 
enough. Instead, it is necessary to return agency to the participants of mass 
nationalist movements and explore the ―micro-foundations‖ of the 
macro-phenomena.
4
 I, therefore, ask why individuals would participate in 
mass nationalist movements. I posit that individuals participate in nationalist 
movements to advance self-regarding material interests. Two factors, the 
perception of a foreign threat and pro-majority domestic institutions, affect 
individuals‘ time horizon and encourage individuals to make short-term 
sacrifices for the nationalist cause. Consequently, if these two conditions are 
present, nationalist mobilization led by the state is most likely to succeed.  
In the following section, I provide greater detail with respect to my 
argument about mass nationalist movements and situate this study in existing 
theories of nationalist movements. The second section discusses how the 
public‘s threat perception, pro-majority institutions, and the success of state 
nationalist mobilization can be measured. The third section previews my 
major cases. I then demonstrate what implications this study has for our 
understandings of popular nationalism in present-day China. The final section 
discusses the organization of the thesis. 
                                           
3
 Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 
18, no. 2 (Autumn 1993); Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire : Domestic Politics and 
International Ambition  (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Stephen Van Evera, 
"Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994). 
4
 Michael Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action," in Rationality and 
Revolution, ed. Michael Taylor (Cambridge Cambridgeshire; New York; Paris: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 63. 
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1.1 The Argument: Individual Choice and State Accumulation 
At the heart of my argument is the contention that factors motivating 
individuals to participate in state-led nationalist movements affect the actual 
outcome of mobilization. I contend that although nationalism encourages 
self-sacrifice, material self-interests are critical in explaining the choice 
individuals make when they face state-led nationalist mobilization. Individuals 
participate in nationalist movements to acquire state protection, immediate 
economic payoffs, or future economic payoffs. Nevertheless, if participants 
are motivated by immediate economic payoffs alone, state-led nationalist 
mobilization is likely to fail. It is because the ultimate goal of nationalist 
mobilization is to increase human and material resources under state control. 
Yet, the provision of economic incentives would constitute an economic drain 
on the state. State elites would be left with fewer resources with which they 
can pursue other strategic objectives, such as waging war. Conversely, if 
participants in a nationalist movement are motivated primarily by state 
protection and future economic payoffs, state nationalist mobilization is more 
likely to succeed.  
Therefore, it is worth asking under what conditions participants in 
nationalist movements care less about immediate economic payoffs. I suggest 
that perceiving a strong foreign threat, individuals are more likely to lend 
support to state-led nationalist movements in search of state protection. In 
contrast, in the absence of a strong foreign threat, individuals‘ security 
concerns would be less severe. As a result, they would expect the state to 
provide immediate economic payoffs or other forms of welfare service as 
compensations for their contributions to the nationalist cause.  
The other factor that affects individuals‘ choice and thus the outcome of 
state mobilization is domestic political and economic institutions. I contend 
that domestic institutions determine how individuals discount future economic 
payoffs. Individuals are more likely to believe that they would benefit in the 
future when the existing domestic institutions are more favorable for them. At 
the aggregate level, state-led nationalist mobilization is more likely to succeed 
when domestic institutions favor the interests of the poor majority.  
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How does my explanation relate to existing theories? The literature on 
nationalism and nationalist movements is striking in its richness. Nevertheless, 
relatively few attempts have been made to explore the rationality of the mass 
participants in nationalist movements. Scholarship on the historical origins of 
nationalism stresses broad socioeconomic processes, such as industrialization
5
 
and the uneven development of capitalism.
6
 For research that is more 
actor-oriented, focusing on elites (intellectuals or political entrepreneurs) as 
the most significant agent in nationalist movements is a widespread practice 
(see Figure 1). Some scholars argue that elites‘ nationalist behavior reflects 
their psychological needs (the upper-right quadrant).
7
 On the contrary, others 
propose an instrumentalist explanation and contend that political elites use 




Although elites are often studied as rational actors, rationality disappears 
when the focus of study shifts to the mass participants in nationalist 
movements. Many scholars maintain that participants are propelled by strong 
nationalist emotions, and that their nationalist behavior cannot be explained by 
instrumental calculation (the lower-right quadrant).
9
 In contrast to this 
                                           
5
 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism  (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983). 
6
 Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain:Crisis and Neo-Nationalism  (London: NLB, 1977). 
7
 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity  (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1992). 15-6, Chapter 3. Anderson seems to be less concerned about the elites material 
interests. He argues that creole officials started to think they were tightly linked to local 
populations after they found their ―administrative pilgrimages‖ to the metropole were blocked. 
Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism  (London ; New York, NY: Verso, 2006). 
8
 See, for instance, Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and 
Nationalist Conflict  (New York: Norton, 2000); V. P. Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War: 
Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s  (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004); John F. 
Clark, "Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalisms," in After Independence: Making and 
Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States ed. Lowell W. Barrington 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006); Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of 
Group Conflict  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). 114; Jack Snyder and 
Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security 21, no. 2 
(Autumn 1996); Van Evern warns that illegitimate governments have a greater propensity for 
nationalist myth making. Evera, "Hypotheses." 
9
 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding  (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994). 206; Paul C. Stern, "Why Do People Sacrifice for Their 
Nations," in Perspectives on Nationalism and War ed. John L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stern 
(Luxembourg: Gordon and Breach, 1995), 102-3.  
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argument, this study attempts to explore the rationality of the mass participants 
in nationalist movements. I propose a mass-based instrumentalist explanation, 




In this study, I view emotive nationalism as a competing explanation to my 
account of nationalist movements. I argue that ignoring the socioeconomic 
demands made by the mass participants in nationalist movements, study of 
nationalism tends to underestimate the difficulties that state elites face in 
mobilizing the masses. In comparison with instrumentalism, theories 
emphasizing the emotional dimension of nationalist behavior may be better 
equipped to explain the passions that participants demonstrate in a nationalism 
movement. Yet, they have a difficult time explaining why sometimes state 
elites fail to mobilize the masses through nationalism. Negative cases as such 
suggest that there is still an element in mass nationalist movements that needs 
















Figure 1 Situating Existing Theories 
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1.2 Conceptualization and Operationalization  
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify that the theory I propose is 
not a general theory of the origins of nationalism or nationalist movements, 
but a theory of nationalist mobilization carried out by the state elites whose 
goal is to extract as much resources as possible from society. Resources raised 
through mobilization in turn can be devoted to other strategic plans set by state 
elites. 
A thorough discussion on how to define nationalism is beyond the scope of 
this research. Given that I am concerned primarily about state-led nationalist 
mobilization, I find John Breuilly‘s definition of nationalism particularly 
helpful. Breuilly defines nationalism as:  
[P]olitical movements seeking or exercising state power and 
justifying such actions with nationalist arguments. 
A nationalist argument is a political doctrine built upon three basic 
assertions: 
(a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.  
(b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other 
interests and values.  
(c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually 
requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty.
10
  
For me, the mobilization is nationalist mobilization when state elites adopt the 
above assertions to justify their call for self-sacrifice by citizens.  
Outcomes of Mobilization How do we know whether state elites succeed 
in mobilizing the masses? One may suggest that the outcome of state 
mobilization should be measured by the scale of the movement that 
mobilization generates, for example, how many people are involved and how 
many organizations are created. Yet, state-led nationalist movements differ 
from social movements. Participants in social movements might face various 
constraints designated by the external environment, such as the punishment 
from the government. The fact of participation in itself indicates a certain 
                                           
10
 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State  (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1982). 3. 
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degree of individual initiative. The emergence of new organizations and an 
increase in their membership, therefore, might be effective indicators of 
successful mobilization.  
In contrast, in the case of state-led nationalist movements, state elites may 
rely on coercion to encourage participation. As a consequence, we might see 
rapid expansion of nationalist organizations sponsored by the state. Yet, we 
still know little about the quality of participation—whether individuals make 
real efforts. Facing punishment from the state, individuals may refrain from 
rising up. They may choose to sit down instead. James Scott, for instance, 
described a range of ―weapons‖ that the weak could employ in passive 
resistance.
11
 In fact, it is very difficult for the state to detect and punish those 
who ―drag their feet‖ and passively engage in nationalist movements. Such 
passivity hurts productivity and thus the tax base.  
Therefore, to measure the outcome of state-led mobilization, it is 
insufficient, sometimes even misleading, to focus only on the construction of 
organizational units and their membership. Instead, I highlight that successful 
mobilization increases public compliance and raise domestic morale and 
producer enthusiasm. More specifically, when mobilization succeeds, we will 
see fewer protests against the government and fewer cases of tax evasion and 
draft-dodging. The rise and fall of producer enthusiasm is manifested in the 
fluctuation of agricultural and industrial productivity. Land reclamation or 
abandonment can also be used to measure peasant initiative.  
Charles Tilly defines mobilization as the ―process by which a group 
acquires collective control over the resources for action.‖12 Drawing on Tilly, 
I contend that successful mobilization is manifested by increase in agricultural 
and industrial output and state tax revenues. Through mobilization, the state 
                                           
11
 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance  (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). xvi. 
12
 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution  (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. 
Co., 1978). 10. Although I draw on Tilly to define mobilization, I use the concept in a 
different way. For Tilly, mobilization—collective control over resources—is a factor that 
determines whether social groups will act on their interests. For me, state accumulation of 
resources is the outcome that I want to explain.  
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acquires resources that can be devoted to its strategic plans. Successful 
mobilization will also assist the state to accumulate manpower. The state will 
able to conscript soldiers, labor, militiamen, and volunteers who can serve as 
the ―vanguard force‖ to implement nationalist mobilization.  
I label the outcome of mobilization as ―complete success‖ when 
mobilization overcomes individual passivity, promotes domestic production, 
and increases state controlled resources. Mobilization achieves ―limited 
success‖ when it increases state-controlled resources without overcoming 
participant passivity and promoting domestic production. Under such 
conditions, mobilization is unsustainable. Mobilization ―fails‖ when it neither 
overcomes individual passivity nor increases domestic production and 
state-controlled resources. 
Perception of Foreign Threats This study maintains that the public‘s 
perception of strong foreign threats contribute to the success of nationalist 
mobilization. I adopt the formative approach proposed by Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer to measure the public‘s threat perception.13 The formula below 
illustrates the relationship between the five formative indicators and the 
public‘s threat perception (PT).  
PT=P[T+I+V(1+H)] 
P is government propaganda. T stands for the time frame of the war. I refers to 
the intensity of the war. V and H represent the region‘s current strategic value 
and its historical experience, respectively.  
I argue that the public‘s threat perception is affected by government 
propaganda, which can play an important role in exaggerating the threat. 
Nevertheless, the government cannot create a foreign threat out of the air. 
Instead, it has to capitalize on actual events to make its propaganda credible 
                                           
13
 Formative indicators are the causes rather than effects of the variable to be measured. 
Adamantios Diamantopoulos and Heidi M. Winklhofer, "Index Construction with Formative 
Indicators: An Alternative to Scale Development," Journal of Marketing Research 38, no. 2 
(2001). 
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and such events are often out of the leaders‘ control.14 For instance, during the 
Korean War, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) capitalized on the public‘s 
threat perception to carry out domestic mobilization. Government propaganda 
might have exaggerated the threat. For instance, it alleged that the United 
States had launched germ warfare against China.
15
 However, it is worth 
emphasizing that actual events, such as the presence of the Seventh Fleet in 
the Taiwan Strait and the Kuomintang‘s (KMT) air raids of Shanghai, lent 
credibility to the CCP government‘s propaganda and enhanced the public‘s 
threat perception (Chapter 5).  
The credibility issue explains why some state elites chose to provoke 
short-term international conflicts to facilitate domestic mobilization.
16
 It is, 
however, also worthwhile to point out that under such conditions, state elites 
would avoid the escalation of conflicts, since the outbreak of war would only 
divert resources from the state‘s strategic plan.17 Simply put, it is limited 
conflicts short of war that best serve state elites‘ interests. Yet, limited 
international conflicts produced limited fear at home, and thus compromised 
the outcome of nationalist mobilization. In this sense, the international system 
imposes constraints on state elites and restrains their capability of 
manipulating domestic popular nationalism.
18
 I demonstrate in Chapter 3 that 
                                           
14
 Christensen, Useful Adversaries: chapter 6; David R. Davis and Michael D. Ward, "They 
Dance Alone: Deaths and the Disappeared in Contemporary Chile," The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 34, no. 3 (1990): 454.de Figueiredo and Weingast point out that in ethnic conflicts, 
insecure leaders manipulate the public‘s fear. Citizens suffer from incomplete information in 
the sense that they can never tell whether peace failed because their own leaders are 
treacherous or because the other ethnic group is aggressive. Nevertheless, de Figueiredo and 
Weingast also emphasize that the enemy‘s aggressive actions play a crucial role in confirming 
the leaders‘ claim and enhancing the public‘s threat perception. Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr and 
Barry R. Weingast, "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," in 
Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention, ed. Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999). 
15
 Ruth Rogaski, "Nature, Annihilation, and Modernity: China's Korean War Germ-Warfare 
Experience," The Journal of Asian Studies 61, no. 2 (2002): 383. 
16
 Christensen, Useful Adversaries: chapter 6. 
17
 Ibid., 205; Davis and Ward also maintain that to appeal to the diversionary use of force, 
leaders must be confident about they ability to control the scale of conflicts. Davis and Ward, 
"They Dance Alone." 
18
 Conventional wisdom holds that leaders stir up international tensions to distract the public 
from domestic discontents. Yet, many scholars cast doubts on diversionary theory of war. 
First, it is because diversionary tactic is costly and state leaders may have other policy choices. 
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in the early 1930s, the KMT government refrained from antagonizing Japan 
because it gave priority to the strategic goals of annihilating the Communists 
and unifying the country. It did not want a war with Japan to divert resources 
from this strategic goal.  
The ―tangible elements‖ of the perception of threats have four components: 
the time frame of threats (whether a war is impending or ongoing), the 
intensity of the war (how many civilian casualties the war causes), the region‘s 
current strategic value (whether it is a political, industrial or commercial 
center), and the region‘s historical experience (whether it suffered from 
foreign military attacks in the past).   
The region‘s current strategic value determines the likelihood that it will 
be attacked by foreign enemies in the event of war. People living in a political, 
industrial or commercial center are more likely to perceive a strong foreign 
threat when international tensions accumulate. The fact that the region 
suffered from foreign military attacks in the past enhances the public‘s threat 
perception. Nevertheless, it can be seen from the formula above that the 
effects of historical experience are contingent upon the region‘s current 
strategic value. Consider a region that has always been an industrial center and 
suffered from foreign military attacks in history. When new international 
tensions accumulate, people‘s memories of historical attacks are invoked. A 
perception of strong foreign threats is likely to form. An example in point is 
the lower Yangtze region during the Korean War (Chapter 5).  
Conversely, if the region has lost its strategic value over time, even if it 
was attacked by foreign enemies in the past, historical experience will play a 
limited role in shaping people‘s threat perception today. Illustratively, during 
the Sino-Japanese War, as the central government and factories retreated from 
                                                                                                  
See, for instance, Christopher Gelpi, "Domestic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the 
Externalization of Domestic Conflict," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 2 (Apr. 
1997); Second, the deployment of the diversionary tactic depends on a series of conditions, 
such as the presence of an opportunity for escalating international tensions.See, for instance, 
M. Taylor Fravel, "The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict," 
Security Studies 19, no. 2 (May. 2010); Brett Ashley Leeds and David R. Davis, "Domestic 
Political Vulnerability and International Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 6 
(Dec. 1997). 
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eastern China to the southwest, Sichuan Province became the wartime political 
and industrial center. It suffered from extensive Japanese bombings. However, 
the province‘s strategic value had declined since the war ended. Historical 
experience thus becomes less likely to affect people‘s threat perception.  
Domestic Institutions As was argued above, the ultimate objective of 
nationalist mobilization is to increase human and material resources under 
state control. In this sense, mobilization inevitably involves a contest over 
resources between the state and the population. I further divide a population 
into two broad categories: the social elites and the masses. The former 
category includes the entrepreneurs and the landlords, while the latter 
incorporates the workers and the peasants. In this sense, the contest over 
resources is actually trilateral.
19
 Domestic economic and political institutions 
determine what rights and obligations different actors have, and how resources 
are distributed amongst the state, the social elites, and the masses. 
Correspondingly, there are three variants of domestic institutions: pro-state 
institutions, pro-minority institutions, and pro-majority institutions.  
State/public ownership of assets, such as land and other means of 
production or the means of living, distinguishes pro-state economic 
institutions from pro-majority and pro-minority economic institutions (see 
Table 1.1). In terms of the distribution of income, pro-state economic 
institutions enhance the extractive capacity of the state. An example in point is 
the people‘s commune established during the Great Leap Forward. In the 
people‘s commune, peasants‘ land, tools, houses, and even cooking utensils 
were appropriated by the commune. With regard to the distribution of income, 
taxes and compulsory sales to the state took precedence: they were to be 
deducted from the income of the commune first, and with only the residual 
income to be distributed among commune members (Chapter 6).  
Pro-state political institutions strengthen the ―despotic power‖ of state 
elites, which is defined by Michael Mann as the power to undertake actions 
                                           
19
 For the trilateral contest over resources, see for instance, Kathryn Bernhardt, Rents, Taxes, 
and Peasant Resistance: The Lower Yangzi Region, 1840-1950  (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1992). 6. Bernhardt views the contest as a zero-sum game, while I suggest 
that succesful mobilization promotes production. In other words, the pie grows bigger. 
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―without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups.‖20 
Pro-state political institutions exclude the populace from political participation. 
The lack of an independent judiciary and the absence of strong representative 
bodies indicate the presence of pro-state political institution.
21
 
                                           
20
 Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State," European Journal of Sociology 
25(1984). 
21
 See Brian M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of 
Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1992). 3-17. 
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Table 1.1 Characterizing Domestic Institutions 
 
Distribution        
of Wealth 







   Excessive state 
extraction 
Empower the state‘s despotic power and 





high concentration of 
wealth 
Favor the interests of 
landowners, or 
capitalists  
Empower the rich minority and exclude 






distribution of wealth 
Favor the interests of 
labor 
Empower people from the poorer strata 
of society and exclude the rich minority 
from political participation 
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Unlike pro-state economic institutions, pro-minority economic institutions 
protect property rights, but concentrate wealth in the hands of a few social 
elites. One example is private ownership of land with high degree of land 
concentration. In terms of income distribution, pro-minority economic 
institutions favor the interests of landowners or capitalists. For instance, the 
rights retained by landlords to raise rents and evict tenants and the absence of 
labor insurance system indicate the presence of pro-minority economic 
institutions.  
Pro-minority economic institutions are often supported by pro-minority 
political institutions. In a pro-minority institutional setting, there might be 
strong representative bodies and the rule of law. Nevertheless, the poorer 
strata of society are excluded from political participation. Property 
qualification for voting and holding office exemplifies pro-minority political 
institutions. These institutions enable the rich to seize state government offices 
and wield its power to appropriate state resources and resist government 
policy. Pro-minority political institutions not only alienate the poor majority, 
but also harm the interests of the state. In this study, I attach more importance 
to office appropriation happened at the grassroots level, since what concerns 
me most is the interaction between the masses and the states. I view policy 
implementation by provincial officials as a control variable and select cases on 
it.  
In direct contrast to pro-minority institutions, pro-majority economic 
institutions limit property-based inequalities. For instance, the government 
may impose limits on the size of landholdings. The land reform carried out by 
the CCP in the early 1950 indicates the establishment of pro-majority 
institutions. With regard to the distribution of income, pro-majority economic 
institutions favor the interests of labor. Labor security system and the limit on 
rents imposed by the government are examples of pro-majority economic 
institutions. It is worth pointing out that pro-majority economic institutions 
promote fairness in the sense that reward reflects efforts, rather than 
egalitarianism.  
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In addition, pro-majority political institutions distribute political power 
widely. Elections with universal franchise are a kind of pro-majority political 
institution. Some undemocratic political institutions that increase social 
mobility by depriving the rich minority of privileges and empowering people 
from the poorer strata of society are also pro-majority. An example in point is 
the Peasant Association set up by the CCP in the early 1950s. The Peasant 
Association excluded the landlords and rich peasants from participation. 
Furthermore, the criteria according to which the bureaucrats or cadres are 
selected are also important. For instance, the CCP recruited numerous new 
cadres from the poorer strata of society, despite that the candidates lacked 
educational qualification, which significantly increased social mobility.
22
 
In the following chapter, I elaborate on the effects of different types of 
domestic institutions on mobilization. Generally speaking, pro-majority 
institutions facilitate state mobilization most effectively, and pro-state 
institutions tend to do a better job than pro-minority institutions. Domestic 
institutions are often hybrids of the three ideal types discussed above. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to make an overall characterization based on the 
dominant feature.  
1.3 Case Selection 
This research proceeds by ―small-N‖ case comparison. I select cases on 
independent and control variables. The four cases include Jiangxi during the 
New Life Movement (NLM) (1934-36), Sichuan during the Sino-Japanese 
War (1937-45), the lower Yangtze region during the Korean War (1950-53), 
and Sichuan during the Great Leap Forward (GLF) (November 1957-61). 
Table 1.2 lays out where these cases fit. If the explanation I propose is valid, 
we will see different outcomes of nationalist mobilization. Admittedly, the 
four cases do not cover all possible variations on the two independent 
variables. Yet, as demonstrated below, as a hybrid case, Sichuan during the 
                                           
22
 Between October 1949 and September 1952, about three million new cadres were recruited, 
57.7 per cent of which were worker-peasant ―activists‖.Gordon White, "The Postrevolutionary 
Chinese State," in State and Society in Contemporary China, ed. Victor Nee and David P. 
Mozingo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 31. 
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GLF provides more than one observation of the relationship between various 
domestic institutions and the outcome of mobilization. 
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This case selection allows me to control a set of variables. First, in all 
cases, state elites made the attempts to mobilize the masses through 
nationalism. In the NLM, state elites adopted nationalist argument to justify 
the mobilization. Government propaganda depicted the transformation of the 
Chinese people‘s daily habits and the improvement of hygienic standards as 
the prerequisite for national revival.
23
 During the Korean War, the 
Communist government used slogans, such as ―Planting one mu of cotton (is 
equivalent to) killing an American soldier‖, to encourage producers to work 
harder.
24
 The GLF was also justified with anti-imperialist rhetoric. People 
were told that the imperialists looked down on the Chinese people mainly 
because China produced insufficient quantities of grain, steel, and machinery. 
In Mao Zedong‘s words, ―Wait until we‘ve made thirty million tons of steel … 
then we shall be able to negotiate with the Americans with a bit more spirit.‖25 
Second, by conducting within-country comparison, it is possible for me to 
hold cultural traditions and the ethnic composition of a country as constant. 
This research design has advantages in answering the question: What explains 
the variation on the degree of success that different political elites achieve in 
mobilizing the masses through nationalism when they have equal access to 
cultural resources? 
The lower Yangtze region (incorporating Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai 
municipality) during the Korean War is the positive case of this study. On the 
one hand, the populace in the region perceived strong foreign threats. On the 
other hand, a series of pro-majority institutions were established after 1949. If 
my argument is valid, we will see the nationalist mobilization achieved 
success. To further test my argument, I invoke a negative case, Jiangxi during 
                                           
23
 Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937  
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974). 67. 
24
 Bureau of Civil Affairs of Jiading, "Jiading renmin kangmei yuanchao yundong jilue [A 
Brief Summary of Jiading People‘s Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign]," in Jiading 
jiefang chuqi de sehui gaizao [Social Transformation of the Newly Liberated Jiading)], ed. 
Linquan Jin (Beijing: Hanyu Dacidian Press, 2002), 45. 
25
 Stephen Lyon Endicott, Red Earth: Revolution in a Sichuan Village  (New York: New 
Amsterdam, 1988). 44. 
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the NLM. In this case, a strong foreign threat was absent, and domestic 
institutions were pro-minority. My framework expects the mobilization to fail.  
I suggest that the two cases exhibited important similarities in many 
aspects except for the independent variables I propose. As Julia Strauss 
contends, ―there was substantial continuity across the divide of 1949 as the 
young PRC managed to implement many of the state building projects first 
aspired to by the departed Kuomintang regime.‖ 26  In both cases, the 
mobilization was carried out in a top-down fashion. Although the CCP 
highlighted the mass-line, the masses were mobilized around the agenda set by 
state elites.  
Using province and region as the unit of analysis permits me to control for 
alternative explanations and maximize the similarities among the cases. The 
KMT regime was notorious for lacking the capacity to implement policies that 
the national leaders made. This was especially true for the NLM. In many 
places, the movement was an urban movement and lost touch with the 
enormous rural population. However, I demonstrate in Chapter 3 that this was 
not the case in Jiangxi, where the KMT government devoted tremendous 
resources and energy to the movement, and many concrete measures were 
taken to implement the mobilization at the grassroots level. Therefore, the lack 
of policy implementation does not sufficiently explain for the outcome of 
mobilization.  
Another factor that may discourage students of China from drawing a 
comparison between the KMT regime and the CCP regime is that the former 
faced strong challenges posed by various domestic contenders. The KMT 
regime in the 1930s and 1940s was far less consolidated than the CCP regime 
in the 1950s. Many provincial militarists were only under the nominal control 
of the central government. Again, using province as the unit of analysis 
permits me to control for this variable. In Chapter 3 and 4, I contend that the 
central government‘s rule in Jiangxi and Sichuan was effective. The NLM was 
                                           
26
 Julia C. Strauss, "Morality, Coercion and State Building by Campaign in the Early PRC: 
Regime Consolidation and After, 1949-1956," in The History of the People's Republic of 
China (1949-1976) (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 39. 
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carried out in Jiangxi under Chiang Kai-shek‘s close supervision. And no 
evidence shows that the implementation of the NLM in Jiangxi was disrupted 
by tensions between the central government and provincial militarists 
elsewhere. In the case of Sichuan, the central government gradually extended 
its authority to the province after 1935. After Liu Xiang—a prominent 
militarist in Sichuan—died in 1937, no provincial militarist could pose a 
severe challenge to the central government anymore.  
Furthermore, by contrasting nationalist mobilization carried out by the 
CCP and KMT regime, I am able to evaluate my explanation against the 
emotive nationalist argument. This line of argument often emphasizes the role 
played by cultural symbols in rousing people to participate in nationalist 
movements.
27
 The KMT regime did not hesitate to employ traditional cultural 
symbols, such as the four virtues—propriety (li), righteousness (yi), integrity 
(lian), and sense of shame (chi). Meanwhile, to mobilize the masses, the KMT 
government restored the old militarized tithing system—baojia, whose history 
can be traced to Song Dynasty. On the contrary, nationalism promoted by the 
Communist regime was more ―iconoclastic‖. Traditional culture, including 
Confucianism, was viewed as backward and labeled as feudal remnants, which 
were to be abandoned.
28
 According to the emotive nationalist argument, the 
NLM should have been more successful than the nationalist mobilization led 
by the CCP. However, the outcomes furnish the instrumentalist argument with 
a remarkable confirmation.  
Apart from these two ―polar‖ cases, I use another two cases—Sichuan 
during the Sino-Japanese War and Sichuan during the Great Leap 
Forward—to illustrate that domestic institutions and the public‘s perception of 
foreign threats are individually necessary for successful nationalist 
mobilization. In the absence of either, the costs of nationalist mobilization will 
rise, and nationalist mobilization would only achieve a qualified success.  
                                           
27
 See, for example, Connor, Ethnonationalism: 204-5. 
28
 Yingjie Guo, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National 
Identity under Reform  (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004). 22. 
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The case of the GLF was a host to a mix of various kinds of institutions. 
This hybrid case increases the number of observations and demonstrates the 
effects of different types of domestic institutions.
29
 I demonstrate that the 
rural sector of China experienced waves of institutional change in the 1950s. I 
contrast the pro-state institution—the people‘s commune—to other forms of 
collective institutions, and maintain that although collectivization started as 
early as 1952, institutions such as the mutual-aid team and the elementary and 
advanced cooperative favored the interests of the poorer peasants. Yet, 
institutions became pro-state after people‘s communes were established 
nationwide in late 1958. The people‘s commune tramped on the property 
rights not only of the rich peasants, but also the poor peasants. This 
before-and-after comparison enables me to test my hypothesis on domestic 
institutions. If the initial stage of mobilization was more successful than the 
second stage, my explanation is more likely to be valid.  
1.4 Nationalism in Present-Day China 
Although this study is a historical analysis, it has implications for 
policy-related studies. Popular nationalism in China has been on the rise since 
the early 1990s and has concerned many observers.
30
 Two factors further 
exacerbate people‘s concerns. First, China is a rising power in the 
international system. Historically, rising powers have always attempted to 
change international order in a way that advances their interests, which may 
lead to war.
31
 Second, China is also an authoritarian regime that faces the 
possibility of democratic transition and domestic unrests. Many scholars have 
                                           
29
 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry : Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). 220. 
30
 See, for instance, Yew Meng Lai, The Resurgence of Chinese Nationalism: Implications 
toward the Regional Security of East Asia, Kertas kadangkala (Kota Kinabalu: Centre for the 
Promotion of Knowledge and Language Learning, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, 2001); Richard 
Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China  (New York: A.A. Knopf : 
Random House, 1997). 4-5; Yinan He, The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and 
German-Polish Relations since World War II  (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and 
Diplomacy  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Yongnian Zheng, Discovering 
Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International relations, 
Cambridge Asia-Pacific studies (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
31
 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics  (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
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hypothesized that domestic unrests would motivate leaders to pursue conflict 
abroad.
32
 Hence, not surprisingly, some observers ask: ―Will China be another 
Germany?‖ 33  
Many scholars approach the above question through studying popular 
nationalism in present-day China and examining whether popular nationalism 
has led to assertiveness in China‘s foreign policy behavior. Some embrace a 
top-down model and maintain that the CCP plays an important role in 
whipping up popular nationalism. Nationalism is used by the CCP to fill the 
ideological vacuum that appears in the era of market economy, foster national 
unity, and divert the public‘s attention from domestic discontent.34 Scholars 
who adopt this line of argument often reach the conclusion that the Chinese 
government is able to control, even manipulate popular nationalism, and 
popular nationalism has not driven China into irrational actions.
35
 In contrast, 
others believe that nowadays, the CCP is losing its monopoly of the nationalist 
discourse,
36
 and that popular nationalism has taken on a life of its own.
37
 
Constrained by popular nationalism and its own nationalist discourse, the 
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 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," 
International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995); "Democratic Transitions, Institutional 
Strength, and War," International Organization 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002); Snyder, From Voting 
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Although these two views reach different conclusions, they have one thing 
in common: they both take popular nationalism for granted. The former 
proposition suggests that the Chinese government is able to stir up popular 
nationalism whenever popular nationalism serves its interests, whereas the 
later implies that popular nationalism may propel the government to pursue 
expansionist foreign policies. It is, however, worth doubting in the first place 
whether current popular nationalism is strong enough to sustain expensive 
expansionist war.  
As was argued above, it is imperative to distinguish nationalist sentiments 
from nationalist behavior. A nationalist population may propel the government 
to take an assertive position on a foreign policy issue. Nevertheless, it is 
entirely possible that nationalist sentiments will subside once the war turns out 
to be too costly. Instead of studying nationalist sentiments among the populace 
in present-day China, I carry out a historical analysis of mass nationalist 
movements in China. A historical analysis on pre-war and wartime nationalist 
mobilization enables us to better understand how individuals would make their 
choice under extreme conditions, and what affects their commitment to the 
nationalist cause.  
I do not intend to argue that China, as a rising power, does not have 
revisionist intentions. Instead, I suggest that the absence of a tangible foreign 
threat might inhibit the state‘s nationalist mobilization. True, many may posit 
that reckless leaders would accept the risk of conflict escalation, or even 
initiate a war to persuade the public to rally around the flag. Despite this, 
domestic institutions will also affect the efficiency of wartime mobilization, 
and thus determines the limit of the external expansion. In this way, this 
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research partially addresses the question of whether China will be another 
Germany (I will further elaborate on this in Chapter 7). 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
Chapter 2 provides greater detail with respect to existing accounts for 
nationalist movements and their limitations. After identifying the theoretical 
gap in existing literature, I lay out my theoretical framework, which has two 
components. One component explains how foreign threats and domestic 
institutions affect individuals‘ choice when they face state nationalist 
mobilization. The other shows how these two factors affect state mobilization.  
Chapter 3, 4, 5, and 6 are the case studies. I arrange the case studies 
chronologically: Jiangxi during the NLM (Chapter 3), Sichuan during the 
Sino-Japanese War (Chapter 4), the lower Yangtze region during the Korean 
War (Chapter 5), and Sichuan during the GLF (Chapter 6).The final chapter 
concludes this study. After summarizing the findings, I discuss how the 
findings of this study can be applied to other cases, including German before 
WWI, Spain at the late nineteenth century, and present-day China.  
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Chapter 2  Explaining State-Led Nationalist Movements: 
Individual Choice and State Mobilization 
In this chapter, I first discuss studies on nationalism and nationalist 
movements. Existing theories highlight the role played by elites and explore 
their rationality. Few attempts have been made to examine the rationality of 
the mass participants. Students of nationalism usually attribute mass 
participation in nationalist movements to emotions. In contrast, I argue that a 
mass-based instrumentalist explanation for nationalist movements is both 
necessary and possible. In the second section, I lay out my theoretical 
framework. After giving my assumptions on individual preferences, I propose 
an explanation for individual participation. I contend that two factors—foreign 
threats and domestic institutions—affect the choice that individuals make 
when they face nationalist mobilization by the state. Next, I develop an 
explanation for state mobilization and examine how the two factors affect state 
elites, their decision to mobilize the masses and the social resistance they face. 
I then bring the two components together and argue that state mobilization is 
most likely to succeed when the public perceives a strong and imminent 
foreign threat and when domestic institutions are pro-majority. The third 
section of this chapter examines competing accounts for mass participation in 
nationalist movements. 
2.1 Situating the Theory 
2.1.1 Rational Elites, Emotional Masses 
Focusing on elites as the most significant agents is a prevalent practice among 
students of nationalist movements.
39
 The standard stories found in existing 
literature emphasize that intellectuals or political elites play a pivotal role in 
delineating the idea of the nation.
40
 After independence is achieved, statesmen 
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appeal to nationalism to increase ethnic integration and accelerate 
nation-building.
41
 In the process of democratic transition, nationalism is also 
deployed by political entrepreneurs to bolster their legitimacy, propel 
themselves into political office and enable them to hang onto power.
42
  
Few would deny that a nationalist movement can only demonstrate its 
force when it acquires a mass following. Nevertheless, relatively few attempts 
have been made to explain why the masses participate in a nationalist 
movement. Many students of nationalism view the masses as passive actors, 
waiting to be awakened by the elites.
 
The masses are resources available to 
political elites: whether the former would be invited to a nationalist movement, 
to a large extent, depends on the strategic considerations of the latter. John 
Breuilly, for example, argues that the opposition appeals to cultural identity 
and seeks support from groups hitherto excluded from political participation, 
when the opposition is too weak to challenge the state.
43
  
Some scholars have noted the prevalent elitism in the study of nationalism 
and its pitfalls. Anthony Smith, for instance, doubts whether elites can make 
use of ethno-history in such an instrumental way depicted by many modernist 
theorists.
44
 Smith, a self-identified ethno-symbolist, emphasizes that elites are 
constrained by pre-existing mass culture. Nationalist intellectuals ―had to 
adhere to the cultural parameters of the traditions of the people, politicizing 
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their sense of ethnic community, and reinterpreting those traditions as deep 
cultural resources for a political struggle for national self-determination.‖45 
However, not all modernists ignore the constraints that mass culture 
imposes on elites.
46
 Tom Nairn, for instance, contends that:  
People is all they (the bourgeoisie) have got: this is the essence of the 
under-development dilemma itself. Consequently, the national or 
would-be national middle class is always compelled to ―turn to the 
people‖ … For what are the implications of turning to the people, in 
this sense? First of all, speaking their language … Secondly, taking a 
kindlier view of their general ―culture‖ … Thirdly—and most 
decisively … coming to terms with the enormous and still 
irreconcilable diversity of popular and peasant life.
47
 
Modernists emphasize that the spread of the idea of nation is only possible in 
the modern world. The argument that elites can create collective identities out 
of the air simply does not hold.  
What Smith fails to see is that there is striking inconsistency in the 
elite-centric accounts for nationalist movements. This line of argument makes 
different assumptions about the nationalist behavior of elites and ordinary 
people. On the one hand, it assumes that elites are rational actors who seek to 
advance their personal, material interests through nationalist mobilization. On 
the other hand, it overlooks the material interests of the mass participants in 
nationalist movements. For instance, although Nairn claims to ―decide upon a 
materialist rather than an ‗idealist‘ explanation‖ of nationalism, he believes 
that to mobilize the people, what the bourgeoisies need to do is to speak the 
language of the people and respect the latter‘s culture.48  
More importantly, empirical evidence seems to challenge the contention 
that elites are rational, while the mass participants are emotional. Peter Hanák, 
for instance, studies public opinion in the Habsburg Empire by investigating a 
large body of letters between soldiers and their families confiscated during the 
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First World War in Vienna and Budapest. Hanák finds that nationalist letters 




At the root of elitism is the belief that ordinary participants in nationalist 
movements lack a clear perception of their own interests. They are passionate 
and emotional. Their behavior is anything but a result of cost-and-benefit 
calculation. Consequently, they tend to be deceived by political entrepreneurs. 
It is not clear, however, why rationality disappears when the focus of the 
research shifts from the elites to the masses. Jack Levy, for instance, casts 
doubt on the diversionary war theory and asks: ―Why do elites give priority to 
their domestic political interests, whereas others (the mass public) give 
priority to the national interest and are so easily seduced by symbolic 
psychological scapegoating?‖ 50 
Neither modernists nor ethno-symbolists pay attention to the 
socioeconomic demands made by the masses. Indeed, as Smith points out, 
elites face constraints in mobilizing the masses, hence a mass-based analysis is 
imperative. However, the constraints the masses impose on elites are not just 
cultural or linguistic ones. People will not lend support to elites and participate 
in nationalist movements simply because elites show respect to their culture 
and tradition. Common culture, language, and ancestors might contribute to 
successful mobilization, but they do not constitute the sufficient conditions for 
successful nationalist mobilization.  
This study suggests that to understand how mass nationalist movements 
take place and develop, it is necessary to shift the focus of the study away 
from the elites to the mass participants. However, unlike Smith's proposition, 
the mass-based analysis I intend to undertake is not a cultural one. I maintain 
that whether the elite can meet the socioeconomic demands of the masses 
affects the outcome of mobilization. 
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What propels ordinary people to participate in nationalist movements? 
Existing theories provide two possible explanations. First, primordialists 





 In this account, there is no place for individual choice. 
Clifford Geertz for instance, maintains that:  
These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on are seen to 
have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of 
themselves … attachments seem to flow more from a sense of 




Primordialists argue that nationalist leaders arouse nationalism, ―not through 
appeals to reason but through appeals to the emotions.‖54 ―The nonrational 
core of nation has been reached and triggered through‖ national symbols, 
nationalist poetry, music and familial metaphors.
55
 Just like primordialists, 
ethno-symbolists also hold that ethno-history plays an important role in 
exciting people and rousing them to collective action.
56
 
The primordialist argument says little about the conditions under which 
mass nationalist movements emerge. If primordial attachments are deep and 
persistent, what accounts for the rise of collective action at certain points of 
time? Why are some political entrepreneurs more successful than others in 
mobilizing nationalist movements, even if they have equal access to cultural 
resources? These questions suggest that there are elements in nationalist 
movements that need to be explained from a different perspective.  
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The second explanation for mass participation is that nationalism is a 
secular substitution for religion. Like religion, nationalism not only provides 
ordinary people with a sense of immortality,
57
 but also lends them hope. Elie 
Kedourie, for example, contends that nationalism is a kind of ―secular 
millennialism.‖58 It is employed by elites in the new states to persuade the 
masses to make the necessary sacrifices in the process of modernization.
59
 
This argument is different from the primordialist argument in the sense that it 
does not reject rationality outright. As David Apter rightly points out, there is 
a distinction between political religion and church religion: the former 
promises material things, the latter intangible rewards. In this sense, political 
religion has ―built into it a particular kind of rationality as well—the 
rationality of economic life.‖60 Nationalism, as a ―secular millennialism‖, 
enable political entrepreneurs to persuade the masses to make short-term 
sacrifices in exchange for long-term gains.  
However, it is questionable how easy it is for political elites to exchange 
future rewards for present support. Empirical study shows that in the process 
of nationalist mobilization, political elites often encounter credibility problem. 
Samuel Popkin‘s study on the Vietnamese revolution shows that political 
entrepreneurs could not mobilize the peasants with nationalist rhetoric. Many 
Vietnamese peasants were more concerned about their own material 
conditions and considered the resistance war as the affair of the government 
and the army. To build up their credibility, the mobilizers had to provide 
peasants with immediate payoffs.
61
  
In agreement with Popkin, I further contend that political elites can solve 
the credibility problem by establishing distributional institutions that favor the 
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interests of the target groups of nationalist mobilization. This is because 
institutions are relatively durable.
62
 Institutions of today are likely to 
determine how benefits will be distributed tomorrow. Political elites can make 




Neither the primordialist nor the secular-religion argument explores the 
rationality of the participants in nationalist movements. Consequently, they 
tend to exaggerate the ease with which political entrepreneurs can mobilize 
mass nationalist movements. Political elites cannot mobilize the masses 
simply by appealing to common culture or through empty promises. 
Examining the rationality behind nationalist participation enables us to better 
understand the constraints facing political entrepreneurs.  
2.1.2 Is a Mass-Based Instrumentalist Explanation Possible? 
It is not clear why the instrumentalist approach, which has been adopted by so 
many scholars to explain the nationalist behavior of elites and proved to be so 
fruitful, cannot be applied to explain the nationalist behavior of the ordinary 
participants. Many theorists reject the instrumentalist explanation because of 
the passions people demonstrate in nationalist movements. Kecmanovic 
argues that ―rational choice theory cannot explain the passion with which 
individuals stick to nationalist views and beliefs.‖64 Smith maintains that ―the 
resort to the ethnic past, however tenuous, can inspire in ‗the people‘ a desire 
and will to self-sacrifice for co-nationals which few ideologies can match.‖65 
Connor quotes Chateaubriand who said that ―Men don‘t allow themselves to 
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be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their 
passions.‖66 He further contends that ―people do not voluntarily die for things 
that are rational.‖67 Paul Stern points out that rational choice theory cannot 
explain why people serve in a wartime army. 
68
  
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I suggest that we should not rush to 
a conclusion that a mass-based instrumentalist explanation is impossible. This 
line of argument lacks a careful assessment of the costs and benefits that 
nationalist behavior involves. Participation in nationalist movements does not 
always require sacrifice by way of death. Instead, participation can be 
conceived as a broader category. There are various forms of ―participation‖, 
and not all nationalist behavior involves high risks. Individuals can lend 
support to a nationalist cause by joining the army and fighting for the nation. 
They can also participate in nationalist movements by contributing labor, 
reducing consumption, paying more taxes, purchasing government bonds, and 
giving consent to other government policies.  
Furthermore, whether the choice made by an actor is rational, to a large 
extent, depends on what alternative choices the actor has. James Tong 
suggests that though the official sanctions were severe, people chose to be 
outlaws because the alternative was starvation.
69
 During the Sino-Japanese 
War, the mopping-up campaigns carried out by the Japanese in north China 
posed a constant and severe threat to the peasants and forced the latter to 
―conclude that their only hope lay in resistance, and the Communists were 
widely regarded as the most competent organizers of resistance.‖70  
Those who claim that nationalist behavior cannot be explained by material 
self-interests need to support their theory with an analysis of the costs and 
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benefits that nationalist participation involves, and demonstrate that 
individuals participate in nationalist movements even if expected costs exceed 
expected benefits. Indeed, nationalist participation might be risky. Yet, people 
are always engaged in risky occupations. Investing and taking up mortgages 
and other sorts of loans all incur risks. As Michael Hechter points out, 
risk-taking is not irrational.
71
 One cannot reject instrumentalist explanations 
for nationalism in general. Instead, more detailed knowledge about the 
contextual conditions is required.
72
 
2.1.3 Self-Interests and Group Interests 
Some students of nationalism have made the attempts to explain nationalist 
participation from a rational choice perspective.
73
 Russell Harding, for 
instance, attempts to answer the question why people participate in ethnic 
violent conflicts. He suggests that one ethnic group receives benefits from 
suppressing another ethnic group‘s interests, and that individuals‘ 
self-interests are matched with group interests.
74
  
Yet, it is not clear why participants would think they can benefit 
individually when their ethnic group gains at the expense of some other group. 
Even if there is congruence between self-interests and group interests, 
collective action would not necessarily result.
75
 To solve this problem, 
Harding appeals to norms and individual epistemological limitations.
76
 This 
explanation, however, compromises the goal of understanding collective 
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action ―with little more than the kinds of self-interest motivations‖, the 
objective that Harding sets for himself at the outset of his book.
77
  
Unlike Harding, I argue that individuals, as rational actors, care not only 
about whether nationalist movements would advance group interests, but also 
how the benefits that nationalist movements bring about are distributed within 
the nation. Domestic institutions that determine what rights and obligations 
individuals have are an important mechanism through which individual 
interests are connected to group interests.  
Moreover, institutions are not neutral. Frequently, they privilege certain 
social groups over others. This explains why some social groups are more 
willing to participate in state-led nationalist movements than others. For 
instance, in eighteenth century Britain, the middle class benefited from 
imperial expansion and thus were a vocal constituency for the imperial 
policy.
78
 In Germany before the WWI, the middle class was also the 
backbone of popular nationalist movement. In contrast, disadvantaged by 
domestic institutions, workers were aloof from nationalist movements and 
labeled as the ―enemies of the Reich.‖79 
There is another issue that the existing mass-based instrumentalist theories 
tend to ignore: the contradiction between the means of nationalist mobilization 
and the end of mobilization. The means of mobilization refers to the provision 
of selective incentives. In a group as large as a national state, collective action 
will not occur unless participants receive selective incentives from the 
mobilizers.
80
 However, the end of nationalist mobilization is to increase 
human and material resources under state control in a relatively short time 
period. The provision of selective incentives will constitute a drain on 
state-controlled material resources. Consequently, the state elites will be left 
with fewer resources to invest in their strategic plans.  
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Despite the tension between the end of nationalist mobilization and the 
means of mobilization, some state elites achieved success in nationalist 
mobilization. What accounts for such an outcome? I maintain that in the cases 
of successful nationalist mobilization, state elites are able to persuade the 
masses to make short-term sacrifices for long-term gains. Individuals care less 
about immediate economic payoffs when they seek state protection or when 
domestic institutions favor their interests.  
2.2 Explaining Mass Nationalist Movements 
2.2.1 Assumptions 
I assume that individuals act as if they are advancing material self-interests. I 
do not intend to reject the importance of emotions. I am aware that the 
assumption I make is a radical simplification of reality.
81
 Yet, the material 
self-interest assumption is a useful analytical tool. Given that many theorists 
have explored the emotional dimension of nationalist behavior, we might be 
able to learn more about mass nationalist movements if an alternative 
perspective is adopted. A theory built on the basis of this assumption may be 
able to explain phenomena that primordialism or ethno-symbolism cannot 
explain.  
Additionally, the assumption serves as a self-imposed limit. As many have 
pointed out, positive rationalism as an analytical approach is wide open in 
terms of substantive content.
82
 Rabushka and Shepsle, for example, assume 
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that individuals in plural societies have ethnic preferences.
83
 Yet, I maintain 
that attributing nationalist behavior to altruistic or ethnic preferences incurs 
the risk of reducing the theory to a tautology. Furthermore, ethnic preferences 
are not given by nature. For instance, in his study of Chinese revolution, 
Bianco suggests that during the Sino-Japanese war, Chinese peasants in many 
places actually knew little about the war. He presents a vivid example: in 1941, 
when townspeople of Luoyang, the capital of Henan province, fled the 
bombed city to the mountains, peasants were heading for the city temples to 
burn incense and pray for rain. Bianco writes that peasants did not know the 
invaders until they ―saw the Japanese soldiers‘ rifles on the horizon.‖ 84 In 
such a social context, the CCP, however, managed to mobilize a peasant 
nationalist movement.
85
 This suggests that ethnic identification and 
preferences are often an effect, rather than a cause, of successful nationalist 
mobilization.  
I do not intend to argue that material, self-interests are ―natural.‖86 On the 
contrary, self-regarding, material interests can be derived from social 
interaction. In many cases, it is the mobilization by elites that makes 
participants realize their own interests and thus enable participants to act 
together. Yet, I suggest that for state elites, it is much easier to wake up 
participants to their self-regarding material interests than make them develop 
altruistic preferences toward the group. For instance, the Communists might 
be able to stir up peasant hatreds toward the landlords and make peasants 
realize that they could benefit from land redistribution. It is, however, much 
more difficult for the Communists to persuade peasants to sacrifice their 
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personal interests for the sake of national interests. Even if individuals have 
ethnical preferences, political entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed when 
they are able to ensure that emotional needs and material interests of the 
participants are satisfied at the same time.  
2.2.2 Why Does Nationalism Matter? 
Before I proceed further, it is important to answer a question: if state elites can 
mobilize the masses simply by distributing selective incentives among citizens, 
why do they even bother carrying out nationalist indoctrination? Theories 
which attribute nationalist behavior to economic interests of individuals tend 
to nullify the effects of nationalism. I contend that nationalism acquires value 
for political entrepreneurs because it performs important functions: it serves as 
the focal point of mass nationalist movements. 
First, the idea of nation specifies criteria for membership and demarcates 
the enemy. As Sun-ki Chai suggests, within a large group, individuals have no 
acquaintance with one another. The costs of organizing will be prohibitively 
high unless there is a relatively simple set of criteria for group membership.
87
 
Politicizing ethnicity and using nation as the criteria for membership have 
advantages. Such criteria are simple. Participants can identify fellow nationals 
from their appearance and the language they speak.  
Second, using nation as the criteria allows a broad coalition to form. To 
pursue their strategic goals, state elites attempt to mobilize as much human 
and material resources as possible. A nation, in Connor‘s words, is ―the largest 
group that can command a person‘s loyalty ...‖88 Nationalist ideology enables 
state elites to command citizens‘ loyalty.  
Third, political elites expect nationalism to reduce the costs of 
mobilization. Nationalism encourages self-sacrifice and nurtures the spirit of 
altruism. It is possible that individuals align their preferences towards the 
nation and fellow nationals over time and become more willing to contribute 
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to nationalist movements even if they do not receive any material payoffs. As 
Russell Hardin contends, ―people who would not have put themselves at risk 
at early stages take great risks at later stages, when they are more subject to 
group commitments…‖89  
The above argument does not contradict the instrumentalist explanation 
that this study proposes. I do not rule out that the preferences of participants 
might change as nationalist movements proceed. Yet, I suggest that before we 
examine how identification propels individuals to run risks of personal harm 
for group benefits, we need to answer the question of from where 
identification originates. If cooperation in the past leads to the emergence of 




2.2.3 Explaining Participation: What Motivates Individuals to Participate?  
The theoretical framework I intend to propose has two components. The first 
component explores the micro-foundation of nationalist movements and 
explains why individuals would participate in nationalist movements. It 
specifies the effects of two explanatory variables—foreign threats and 
domestic institutions—on individual participants. The second component 
examines these two variables‘ effects on the state elites. I then bring the two 
components together. This section elaborates on the first component.  
Just as other forms of mass movements, mass nationalist movements 
involve collective action problems. Indeed, nationalism encourages 
individuals to make sacrifices for group interests. Yet, for collective action to 
take place in a group as large as a nation, the provision of positive and 
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negative incentives is necessary.
91
 Positive incentives include protection of 
physical security, immediate economic payoffs and future economic payoffs. 
Negative incentives refer to punishment imposed by the state.
 92
 
Protection Inspired by the fiscal contract model used by some scholars to 
explain tax compliance, I argue that individuals contribute to state-led 
nationalist movements because they expect the state to deliver services, such 
as protection and welfare services.
93
 The presence of a strong and imminent 
foreign threat creates the pressing demands for state protection among the 
populace.
94
 Individuals participate in nationalist movements and expected 
fewer rewards by way of immediate economic payoffs, provided that the state 
delivers effective protection. The more imminent is the foreign threat, the 
more patent its effects are.  
It is also worth emphasizing that if the state fails to deliver protection to 
citizens, individuals would not lend support to state-led nationalist 
movements.
95
 Conventional wisdom holds that state protection is a public 
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goods, rather than selective positive incentives. In fact, it is entirely possible 
that protection become selective incentives provided by the state. For instance, 
after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT government assisted 
private factory owners and skilled workers to migrate to the interior, and left 
the general population behind (See Chapter 4).
96
   
Immediate Economic Payoffs When their physical security is not under 
threat, individuals may also participate in nationalist movements. They, 
however, expect the state to provide some economic payoffs as a 
compensation for the contributions they make to the nationalist cause. 
Future Economic Payoffs Individuals who participate in nationalist 
movements can also be motivated by future economic payoffs. However, 
whether individuals would trade off short-term gains for long-term rewards 
depends on their relative position in domestic institutions.  
This is because domestic institutions determine how resources will be 
distributed within the nation in the future. Ordinary people, who have no 
capacity to reform existing institutions, are more likely to expect existing 
institutions to persist. They, therefore, assess their future payoffs on the basis 
of existing institutions. Those who are favored by the existing institutions are 
more likely to believe that they will benefit from a nationalist movement once 
it succeeds. For them, the promise of future payoffs from the state elites is 
more credible.
97
 As a consequence, these individuals are more inclined to 
make short-term sacrifices and to lend support to nationalist movements. On 
the contrary, those who are disadvantaged by existing institutions are less 
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At the aggregate level, the majority of the population is more willing to 
make short-term sacrifices when domestic institutions are pro-majority. In 
terms of social classes, all other things being equal, a middle class society 
tends to be more capable to handling mass mobilization than a society that 
suffers from high political and economic inequality. This is because the 
middle class is more likely to consider themselves as the stake-holders of the 
country and thus more susceptible to nationalist mobilization led by the state. 
In fact, a large middle class indicates the presence of pro-majority institutions. 
It is true that the upper classes also benefit from the existing system. 
Nevertheless, the upper classes are more capable of fleeing the country in the 
event of war.  
Factors motivating individuals to participate in nationalist movements 
affect the outcome of mobilization. If individuals contribute to nationalist 
movements in exchange for state protection and future economic payoffs, the 
state is able to accumulate resources. Nationalist mobilization is more likely to 
succeed. In contrast, if individuals expect immediate economic payoffs, the 
costs of mobilization will increase. The state is left with fewer resources that 
can be devoted to other strategic plans.  
Before I proceed further, it is important to point out that the incentive 
effects that foreign threats and pro-majority institutions exert on individuals 
tend to wear out over time. Successful nationalist mobilization enables the 
state to accumulate human and material materials in a relatively short time 
period. High-level mobilization usually does not last. On the one hand, the 
sustainability of mobilization is a function of the strength of foreign threats. 
The stronger is the threat, the longer mobilization will last.
99
 On the other 
hand, whether high-level mobilization can continue depends on whether state 
elites can carry on successive pro-majority political and economic reforms and 
provide more institutional incentives to the masses. Moreover, if mobilization 
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lasts for longer time, rational individuals would expect state elites to honor 
part of their promises, distributing some immediate economic payoffs. 
Pro-majority institutions enable state elites to suppress socioeconomic 
demands of the masses temporarily, but not forever.  
2.2.4 Explaining Mobilization 
The two explanatory variables not only exert effects on participants, but also 
the state elites and their mobilization. The perception of a strong foreign threat 
spurs the state elites to mobilize their nations.
100
 Nevertheless, countering 
foreign threats is not the only incentive for state elites to turn to the people. 
State elites may also mobilize the masses behind other strategic plans, such as 
speeding up industrialization.  
Domestic institutions determine the social resistance faced by state elites 
when they implement nationalist mobilization.
101
 Given that the ultimate 
objective of state-led mobilization is to increase human and material resources 
under state control, mobilization is often accompanied by an increase in state 
extraction.
102
 Nevertheless, we must distinguish short-term extractive policies 
from more durable extractive institutions.
103
 For instance, the state is likely to 
raise the agricultural tax in wartime. State elites can use the war as a 
justification for such extractive policies and encourage the populace to make 
short-term sacrifices. Pro-majority institutions, such as the private ownership 
and equal distribution of land, reassure the masses that extractive policies are 
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temporary. On the contrary, if state elites choose to nationalize the land, the 
peasants are more likely to think excessive extraction will last. The 
disincentive effects of pro-state institutions are much stronger than pro-state 
policies. Simply put, it would be easier for state elites to carry out 
mobilization and increase state extraction in pro-majority institutional settings 
than pro-state or pro-minority institutional settings.  
Compared with pro-state institutions, pro-minority institutions are even 
more inimical to state-led mobilization. Indeed, pro-state institutions may 
alienate the masses and harm producer enthusiasm. However, such 
institutional arrangements enhance the state‘s extractive capability. For 
instance, during the GLF, the people‘s commune guaranteed that state 
procurement took precedence in the distribution of harvest (Chapter 6). As a 
result, state tax revenues continued to increase even as agricultural production 
had started to fall. The state was able to accumulate resources through 
excessive extraction.  
Pro-minority institutions not only incur resistance from the masses, but 
also empower the social elites at the expense of the state. The privileged rich 
minority often wields its power to resist government policies that go against its 
personal interests and to appropriate state resources. Pro-minority institutions 
adversely affect both production and state accumulation.  
Unlike pro-state and pro-minority institutions, pro-majority institutions 
minimize the social resistance. State elites are able to convince the majority of 
the population that current hardship is temporary, and that participants will 
receive future economic payoffs once the nationalist cause succeeds. 
Meanwhile, the social elites are deprived of an autonomous source of power, 
and thus become less capable of resisting government policy. Additionally, the 
establishment of pro-majority institutions is often accompanied by the 
dispossession of the rich minority. For state elites, the dispossession of the rich 
minority generates ―revolutionary surplus‖, which can be used to accomplish 
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It is also worthwhile to consider the pre-existing social contexts. In a 
society suffered from significant political and economic inequality, even a 
moderate pro-majority institutional reform tends to generate great incentive 
effects. However, the paradox is that in such a society, a moderate 
pro-majority reform is more likely to fail, since the rich and powerful social 
elites are more capable of wielding their power to resist pro-majority 
institutional reform. Jiangxi during the New Life Movement is a case in point. 
The KMT government adopted many policies that favored the interests of the 
peasantry. Yet, such policies lost touch with the peasantry due to the resistance 
of the landlords. To ensure the success of mobilization, state elites often find 
that they are forced to pursue a more radical line of reform and destroy the 
power base of the rich minority thoroughly. For instance, the land reform 
carried out by the CCP radicalized during the Korean War.  
2.2.5 Bringing the Two Components Together 
Successful mobilization is most likely to happen when the public perceives a 
strong and imminent foreign threat and when domestic institutions are 
pro-majority. If one condition is absent, nationalist mobilization is likely to 
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achieve a limited success. In the absence of both, nationalist mobilization is 
likely to end up with a complete failure (see Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1 The Public's Threat Perception, Domestic Institutions, and the 







Strong Mobilization Succeeds Limited Success 
Weak Limited Success Mobilization Fails 
 
Strong Threat Perceptions, Pro-Majority Institutions, and Successful 
Mobilization When the public perceives a strong foreign threat, its demand for 
state protection rises. In search of state protection, individuals become more 
willing to give their consent to the government and participate in state-led 
nationalist movements. They ask for fewer immediate economic payoffs, as 
long as participation can guarantee their physical security. Their participation 
leads to the enhancement of state control over human resources. The state 
elites can project the foreign enemy as the root cause of current hardship and 
suppress people‘s welfare demands. 
Pro-majority institutions also facilitate mobilization. Favored by domestic 
institutions, the majority of the population is more likely to believe that they 
will receive rewards once the nationalist movement succeeds. Although state 
extraction increases under mobilization, people deem current hardship 
temporary. In addition, in a pro-majority institutional setting, social elites 
(such as the landlords) are less capable of resisting government policy and 
appropriating state resources. In sum, when the public perceives a strong 
foreign threat and domestic institutions are pro-majority, the immediate costs 
of mobilization are reduced, and nationalist mobilization is most likely to 
succeed.  
Strong Threat Perceptions, Pro-Minority/Pro-State Institutions, and the 
Limited Success of Mobilization Unlike the previous case, though the 
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perception of foreign threats lowers the immediate costs of the mobilization, 
pro-minority/pro-state institutions make mobilization costly. Disadvantaged 
by domestic institutions, people are less likely to find the promise of future 
economic payoffs by the state elites credible. Under the pro-state institutional 
settings, people are likely to think that excessive state extraction will last. Just 
as pro-state institutions, pro-minority institutions alienate the majority of the 
population. In addition, pro-minority institutions empower a few social elites 
at the expense of the state. The social elites wield their power to appropriate 
state resources and resist government policies that go against their interests. 
The immediate costs of nationalist mobilization rise. As a result, nationalist 
mobilization is more likely to end up with a limited success.  
Weak Threat Perceptions, Pro-Majority Institutions, and the Limited 
Success of Mobilization In the absence of a strong foreign threat, state elites 
may also mobilize the masses to accomplish other strategic goals. However, 
there is no pressing demand for state protection among the people. As a 
consequence, individuals would expect the nationalist cause to bring about 
some economic payoffs. Due to the pro-majority institutions, state elites are 
more capable of mobilizing the masses by promising them future economic 
payoffs. Moreover, pro-majority institutions also weaken the power base of 
social elites. Under these conditions, nationalist mobilization is likely to 
achieve a limited success.  
Weak Threat Perceptions, Pro-Minority/Pro-State Institutions, and Failed 
Mobilization In the absence of a strong foreign threat and pro-majority 
institutions, people would only participate in nationalist movements when they 
receive immediate economic payoffs. In pro-minority institutional settings, 
social elites wield their power to resist state policy that harms their interests 
and appropriate resources that the state devotes to nationalist movements. For 
state elites, the costs of nationalist mobilization would be prohibitively high. 
Nationalist mobilization is most likely to fail. The table below summarizes the 
effects of two explanatory variables (see Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.2 Independent Variables and Their Effects 
 Effects on Individuals Effects on the State 




Perceiving a strong foreign threat, 
individuals participate in nationalist 
movements in search of state 
protection. 
In the absence of a strong foreign 
threat, individuals would require 
the state to provide immediate 
economic payoffs.  
Perceiving a strong foreign threat, 
state elites turn to the masses and 
carry out nationalist mobilization.  
In the absence of a strong foreign 
threat, state elites may mobilize the 
masses behind other strategic plans. 
The public‘s threat perception lowers 
the immediate costs of mobilization 
and facilitates state mobilization.  
In the absence of a strong foreign 
threat, the immediate costs of 
mobilization rise.  
Domestic 
Institutions 
Pro-majority institutions encourage 
the masses to make short-term 
sacrifices in exchange for future 
economic payoffs. 
Pro-minority/pro-state institutions 
alienate the masses. The masses 
would require more immediate 
economic payoffs. 
Pro-majority institutions reduce 
resistance from the masses, weaken 
the power base of the social elites, 
and thus facilitate mobilization. 
Pro-state institutions alienated the 
masses and harm producer 
enthusiasm.   
Pro-minority institutions incur  
resistance from the majority and 
empower social elites at the 
expense of the state 
Pro-majority institutions lower the 
immediate costs of mobilization and 
facilitate state mobilization. 
Pro-minority/pro-state institutions 
raise the immediate costs of 
mobilization and impede state 
mobilization.  
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2.3 Alternative Explanations 
As was demonstrated above, this research contributes to the debate on what 
motivates nationalist behavior, material self-interests or emotions.
105
 I do not 
deny that emotive nationalism of the masses facilitates state mobilization. 
Rather, I suggest that existing theories overlook the rationality of the mass 
participants in nationalist movement, and thus tend to underestimate the 
problems that state elites encounter in mobilizing the masses. In this section, I 
examine two major alternative explanations for nationalist participation, both 
of which are built on the emotive nationalism assumption. One highlights the 
role of cultural symbols in rousing people to participate in nationalist 
movements; the other attaches more importance to ethnic animosities. In the 
following chapters, I will engage case specific arguments made by different 
historians and China experts.  
2.3.1 Cultural Symbols 
For ethno-symbolists, national symbols or other cultural factors rouse people 
to collective action.
106
 The ethno-symbolist thesis are vague in the sense that 
it does not specify what kind of cultural symbols lead to successful 
mobilization. On the one hand, to mobilize the entire society, state elites have 
to deploy cultural symbols that are attractive to the broadest possible 
constituency. Such symbols are most likely to be drawn from the high culture 
of a nation. On the other hand, there is a chasm between the high/national 
culture and the low/ local culture. It is worth asking why a person who has 
never experienced the high culture would find these symbols adopted by state 
elites appealing. Gellner suggests that as industrialization progresses, wild 
cultures would be replaced by a high culture.
107
 For Benedict Anderson, 
nations, as imagined communities, became possible because of ―print 
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capitalism‖.108 Although these theories offer accounts for the emergence of 
nationalism and nationalist movements, a series of questions remain 
unanswered. For instance, why would mass nationalist movements take place 
in pre-industrial societies? Why would illiterate peasants imagine themselves 
as members of a nation and lend support to the nationalist cause? 
Ethno-symbolism does not answer these questions.  
One falsifiable hypothesis derived from this proposition is that individuals 
are more likely to participate in nationalist movements when the ideology 
espoused by the mobilizers contains more indigenous elements and fewer 
foreign elements. If the ethno-symbolist arguments are valid, nationalist 
mobilization would succeed when the mobilizers appeal to traditional cultural 
resources. One way to test the instrumentalist explanation against the 
ethno-symbolist explanation is to focus on a mass nationalist movement, 
within which different nationalist ideologies compete with one another. The 
ethno-symbolist argument would be strengthened if political elites who appeal 
to national symbols win out. In contrast, if political elites who are able to 
distribute material incentives among participants gain more support, even if 
the ideology they espouse contains more foreign elements, I will have more 
confidence in my argument.  
2.3.2 Ethnic Animosities 
Different from the ethno-symbolist argument, primordialists attach more 
importance to the dictates of blood or the role of kinship ties in causing 
collective action. Many scholars employ primordialist arguments to explain 
ethnic violence in ethnically plural societies.
109
 Collective violence is 
attributed to ethnic animosities, which have lasted for centuries and will not 
easily disappear in the future. Ancient animosities supersede rational calculus. 
When it comes to war or conflicts between national states, primordialists 
would predict that the greater the number of atrocities committed by foreign 
troops against the nationals of a country, the greater the level of animosity 
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there would be. Consequently, resistance by a country against the foreign 
troops will last longer. Moreover, for primordialists, the animosities between 
the two nations will not disappear even after the war ends and will continue to 
sour bilateral relations between the two countries.  
If primordialist accounts are correct, we would see that more ordinary 
people participate in nationalist mobilization when foreign attacks lead to high 
civilian casualties. Foreign invaders who committed atrocities at the initial 
stage of the war will find it difficult to consolidate their occupation. This is 
because previous atrocities generate hatred among the population and such 
hatred will perpetuate and keep motivating people to join nationalist resistance. 
Resistance will persist even if invaders give up the initial heavy-handed 
policies and begin to pursue a mild occupational policy. In contrast, if people 
refrained from participating in nationalist movements and choose to 
collaborate with foreign occupiers as soon as the latter stop threatening the 
former‘s physical security, primordialist explanations will be weakened.  
Unlike the primordialist explanations, although my explanation also 
emphasizes the role that foreign threat played in facilitating nationalist 
mobilization. I contend that individuals participate in nationalist movements to 
maximize the likelihood of survival. Participation is contingent upon not only 
whether the threat perception persists, but also upon whether the mobilizers 
are able to deliver effective protection. I will have more confidence in my 
explanation if nationalist participation reduces when the mobilizers fail to 
provide participants with effective protection.  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid out my theoretical framework and also situated this 
research in relevant theoretical debates. I emphasize the necessity of a 
mass-based instrumental explanation for state-led nationalist movement. I 
assume that individuals participate in state-led nationalist movements to 
advance material interests. On this ground, I argue that nationalist 
mobilization by the state is more likely to succeed when the public perceives a 
strong and imminent foreign threat and when domestic institutions are 
    
52 
 
pro-majority. Both conditions encourage individuals to make short-term 
sacrifices for long-term advantages. Moreover, pro-majority institutions 
prevent social elites from gaining an autonomous source of power, and thus 
facilitate the implementation of government policy. As a consequence, the 
state is able to accumulate human and material resources, so that state elites 
can invest in their strategic plans. The following chapters present an in-depth 
analysis of four nationalist movements that happened in Chinese history. I 
arrange the case studies in chronological order: Jiangxi during the New Life 
Movement (Chapter 3), Sichuan during the Sino-Japanese War (Chapter 4), 
the lower Yangtze region during the Korean War (Chapter 5), and Sichuan 
during the Great Leap Forward (Chapter 6).  
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Chapter 3  The New Life Movement in Jiangxi: Weak Threat 
Perceptions, Pro-Minority Institutions, and the Limits of Nationalism 
The study of nationalism has been heavily influenced by its close association 
with violent protests and destructive warfare. Students of nationalist 
movements ask why popular nationalism prevails and how popular 
nationalism propels state elites to pursue an aggressive foreign policy.
110
 They, 
however, tend to overlook the negative cases of nationalist mobilization, and 
seldom ask why in these cases state elites fail to rouse the masses to nationalist 
participation. This chapter attempts to explore the limits of nationalism by 
examining such a case—the New Life Movement (NLM). The NLM was 
launched by Chiang Kai-shek in Nanchang—the capital city of Jiangxi—on 19 
February 1934, and expanded to other provinces in the following months. 
Although the movement officially lasted from 1934 to 1949, it was most 




Conventional wisdom deems the NLM as a movement aiming at 
improving the Chinese people‘s daily habits and standards of hygiene. The 
movement has rarely been studied as a nationalist movement probably because 
people usually view nationalism as a mysterious force that guarantees the 
success of mobilization and brings about mass participation. Yet, the NLM 
failed miserably. 
Nevertheless, I maintain that the NLM was an effort at nationalist 
mobilization for two reasons. First, the KMT government adopted nationalist 
arguments to justify the movement. Second, the ultimate goal of the 
mobilization was to increase the material resources under state control and 
enhance state control over citizens. A study on the NLM was important for 
understanding nationalism, especially its limits. I demonstrate in this chapter 
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that the absence of a strong and imminent foreign threat and the presence of 
pro-minority domestic institutions impede nationalist mobilization.  
Additionally, common wisdom emphasizes that state elites capitalize on 
international tensions to accelerate domestic mobilization. Frequently, state 
elites discipline domestic society by alleging that domestic contenders are in 
league with foreign enemies.
112
 The case of NLM, however, suggests that 
situations faced by state elites can be more complicated than conventional 
wisdom dictates. Nationalist mobilization at home may provoke foreign 
enemies to take preventive measures. International conflicts in turn would 
weaken the state and divert resources from the state‘s strategic plans. However, 
if state elites back down and take a more conciliatory stance toward the 
foreign enemy, they jeopardize their domestic legitimacy and risk being outbid 
by their domestic contenders in nationalist mobilization. The KMT faced a 
similar dilemma in the early 1930s.  
The first section of this chapter explores the rationale of the NLM and 
addresses the question of whether the NLM is a nationalist movement. The 
second section assesses the movement‘s outcome. It demonstrates that the 
NLM did not lead to a significant increase in production and state 
accumulation of resources. Instead, it constituted an economic drain on the 
state. Subsequently, I lay out my own explanation. I contend that in 1934, 
people living in Jiangxi did not perceive a strong foreign threat. To facilitate 
the mobilization, state elites should have provided participants with economic 
payoffs and other forms of welfare services. However, the NLM was 
completely divorced from the public‘s real needs, and hence lost its mass 
appeal. In addition, the restoration of pro-minority institutions further hurt 
peasant initiative and empowered the landlords at the expense of the state. The 
fifth section examines existing accounts for the failure of the NLM and their 
limitations.  
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3.1 Is the New Life Movement a Nationalist Movement? 
3.1.1 The Rationale of the New Life Movement: From Daily Habits to 
National Revival  
The NLM has long been approached as a joke due to its absurd emphasis on 
standards of hygiene and daily habits of the Chinese,
113
 which was probably 
best manifested by the ninety-six rules of conduct prescribed by the New Life 
authority. A few examples of the rules of conduct included: ―Keep your 
clothes clean‖, ―Button your clothes neatly‖, ―Clean your face‖, and ―Clean 
your hands‖.114 In retrospect, such requirements can hardly be related to 
national revival. Some measures the government took in the process of 
implementing the NLM might also appear to be foolish to observers of today. 
Nevertheless, these measures make more sense if we understand the rationale 
behind the NLM.  
When the movement was launched in 1934, its initiators subscribed 
wholeheartedly to the idea that the transformation of the Chinese people‘s 
daily habits was the prerequisite for national revival. As Lloyd Eastman notes, 
Chiang had no illusions that the rules of conduct were ends in themselves.
115
 
He sincerely believed that Chinese people could become loyal soldiers and 
productive workers and peasants only after they were able to live a clean and 
disciplined daily life.
116
 ―(H)ygienic reform, far from being a superficial 
concern, was an integral part of a comprehensive political outlook.‖117  
The rationale of the NLM was expressed explicitly by Chiang Kai-shek in 
his speech delivered at the inaugural ceremony of the movement. In the speech, 
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Chiang blamed the people for the humiliation that China suffered at the hands 
of foreign powers, asserting:  
If we want to reform society and revive the state and the nation, (we) 
cannot achieve success by relying on military power…Germany does 
not retain a strong military capability. In contrast, our army is tens of 
times more than German army. We have navy and air force. 
Germany only has a population of 60 million, while our population is 
400 million … But they (the German people) achieved armament 
equality when they requested armament equality. They have war 
reparations canceled when they wanted to do so … China has 
military capabilities. It, however, cannot achieve equality (with other 
nations). Why is it so? There is no other reason than that our citizens 




For Chiang, improvement of the Chinese people‘s ―knowledge and morality‖ 
was the prerequisite for national renaissance.  
How could the ―knowledge and morality‖ of the Chinese be improved? 
Inspired by Wang Yangming‘s theory of the unity of action and knowledge,119 
Chiang believed it was imperative to start from action ―on the mundane, 
personal level‖ and proceed to the more complicated issues subsequently.120 
In a speech delivered in March 1934, Chiang stated:  
Now we promote the New Life. The purpose is to make them (the 
Chinese) start from the simplest, the most superficial and nuanced 
aspects (of life), since only (by grasping) these three essentials we 
can make everybody disciplined … Start from the daily lives, and 
reach the ―level of nation-wide mobilization‖ step by step …121 
For the New Life leaders, forming good daily habits was as important as 
military training. In his inaugural speech, Chiang cited the Japanese as an 
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example. He insisted that the Japanese lived a militarized life, which was 
exemplified by the fact that Japanese people used cold water to wash their 
faces and had cold meals every day. Chiang said:  
In wartime, if you cannot wash your face until the water is boiled and 
eat until the food is heated, you would have been besieged by the 
enemy … What is the New Life Movement that we are promoting 
now? Simply put, it is to thoroughly militarize the life of the citizens! 
Make brevity, promptness, assiduity, and discipline become habits 




Likewise, the NLM Central Promotion Association clearly stated that making 
life orderly and clean was only the goal set for the initial stage of the 
movement. For the second stage, the movement should realize three 
transformations of life: militarization (junshi hua), productivization 
(shengchan hua), and culturalization (yishu hua).
123
 
Both productivization and militarization directly related to state control 
over human and material resources. By establishing the productive mode of 
life, the New Life leaders expected the people to produce more and reduce 
their consumption, especially the consumption of imported products. The New 
Life leaders believed that the productivization of life would lay the foundation 
for the national economy.
124
 By establishing the militarized mode of life, the 
New Life leaders hoped that the Chinese people would become more 
disciplined and capable to respond to orders from the state in wartime. In a 
word, the leaders intended to transform citizens to efficient producers and 
loyal soldiers through the NLM.  
The NLM was a nationalist movement not only because the state elites 
adopted nationalist arguments, such as ―national revival‖, to encourage public 
participation and justify their call for self-sacrifice by citizens, but also because 
the movement‘s ultimate objectives were to promote production, increase state 
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accumulation, and enhance state control over citizens. The rest of this section 
examines how the NLM was carried out in Jiangxi. 
3.1.2 Cleaning up Cities  
The Jiangxi provincial government devoted considerable resources and efforts 
to implement the NLM. All channels of mass media were employed to 
propagate the movement, including radio broadcasts, speeches to large crowds, 
newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, slogans, movies, and advertisement.
125
 
On 28 February, only nine days after the NLM was inaugurated, the Nanchang 
municipal government organized a large-scale lantern parade. People were 
required by the government to go into the streets in the evening with lanterns. 
The New Life rules were written on the slides of lanterns in order to 




To put the New Life spirit into practice, the Inspection Corps (jiancha dui) 
regularly inspected restaurants, tea houses, and public bath houses in 
Nanchang to make sure that public places met the hygienic standards set by 
the government.
127
 The authority also encouraged people to curtail 
improvident spending and devote resources to productive activities. Smoking 
was discouraged. Women were requested not to perm their hair or use perfume. 
To encourage the public to have frugal meals, the New Life authority limited 
the number of dishes that could be ordered in restaurants and forbade 
restaurants to sell alcohol. Mass weddings were strongly recommended. In 
some places, governments even enacted law to determine the acceptable ways 
of gift-giving and celebrating birthdays.
128
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3.1.3 Rehabilitating the Rural Areas 
In other parts of China, the NLM might be confined to the urban areas and lost 
touch with the countryside. However, this was not the case in Jiangxi. In 
Jiangxi, the KMT government took many concrete measures to achieve the 
productivization and militarization of the rural life. Jiangxi was supposed to 
become ―the surest guide‖ to what China would be in the future.129 To protect 
peasant initiative and promote agricultural production, the government not 
only imposed limitation on rents, but also prohibited the landlords from 
evicting tenants.
130
 Additionally, as a first step towards the equalization of 
land rights, cooperatives were founded under government instruction. The 
cooperative was to act as the broker among landlords, tenants, and government 
and to ensure that rents were kept at a reasonable level. Moreover, the 
cooperative also enjoyed the first rights to purchase lands from the market, so 




Another important measure of the mobilization was the revival of baojia 
system—a militarized tithing system. In Qing dynasty, the baojia system was 
a community-based system of law enforcement, shouldering the collective 
responsibility for the apprehension of criminals. The KMT expected the baojia 
system to perform more functions. Baojia units became the basic units of local 
governance, militia formation, and mass elementary schools.
132
  
The baojia system adhered to a decimal organizational principle: ten 
families were organized as a jia, and ten jia as a bao. Above the level of bao, 
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it was a federated bao (lian bao). The baojia system laid down the 
organizational basis for the implementation of all government policies. For 
instance, bao heads were given the responsibilities for tax collection, 
conscription, intermediation, and arbitration.
133
 Though baojia units were 
self-financed organizations that collected operational funds from the 
households, they received funds from the government to develop education 
and build infrastructure within their jurisdiction. As a consequence, bao heads 
gained the opportunity to appropriate government money.  
As an effort at militarizing society, the government required all 
able-bodied men between 18-45 years of age to join baojia militia units.
134
 
Baojia militia units not only pledged to defend their own villages against the 
―communist bandits‖, but also served as a pool of manpower from which 
recruits could be drawn in wartime.
135
 The Special Movement Corps 
composed of the Blue Shirts members (I will elaborate on the Blue Shirts and 
the Special Movement Corps below) arrived in Jiangxi in 1933, and started to 
offer military training to militiamen and distribute weapons, including guns 
and spears to each village.
136
  
The KMT leaders knew that constructing new organization units alone was 
not enough to guarantee the success of mobilization. Equally important was to 
win people‘s hearts and minds. It was reported that by March 1934, the 
Communists had established 3,199 Lenin Elementary Schools in Jiangxi, 
Fujian, Guangdong, and Hunan, with about 100,000 students enrolled. In 
Jiangxi alone, 120,000 people joined the literacy groups organized by the 
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 Agitated by the development of the communist education system, 
Chiang sent a telegram to the Jiangxi provincial government emphasizing that 
education must be given a high priority in the recovered areas. In the telegram, 
Chiang said:  
Despite the (social) disorder and the exhaustion of financial resources 
in the red areas, (the Communists) still managed to establish schools. 
The KMT army has recovered the areas now. If we do not make 
efforts to educate people, or only set up one school at the county 
level, we would be dwarfed by the (communist) bandits ... 
138
 
Under Chiang‘s instruction, the Jiangxi provincial government set up a 
Special Education Office, which was responsible for the establishment of the 
Sun Yat-sen schools and the training of teachers. In 1934, 245 Sun Yat-sen 
schools were established in Jiangxi. The number of enrolled students reached 
32,907.
139
 Meanwhile, each bao was required to establish a bao school to 
complement the Sun Yat-sen schools.  
The New Life authority did not hesitate to appeal to nationalism as well as 
traditional cultural symbols to solicit support from the population. The courses 
offered by the Sun Yat-sen schools not only taught students the Three 
Principles of the People (san min zhu yi), but also Confucian virtues and 
lessons on the humiliations suffered by China at the hands of foreign 
powers.
140
 Through these two education systems, the Special Education 
System and the bao school system, the KMT ―planned to build the foundation 
of a loyal and well educated citizenry in the backward villages of Jiangxi.‖141  
In summary, the NLM in Jiangxi was not merely a hygienic campaign. It is 
an effort at mobilizing the masses through nationalism. However, the 
movement ended up with a failure. I demonstrate below that it neither 
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enhanced the state‘s control over the people nor led to an increase in state 
accumulation of material resources. Instead, the mobilization itself constituted 
a drain on state-controlled resources.  
3.2 Assessing the Outcome of New Life Mobilization 
As Samuel Chu says, the NLM was ―unique because nothing comparable to its 
size, its organization and its methods had ever been seen in China.‖142 What 
the movement lacked was neither the support from the top leaders nor 
effective policy implementation by local officials. Nevertheless, it failed to 
overcome the public alienation from the government and did not increase the 
accumulation of resources by the state.  
At its initial stage, the movement witnessed a rapid expansion in the 
number of promotion associations. By the end of 1936, there were twenty-one 
provincial associations, most of which were established in the first year of the 
movement. Moreover, the number of county associations reached 1,355, and 
railway associations fourteen.
143
 The establishment of promotion associations, 
however, was imposed from above and did not result from the spontaneity of 
the populace. The organizational expansion, looking good on paper, concealed 
the sparseness of actual achievements. As was argued in the Chapter 1, 
numbers of state-sponsored organizations and their membership are not good 
indicators of the outcome of state-led mobilization. Instead, to measure the 
outcome of state-led mobilization, we examine whether the mobilization leads 
to an increase in production and state accumulation of resources.  
Agricultural Production Historically, Jiangxi was an agricultural province 
that exported grains to other provinces. Table 3.1 lists the rice yield of Jiangxi 
from 1923 to 1937. It can be seen that the rehabilitation program initiated by 
the KMT government did not lead to a significant increase in agricultural 
production. Only in 1936 did the yield of rice marginally exceed its level in 
1933, when the devastating anti-Communist campaigns were still in 
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 Nevertheless, the 1936 rice yield was still far below its pre-war 
levels. It is also worth noting that the increase of rice production between 1934 
and 1936 was actually achieved on a low basis. In 1934, Jiangxi suffered from 
a severe drought that it had not encountered for seven decades.  
Furthermore, the mobilization did not promote producer enthusiasm, 
which was reflected by the increase in uncultivated land. By early 1935, just 
after the end of the military campaign against the Communists, about a third of 
the land throughout the Soviet areas lay idle.
145
 Yet, by 1937, the proportion 
of uncultivated land had increased to 59.27 percent.
146
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Table 3.1 Yield of Rice (Unhusked) in Jiangxi, 1923-37 
(Unit:1,000 dan ) 
Year 1923 1924 1925 1926 1931 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Yield 171,761 169,145 169,442 169,324 93,560 111,369 92,064 97,399 119,836 
Source: For figures for 1923-1931, see Statistics Office of Jiangxi Provincial Government 
Secretariat, ed., Jiangxi zhi migu [Jiangxi's Rice and Wheat], 1938, 16, held by China 
National Microfilming Center for Library Resources (hereafter, CNMCLR). For figures for 
1933-1937, see Commission of Re-Constructions of Jiangxi Provincial Government, ed., 
Jiangxi gu mi gaikuang [General Situations of Jiangxi’s Grain and Rice Yield], 1938, 1. 
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State Accumulation Successful mobilization increases state accumulation 
in a relatively short period, so the state acquires resources to accomplish its 
strategic goals, such as military build-up. However, this was not what the 
NLM brought to the government. Instead, the mobilization itself constituted a 
heavy drain on the central government's fiscal resources. Table 3.2 shows that 
Jiangxi continued to be a highly subsidized province, and very limited fiscal 
resources were transferred from the provincial government to the central 
government. The tax revenues levied by the central government from Jiangxi 
province even declined from 6,247,412 yuan in 1934 to 2,523,618 yuan in 
1935, and 4,610,095 yuan in 1936. For the provincial government, although it 
received substantial grants from the central government, it struggled to 
maintain the balance between income and expenditure (see Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.2 Central Government Subsidies and "Assistance Fee" in 
Comparison 
(Unit: yuan) 
Item 1934 1935 1936 
Central Government 
Subsidies 
8,678,045 6,926,526 5,750,549 
Assistance Fee 6,247,412 2,523,618 4,610,095 
Source: Commission of Finance of Jiangxi Provincial Government, ed., 
Jiangxisheng caizheng tongji tubiao [Statistical Charters of Jiangxi Finance], 
1939, held by Jiangxi Provincial Library, 27, 28.  
Note:  "Assistance fee" is listed as an item of local governments' expenditure. 
It is tax revenues collected by local governments on behalf of the central 
government and would be transferred to the central government.  
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Table 3.3 Revenue, Expenditure, and Surplus of Jiangxi Provincial Government, 1932-36 
(Unit: yuan) 
Year 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Revenue 14,962,183 18,663,408 23,823,430 21,782,178 30,400,985 
Expenditure 14,844,724 18,107,474 23,794,902 21,666,531 30,015,451 
Local Government 
Surplus 
117,459 555,934 28,528 115,647 385,534 
Source: For figures for 1932 and 1933, see Statistical Charters of Jiangxi Finance, 1939; For 
figures for 1934-1936 see Commission of Finance of Jiangxi Provincial Government, ed., 
Report on Jiangxi Finance, 1939, 31.
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Table 3.4 sets out the major components of the revenue of Jiangxi 
provincial government. From 1932 to 1936, the subsidies that Jiangxi 
provincial government received from the central government amounted to 
34,427,353 yuan, exceeding the land tax revenue and becoming the most 
important source of local government revenue. The land tax revenue increased 
steadily between 1933 and 1936. The increase, however, can hardly be 
attributed to successful nationalist mobilization. As was demonstrated above, 
there was no significant increase in agricultural output. Instead, two factors 
explain the increase in the land tax revenue.  
First, before the CCP was expulsed from Jiangxi, it was difficult for the 
KMT government to levy taxes in the Communist-controlled areas. In the fall 
of 1933, of the eighty-one counties of Jiangxi, the Communists completely 
dominated nineteen counties, semi-occupied six, and were active in thirty-one 
counties.
147
 The CCP began to levy taxes in the Soviet areas from 1929.
148
 In 
1932, the Commission of Civil Affairs of the KMT government conducted a 
survey on land area. Yet, the survey could only be carried out in sixty-three 
counties due to the presence of the ―communist bandits‖. Eighteen counties 
were left out.
149
 The presence of a competing authority before 1935 made it 
impossible for the KMT government to investigate the land, let alone levying 
taxes. The increase in tax revenue after 1934 was partly due to the 
enlargement of tax base rather than restoration of production.  
Second, the KMT government initiated a land organization program in the 
early 1930s. All lands were investigated, with its size measured and price 
assessed.
150
 The program greatly enhanced the government‘s capacity of 
extraction. However, the program was also costly. The central government 
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allocated special funds to the local government to assist the latter to carry out 
the land organization program. From 1933 to 1936, funds from the central 
government reached 2,055,435 yuan. In 1936, for example, although the land 
tax revenue increased by 2,900,529 yuan from the previous year, the land 
investigation alone cost the central government 1,103,400 yuan (see Table 
3.4).  
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Table 3.4 Major Components of the Revenues of Jiangxi Provincial Government, 1932-36 
(Unit: yuan) 
Item Total 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Total 109,632,184 14,962,183 18,663,408 23,823,430 21,782,178 30,400,985 
Central Government 
Subsidies 
34,427,353 6,432,288 6,639,945 8,678,045 6,926,526 5,750,549 
Land Tax Revenue 28,439,808 4,343,980 3,830,722 3,867,621 6,748,483 9,649,002 
Funds for Land 
Organization 
2,055,435 — 178,380 89,519 684,136 1,103,400 
Source: Statistical Charters of Jiangxi Finance, 1939, 2
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―Cleanliness and Orderliness‖ The movement failed to achieve not only 
the objectives of militarization and productivization of life, but also the 
objectives set for the initial stage—orderliness and cleanness of cities. 
Chiang‘s speech delivered at the second anniversary of the movement showed 
that the generalissimo was deeply disappointed. He harshly criticized the 
NLM, saying that: 
Wherever I went, I have looked carefully for the actual achievements 
of our movement, to see whether there is any difference in society 
and the life of the people, compared to the time before the movement 
was launched. I must say that, with very few exceptions, most places 




As the NLM lost it mass appeal, the authority had to rely on coercion to 
guarantee the enforcement of various regulations. It was common that the 
police beat people who violated the New Life regulations and drank in 
restaurants. Some violators were forced to wear humiliating ―tall paper hats‖ 
and parade on the streets.
152
 Nevertheless, people came up with various 
methods to resist the movement. Some restaurants, for instance, sold alcohol 
in tea pots to avoid detection by the police and the Inspection Corps.
153
  
In summary, the NLM failed in both urban and rural areas. In cities, the 
movement failed to achieve its goals of ―cleanliness and orderliness‖. In the 
rural areas, although more efforts were made to rehabilitate the region and 
reorganize peasants, mobilization did not result in a significant increase in 
agricultural production and state accumulation of resources. For the central 
government, the costs of the mobilization turned out to be extremely high, 
while few fiscal resources were channeled back to the central government. In 
the section three and four, I demonstrate that the public‘s weak threat 
perception and pro-minority institutions explain the failure of the NLM.  
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3.3 The Public’s Weak Perception of Foreign Threats 
3.3.1 Nationalist Mobilization without a Foreign Enemy 
By the time the NLM was initiated, Japan had already captured Manchuria (in 
1931) and the Inner Mongolian province of Rehe (in 1933). Nevertheless, 
foreign threats as perceived by people in Jiangxi did not meet the threshold 
suggested in this study for ―a strong and imminent foreign threat.‖ First of all, 
the threat was not imminent in terms of ―time frame‖. There was a brief 
interlude of peace between 1933 and July 1937. The threat posed by the 
Japanese had been ameliorated temporarily by the Tanggu Truce signed in 
May 1933, which ended the Manchuria crisis and established a demilitarized 
zone extending from Beijing to Tianjin. Second, as agricultural province, 
Jiangxi‘s strategic value was also low. In fact, Jiangxi—a province located in 
southeast China—did not become a target of Japanese attacks until 1937 when 
the full-scale Japanese invasion of China began. Before 1934, it was the civil 
war, rather than the presence of a foreign enemy that had disrupted people‘s 
everyday life and the local economy.  
As was argued in Chapter 1, the public‘s perception of foreign threats 
might be influenced by the government's propaganda. It is also true that state 
elites sometimes deliberately stir international tensions and capitalize on the 
public‘s threat perception to carry out nationalist mobilization.154 However, 
state elites are also aware that the escalation of international tensions would 
divert resources from their strategic plans. Such concerns explain why some 
state elites refrain from provoking their foreign enemies. This was the choice 
made by the KMT leadership in the early 1930s.  
The KMT government had its hands tied in capitalizing on international 
tensions to mobilize domestic society. In the first place, an anti-Japanese mass 
movement might provoke the Japanese to take further military action against 
China. Chiang constantly insisted that, given its lack of domestic unity, China 
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was too weak to resist Japan.
155
 Chiang believed that China needed more time 
to prepare itself for a full-scale war. The 1931 boycott against Japan was 
considered to be one of the causes, or at least the catalyst, of Japan‘s attack on 
Shanghai.
156
 The government definitely did not want the NLM to become 
another anti-Japanese mass movement. Therefore, though the New Life 
mobilization involved nationalist indoctrination, the government refrained 
from antagonizing Japan.  
More importantly, in 1934, the KMT leaders had reached the agreement 
that the campaign of annihilation against the Communists should be given 
priority.
157
 Chiang had learned from the 1931 political crisis that nationalist 
sentiments among the populace might undermine his own legitimacy and that 
of the government. When the Japanese invaded Manchuria in September 1931, 
the public immediately turned against the government and pressed the KMT to 
terminate intraparty conflicts.
158
 Similarly, once conflict between China and 
Japan intensified, the angry populace might press the Chinese government to 
direct its fire against the Japanese aggressors, rather than the Communists. The 
KMT elites were fully aware that the popular nationalism was a double-edged 
sword and would not allow rampant popular nationalism to ruin the 
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anti-Communist annihilation campaigns. As a consequence, the NLM became 
a nationalist movement without a foreign enemy. The absence of a 
clearly-identified foreign enemy impeded the mobilization of the masses.  
3.3.2 Effects on Mobilization 
The Urban Areas In the absence of a tangible foreign threat, the demand for 
state protection was less pressing. Instead, the population expected the 
government to provide immediate payoffs in exchange for their support. Yet, 
the NLM did not improve the material conditions of urban dwellers. For those 
who were still struggling to make the ends meet, the NLM was completely 
divorced from their real needs. For example, in some poor neighborhoods of 
Nanchang, people still shared a room with the pigs that they raised.
159
 It was 
simply impossible for them to achieve the orderliness and cleanness required 
by the government.  
We may better understand how the public‘s threat perception might have 
assisted the New Life leaders to achieve such goals as orderliness and 
cleanliness by contrasting the NLM to the Patriotic Health Campaign launched 
by the CCP during the Korean War. Unlike its KMT predecessor, the CCP was 
able to capitalize on the war to mobilize the masses. The CCP propaganda 
alleged that the United States launched germ warfare against China and 
required the Chinese people to take action to annihilate pests and clean up 
cities and villages.
160
 The public actively responded to state mobilization, and 
the Patriotic Health Campaign was much more successful than the NLM in 
achieving ―cleanness and orderliness.‖ When a British scientist visited Gannan, 
a county in Heilongjiang, ―he was surprised to find the villages spotless and 
devoid of flies and dogs, the ubiquitous animal presences he had come to 
expect in rural China.‖161 People responded to state mobilization not only 
because of the sense of a patriotic duty, but also because of the concerns about 
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their own personal security. The presence of a foreign enemy united individual 
interests with national interests.  
For many people, the NLM did not bring extra income, but constituted a 
financial burden. Taking the lantern parade mentioned above as an example, 
the Nanchang municipal government required all participants to wear blue 
shirts, which many families could not afford. What they could do was to buy 
blue ink and dye their old shirts by themselves. To ensure mass participation, 
the New Life authority made attendance compulsory: each household must 
send at least one person. People were exempted from the duty only if they 
contributed some money, so that officials responsible for organizing the 




To mobilize the masses, the state needs volunteers from society, who 
could serve as a ―vanguard force‖ and implement the mobilization on behalf of 
the state. The assistance from the vanguard force lowers the costs of 
mobilization for the government. However, the KMT government encountered 
grave problem constructing such a force. For instance, the New Life authority 
initiated the Youth Vacation Service Corps (YVSC), which was supposed to 
organize the youth to promote the NLM. However, in twenty-eight of the 
fifty-five schools in Jiangxi, no more than ten staff joined the YVSC. In 
Gaoqiao Elementary School and Baihuazhou Elementary School, only one 
staff became the YVSC member. Few students joined the YVSC 
voluntarily.
163
 The New Life authority had to change its policy and make 
participation in the YVSC compulsory for all faculty and staff, as well as 
university and middle school students.
164
  
The lower-classes had neither money nor leisure to contribute to the 
movement. In the 1930s, it was common for people to work for more than ten 
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hours every day and receive wages on a daily basis. Liu Longzao, a Nanchang 
resident, was appointed by the government to take the responsibility for 
promoting the NLM. He, however, wrote to the authority to resign from the 
appointment. In his letter, he stated:  
I come from a working family, suffering from starvation on a daily 
basis and struggling to make the ends meet. For me, a day of rest 
would mean a day with food shortage. I find myself caught in great 
confusion whenever I receive instructions from the superior. In the 
case of meetings, which often last one whole day, though I cannot be 
absent, I simply follow others blindly and would not be able to 
contribute to the discussion. At the same time, I lost the opportunity 
to earn my living of the day.
165
 
The Rural Areas The KMT government made substantial efforts to deliver 
public service to the peasants in Jiangxi. Nevertheless, the services provided 
by the government were not something that met the needs of the peasantry. 
For instance, the new roads that the government constructed in Jiangxi were 
used exclusively for ―expensive passenger traffic and military purposes‖ and 
did not bring any immediate economic benefits to the poor and landless.
166
 
That the New Life promoted by the authority was divorced from the 
peasants‘ needs was also manifested by the establishment of Sun Yat-sen 
schools and bao schools. The New Life leaders believed that the root cause of 
peasants‘ insensitiveness and alienation from politics (mamu buren) lay not in 
poverty but their bad daily habits, such as laziness and filthiness. Therefore, it 
was imperative to urge the Chinese peasants to start a New Life, and the 
improvement of education in the rural areas was indispensable for the NLM.
167
  
However, peasants in Jiangxi showed little interest in the nationalist 
indoctrination and Confucian virtues offered by the Sun Yat-sen schools. They 
simply did not have an incentive to drop their work and attend school. 
Officials that were responsible for promoting the education program 
encountered great difficulty in arousing peasant interests. An official reported:  
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Simply to request them (peasants in the recovered areas) to go to 
school was not an easy task. At first we expended a great deal of 
effort to summon them to school, and went from house to house 
pressuring them. But they still had their methods (of resistance), and 




To expand school enrollment, the government had to establish a Forced 
School Entry Committee (qiangpo ruxue weiyuanhui).
169
 Although the 
enrollment rate increased, relatively few students managed to finish the 
six-month course. Table 3.5 shows that the Sun Yat-sen schools had a low 




In a word, in the absence of a strong and imminent foreign threat, the 
public expected more rewards for their support to the state-led nationalist 
movement. In the following section, I demonstrate that the pro-minority 
institutions harmed peasant initiative and empowered landlords at the expense 
of the state. The resources that the government devoted to reducing the 
grievances of peasants were appropriated by the landlords. As a result, the 
immediate costs of nationalist mobilization rose.  
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Table 3.5 The Annual Statistical Overview of the Sun Yat-sun Schools in Jiangxi, 1934-37 
(Unit: person) 
Source: Wen and Tang, 2002, 213.  





Number of Students Number of Graduates Graduation Rate* 
Children Male Female Total Children Male Female Total  
1934 245 18,012 11,651 3,244 32,907 2,225 1,341 986 4,552 13.8% 
1935 204 12,088 8,257 1,730 22,075 8,385 6,482 1,483 16,350 74% 
1936 200 11,345 8,025 2,850 22,220 1,251 7,210 752 9,213 41.5% 
1937 199 9,851 8,486 3,255 21,592 742 234 103 1,079 5.0% 
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3.4 The Restoration of Pro-Minority Institutions 
3.4.1  ―Returning the Land to the Original Owners‖   
In late 1934, the KMT successfully destroyed the CCP‘s base area in Jiangxi. 
As the CCP‘s base area was squeezed gradually, the KMT government 
initiated a rehabilitation program in the recovered areas. As was discussed 
above, at the core of the whole rehabilitation scheme was the revival of baojia 
system. What has not been discussed so far is the policy of ―returning the land 
to the original owners‖ that the KMT government adopted.171  
It was the policy of ―returning the land to the original owners‖ that led to 
the restoration of pro-minority institutions. After the CCP was driven out of 
the province, the KMT government established the Rural Rehabilitation 
Committees (nongcun fuxing weiyuanhui). The committee was given the 
responsibility of land ownership investigation. Peasants were requested to 
hand out the land that they had received during the communist land revolution 
and pay rent if they wanted to continue tilling the land.
172
 George Taylor 
noted in 1935:  
(B)y a policy of masterly inaction this thorn in the side (the land 
problem) has been removed; the status quo ante has been restored 
and everyone is happy, except perhaps the landless. In spite of a 
certain lowering or remission of rents, and of the abolition, in some 
parts, of certain miscellaneous taxes, the question of the unequal 
distribution of land and land tenure and taxation as a whole has been 
left largely untouched. 
173
 
To promote equality in land rights and protect peasant initiative, the KMT 
government imposed some limited restrictions on the landowners. For instance, 
the Land Law that the KMT government promulgated in 1930 specified a 
maximum amount of land that could be owned by individuals and stipulated 
that any excess would be subject to surtax.
174
 Nevertheless, such measures 
                                           
171
 See Averill, "The New Life in Action."; Also see Gengya Chen, Gan, Wan, Xiang, E 
shicha ji[Account of a Visit to Jiangxi, Anhui, Hunan and Hubei]  (Shanghai: Shenbao 
Yuekan She, 1934). 46-8. 
172
 Averill, "The New Life in Action," 607; Chen, Gan, Wan, Xiang, E  shicha ji: 47-8.  
173
 Taylor, "Reconstruction after Revolution," 310. 
174
 Averill, "The New Life in Action," 609. 
    
79 
 
played a limited role in reducing the concentration of large landholdings. The 
maximum size limit was simply too large.
175
 As a contemporary observer 
noted, in Jiangxi, few landlords owned more land than the limits stipulated by 
the Land Law, so the size limit was ―pointless and ineffective.‖ 176  
Not only were the economic institutions pro-minority; so too were the 
political institutions. The returning landlords soon took over the newly created 
posts and became bao heads.
177
 The revived baojia system concentrated 
power in the hands of bao heads, who often concurrently held the posts of 
principal of the bao school and headman of the militia.
178
 For instance, in 
Linchuan County, Jiangxi, the principal of a primary school controlled a 
militia of 1,000 persons armed with more than 50 guns. A township secretary 
commanded a militia of 300 persons.
179
 There was no institution that held the 
power of the landlords in check.  
The returning landlords often employed the militias to advance private 
interests. The KMT government adopted some policies to reduce exploitation, 
such as imposing a limit on rents. These policies, however, lost touch with the 
ordinary peasants due to the resistance from the landlords. One commentator 
noted:  
Many of the baojia leaders, landlords, and lianbao heads formerly 
suffered from the Communists, so now they have a vengeful attitude 
and oppress people. Contrary to government regulations they make 
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people pay back rents for the period when land was held by the 
Communists. Government regulations also specify extending the 
payment period for debts, and reducing interest, but they require 
payment. Some blackmail and coerce people under threat of not 




Consequently, the abuse of the peasants became a widespread practice. 
3.4.2 Effects on Mobilization 
The restoration of pro-minority institutions might enable the KMT to curb the 
spread of communism. However, it inhibited the mobilization in two ways. In 
the first place, pro-minority institutions dulled peasant initiative. The 
restoration of rents made tilling the land less profitable. Indeed, the 
government provided some economic incentives to the peasants. For instance, 
the government provided loans to peasants at low interest rates. Nevertheless, 
the latter were still required to provide some kind of security that they could 
not afford.
181
 In areas just recovered from the CCP, government officials 
encouraged peasants to plant the land despite the absence of tenancy contracts. 
Yet, peasants were reluctant to put in more efforts since they feared that the 
government would take back the lands they had received during the 
communist land revolution.
182
 The policy of ―returning the land to the original 
owners‖ soon proved that peasants' concerns were not unreasonable.  
Instead of rising up to revolt, peasants found other ways of resistance. 
Those who found tilling the land not profitable chose to abandon their land, 
migrate to cities, and become coolies and peddlers. Uncultivated land 
increased. As fewer and fewer peasants wanted to till the land, in many areas 
the price of land decreased, sometimes for 15 to 35 percent.
183
 A 
contemporary writer suggested that the government should force peasants to 
return to their hometown and reward those who returned voluntarily.
184
 The 
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government indeed provided some rewards, such as foodstuffs and ―seed 
money‖, to returning refugees. However, these supportive policies soon 
proved to be too expensive for the government and thus could not last.
185
  
Pro-minority institutions not only alienated the peasants, but also 
empowered the landlords at the expense of the state. At the grassroots level, it 
was the landlords that acted as the agent of the state. Once they controlled the 
grassroots administrative organizations, they wielded power to advance 
private interests. A large proportion of the fiscal resources that the government 
devoted to the NLM were appropriated by baojia heads. As Averill points out:  
In some parts of Jiangxi the baojia system seems to have existed 
mostly on paper, swallowing up whatever funds were available to it 
without producing much of anything in the way of mass organization, 
let alone providing the nucleus for popular military training, patriotic 




Moreover, the landlords resisted government policies that went against 
their interests and impeded the extraction of resources by the state. In Jiangxi, 
big landlords and rich peasants had a long history of evading taxes.
187
 
Between 1934 and 1936, the government‘s actual land tax revenue in Jiangxi 
never achieved its budget (see Table 3.6). Although government decrees 
permitted the arrest of landlords who refused to pay taxes, local officials could 
be intimidated by powerful landlords and were often reluctant to do so.
188
 
Sometimes it was simply impossible for local officials to know how much 
land the landlords owned, since the former relied on baojia heads to 
investigate the landlords‘ property, which gave landlords an opportunity to 
conceal assets and evade taxes.
189
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Table 3.6 Land Tax Revenue of Jiangxi, 1932-36 
(Unit: yuan) 
 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Budgetary  Revenue 4,123,078 4,310,014 7,536,129 6,917,572 9,992,050 
Actual  Revenue 4,343,980 3,830,722 3,867,621 6,748,483  9,649,002 
Actual Revenue as % 
of Budgetary Revenue 
(%) 
105.3 88.9 51.3 97.6 96.6 
Source: Statistical Charters of Jiangxi Finance, 1939, 22, 27
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Some scholars attribute the failure of the rehabilitation program to the lack 
of labor in Jiangxi.
190
 However, it is worth pointing out that historically, 
Jiangxi had always suffered from the shortage of labor. For instance, Mao 
Zedong once noted, in the township of Changgang, people who joined the Red 
Army or worked elsewhere mounted to 320, which accounted for 17.9 percent 
of the total population. In the township of Caixi, as many as 1,040 persons 
joined the Red Army and 186 worked elsewhere, which accounted for 21.2 
percent of the total population.
191
 Nevertheless, the CCP was able to mobilize 
women, children and the elders and provide them with necessary assistance. 
By 1934, in the Central Soviet Area (located in southwest Jiangxi and west 
Fujian) alone, 83,000 dan of uncultivated land were reclaimed. In many 
counties, land that had been abandoned for several decades was tilled again.
192
  
Depopulation was not only an effect of the civil war, but also the land 
policy pursued by the KMT government after 1934. Attributing depopulation 
to the civil war does not explain why peasants who fled from the region during 
the war did not come back when the war ended. In fact, the agricultural 
conditions in Jiangxi are considered to be relatively favorable.
193
 The 
landlords returned because the government provided sufficient incentives, 
whereas peasants did not receive equivalent benefits. Although the KMT 
government attempted to reassure peasants by promising not to investigate 
their previous crimes of participation in the land revolution led by the CCP, 
such incentives were simply not appealing enough.
194
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In summary, the pro-minority institutions empowered the landlords at the 
expense of both the state and the peasantry. The landlords not only 
appropriated state resources, but also resisted government policies that harmed 
their interests. Meanwhile, the pro-minority institutions alienated the peasants. 
Not receiving concrete economic benefits, the lower-classes showed little 
interest in the NLM. The resistance from the rich minority and the poor 
majority's request for immediate economic payoffs significantly raised the 
costs of mobilization and adversely affected the state‘s accumulation of 
resources.  
3.5 Competing Explanations  
Existing studies provide various explanations for the failure of the New Life 
Movement. In this section, I examine these accounts and discuss their 
limitations. 
3.5.1 Policy Implementation by Local Officials 
The KMT regime was notorious for its inability to implement policies 
proposed by its national leaders. Lloyd E. Eastman once noted, ―Perhaps the 
classic example of the Kuomintang‘s administrative incompetence … was the 
New Life Movement.‖195 Nevertheless, the lack of policy implementation by 
local officials does not provide sufficient explanation for the failure of the 
movement in Jiangxi. As demonstrated above, plenty of evidence suggests that 
the NLM was carried out in Jiangxi. After the NLM was launched in 
Nanchang, Jiangxi in fact became the heart of the movement. An article of 
G.E. Taylor‘s in 1935 is worth quoting at length:  
A clean sweep (the defeat of the Communists) made possible a clean 
start. Kiangsi (Jiangxi) also is far from the coast, away from foreign 
influences, and admirably located if there should be any trouble 
between Nanking and Kuangtung (Guangdong) or Kuangsi 
(Guangxi). The enormous energy of the Communists, finally, had 
brought about on the part of its opponents a constructive zeal and 
political activity born of fear and the necessity for self-preservation. 
It was here, for sheer military reasons, that the Government first 
changed its attitude toward the people … 
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The most impressive thing in Kiangsi today is the personality of 
Chiang Kai-shek. His driving force permeates every branch of the 
administration and encourages definite tendencies which are apparent 
in the military organization of the Provincial Government, in the 
loyalty of its members to Chiang himself ...
196
 
As Taylor observed, the involvement of the generalissimo facilitated the 
carrying out of the NLM. Chiang did not only launch the movement, but also 
kept a close eye on it as it progressed and constantly intervened to make sure it 
was implemented.  
Additionally, Chiang successfully cultivated a loyal and effective task 
force to implement the policies at the lower administrative levels. The primary 
agency responsible for promoting the NLM was the Society for Vigorous 
Practice of the Three People‘s Principles (sanmin zhuyi lixing she) and its 
satellite organization—the Blue Shirts (lanyi she). When the NLM Promotion 
Association was first established in Nanchang on 21 February 1934, it was 
tightly controlled by Lixingshe members, such as Deng Wenyi, Zhang Yiding, 
Li Huanzhi, Xiao Chunmian, and Jiang Zhicheng.
197
  
The Lixingshe comprised primarily of Whampoa cadets, who owed loyalty 
to Chiang. Their trust in Chiang was established in the early days of the 
Whampoa Military Academy when Chiang held the position of commandant. 
For the Whampoa cadets, Chiang was a leader who always made the right 
decisions in critical moments.
198
 Since the Lixingshe was established, its 
members had reached the consensus that the organization should operate under 
the direct guidance of Chiang.
199
 Their allegiance to Chiang was partly 
reflected by the ―Song of the Leader‖ (lingxiu ge) of the Lixingshe, which 
went like this:  
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China is indeed great! 
Each generation has its worthy and able men.  
Though there have always been disorder and upheaval 
We‘ve always been able to recover 
Today Chiang Kai-shek is our savior.  
We march forward together with him. 
Fuxing! Fuxing! (Revival! Revival!) 
200
 
Due to the efforts of the Blue Shirts, the NLM even reached the grassroots 
in rural Jiangxi. The Special Movement Corps (bie dong dui) comprised of the 
Blue Shirts members operated in Jiangxi from 1933 to 1935. The corps, which 
had 10,000 to 20,000 members at its peak, was responsible for organizing 
peasants in to the baojia system, establishing schools, training the militias, and 
investigating corruption by civil administrators.
201
 
Apart from a loyal task force, factional rivalry was another factor that 
alleviated the ―principle-agent problem.‖ There were three major cliques 
within Chiang‘s own power base: the Whampoa Clique, the C.C. Clique, and 
the Political Study Clique.
202
 These three regarded Chiang as the supreme 
leader of the regime and competed against each other at the level of policy 
implementation, where the regime‘s resources were allocated.203 In Jiangxi, 
the Lixingshe‘s major competitor was the Political Study Clique. In fear of 
losing out in the competition for budget resources or being viewed as disloyal 
to the generalissimo, leading figures from both factions enthusiastically 
participated in all kinds of promotion activities of the NLM, delivering public 




                                           
200
 Wakeman, "A Revisionist View," 412.  
201
 Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: 70-4. 
202
 For a brief history of the C.C. Clique and the Political Study Clique, see Hung-mao Tien, 
Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-1937  (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1972). Chapter Three. 
203
 Ibid., 46. 
204
 Wen, Chongjian hefaxing: 141-2. 
    
 87 
I by no means suggest that the KMT government successfully solved the 
problem of administrative incompetence. Yet, it is fair to say that if the NLM 
had any chance of success, the KMT would have succeeded in Jiangxi. The 
lack of policy implementation by local officials does not sufficiently explain 
the NLM‘s failure.  
3.5.2 Domestic Contenders 
In addition to administrative incompetence, the weak central government and 
resistance from local militarists also impeded the implementation of 
nationalist mobilization. After all, in the 1930s, many provinces and regions 
were only under the nominal control of the central government. Although 
Jiangxi was under the effective control of the central government, there were 
powerful militarists in neighboring provinces. On 22 November 1933, the 19th 
Route Army led by Cai Tingkai, Chen Mingshu, and Jiang Guangnai rebelled 
against the Nanjing government and took control of Fujian.
205
 In June 1936, 
militarists in Guangdong and Guangxi accused the central government for not 
resisting Japanese aggression and declared that they would march their forces 
to north China to resist Japanese invasion.
206
  
Nevertheless, no evidence shows that the implementation of New Life 
mobilization in Jiangxi was interrupted by the conflicts between the central 
government and the militarists in neighboring provinces. Although the Fujian 
Rebellion brought a temporary halt to the central government‘s Fifth 
Encirclement Campaign against the CCP, it did not impede the NLM.
207
 The 
central government defeated the rebels in January 1934—before the NLM 
started. The Guangdong-Guangxi Incident, though leading to military 
confrontation between the center and the local, was solved peacefully within 
three months.
208
 During the crisis, the central government deployed troops to 
Guangdong, Hunan, Guizhou, and Yunnan, but not Jiangxi. In a word, 
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challenges posed by domestic contenders do not explain why the NLM failed 
in Jiangxi. 
3.5.3 The Superficiality of the New Life Movement 
Many scholars attribute the failure of the NLM to its superficiality and the 
authority‘s ―absurd‖ emphasis on hygienic standards. Samuel Chu writes, 
The initial stages were repeated over and over again without any 
improvement … In too many places it became no more than a 
periodic clean-up just before an inspection, after which everything 
was allowed to lapse back to the stage before the clean-up.
209
  
Arif Dirlik also contends that as the movement progressed, ―the means 
supplanted the ends‖.210 These propositions are a proper assessment of the 
movement‘s outcome. Yet, it is unfair to say that the New Life leaders made 
no attempt to make the movement more meaningful. As was demonstrated 
above, in Jiangxi, the government took concrete measures to rehabilitate the 
rural region and promote production, and the NLM was by no means an 
urbanized movement built on the ―toothbrush, the mouse trap, and the fly 
swatter.‖211 The initial stages of the movement were repeated over and over 
again in many places because the goals of ―orderliness and cleanness‖ had not 
been achieved due to the lack of mass participation. The question of why the 
masses did not find the NLM appealing remains unanswered. 
Moreover, it is unfair to allege that the New Life leaders‘ concerns over 
hygienic conditions were superficial. Such concerns actually reflected state 
elites‘ desires to wield state power over society. The New Life authority‘s 
emphasis on hygienic conditions would make more sense from the perspective 
of trying to impose state control over citizens. I drew a parallel between the 
NLM and the Patriotic Health Campaign launched by the CCP in 1952 above. 
The nationalist mobilization carried out by the CCP during the Korean War is 
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often viewed as a huge success.
212
 The Patriotic Health Campaign is believed 
to have ―successfully impressed upon individuals that they had the patriotic 
duty to take up arms‖ against imperialism.213 
3.5.4 Top-Down Model 
Some scholars blame the KMT for adopting a top-down model of mobilization. 
His-sheng Ch'i, for instance, highlights that from the outset, the government 
indicated that it wanted to achieve the goal of the NLM by ―mechanical, 
bureaucratic control from above, rather than by encouraging individual 
initiative, voluntarism, and revolutionary change from below.‖214 Julia Strauss 
also contrasts the mobilization by the KMT to that by the CCP, and maintains 
that: 
What was so distinctive about the CCP‘s implementation of 
campaigns was … the CCP‘s genuine desire for popular participation, 
and its unusual degree of confidence that with proper education, the 
ultimate support of a broad cross-section of both rural and urban 
society for its policies would be present. 
215
 
The fact that the movement was orchestrated from the top does not 
adequately explain the outcome of mobilization. All state-led nationalist 
movements studied here, including the Communist-led ones, were initiated 
from the top.
216
 There might be differences between the Communists and 
Nationalists in terms of work style.
217
 Yet, the purpose of all these 
movements was to mobilize the people in support of the agenda set by state 
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elites, rather than to encourage individual freedom and extend democratic 
participation to the people. As Gordon White contends, for the CCP, 
[M]ass participation had to be channeled to be effective, and mass 
organizations had to be subordinate to party control … Mass 
participation was not allowed to develop into autonomous political 




Like the CCP, the New Life elites also demonstrated ―unusual degree of 
confidence‖ on the power of education, which was exemplified by the 
construction of Sun Yat-sen schools and bao schools. The ensuring question is: 
If both regimes adopted the top-down model of mobilization, why was one 
more successful than the other in mobilizing the masses?  
3.5.5 Customs and Cultural Symbols 
Emotive nationalist argument emphasizes the role of cultural symbols in 
rousing the masses to participate in nationalist movements. The New Life 
leaders, however, were revolutionaries who endeavored to replace the Chinese 
people‘s religious affiliations and their attachments to old cultural symbols 
with a national identity and new national symbols.
219
 Rebecca Nedostup, for 
instance, observes that the NLM was accompanied by the combat against 
superstition as well as custom reforms. For instance, the New Life leaders 
attacked wasteful customs, such as expensive weddings and funerals, and the 
use of spirit money.
220
  
Nevertheless, the iconoclasm of the NLM does not sufficiently explain the 
movement‘s failure. It is worth emphasizing that the New Life leaders did not 
abandon Chinese traditions completely. Instead, they believed that the new 
Chinese civilization was to be erected on a native moral foundation. 
Confucianism in fact laid down the ideological foundation of the NLM. The 
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four traditional virtues—propriety (li), righteousness (yi), integrity (lian), 
sense of shame (chi) —retained a central position in the New Life ideology.221  
One may also suggest that the four virtues are symbols of the high culture, 
and thus did not appeal to ordinary peasants. In other words, it was the chasm 
between the high culture and the low culture that led to the failure of the 
movement. However, there is evidence that the New Life leaders were fully 
aware that to prevent the movement from losing touch with the people, they 
must reconcile the New Life ideology with peasant life. Ye Chucang, a KMT 
politician and New Life writer, once noted that xiangyue, ceremonies staged 
for rural citizens, should be revived. Xiangyue usually combined religious 
elements with public lectures. Ye insisted that the New Life authority should 
invite senior citizens and teachers to explain loyalty (zhong), filial piety (xiao), 
benevolence (ren), love (ai), and the four traditional virtues to the peasants.
222
  
More importantly, if the NLM was iconoclastic, the nationalist 
mobilization carried out by the CCP was even more so. Compared with the 
KMT, the CCP took a more assertive stance towards religious and 
superstitious activities. For instance, the Communists were reported to have 
destroyed all temples and god statues in Jiangxi Soviet Areas.
223
 Many monks 
in the Soviet areas were either categorized as counterrevolutionaries together 
with large landlords, or forced to ―change their jobs (zhuan ye).‖ 224 
Emphasizing class struggle and gender equality, the communist ideology 
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espoused by the CCP was even more radically divergent from traditional 
values of Chinese peasants.
225
  
Nevertheless, the elements that were foreign to the peasants in Jiangxi did 
not impede the spread of communism. A journalist who visited the ex-Soviet 
areas in 1934 found to his surprise that children and the elder in these areas 
were very familiar with the CCP‘s slogans and its ―ism‖, which indicated the 
success that the CCP achieved in indoctrinating the masses.
226
 
Elizabeth Perry‘s recent study of the early communist mobilization at 
Anyuan coal mine, Jiangxi, seems to challenge the conventional view that the 
CCP‘s mobilization was iconoclastic. Perry demonstrates that the CCP‘s 
strategic deployment of traditional cultural resources, such as folk festivals, 
ancestor and spirit worship, and secret societies, was proved to be effective in 
attracting peasant-workers. Nevertheless, Perry does not deny that the 
substance of the messages that the CCP introduced to the peasant-workers was 
―radically new‖, but resonated with the peasant-workers.227 As she contends, 
symbolic resources are actually highly adaptable. Moreover, although Perry 




3.6 Conclusion  
Although the KMT government devoted considerable amount of resources to 
the NLM, the movement ended up with a failure. Neither the militarization nor 
the productivization of life was achieved. This chapter demonstrates that the 
disappointing outcome can be attributed to two factors, the public‘s weak 
threat perception and the presence of pro-minority institutions. In the absence 
of a foreign enemy, state protection became less important for the masses. If 
the New Life leaders had managed to provide other services that the public 
demanded, they would have had a better chance to solicit public support. 
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However, the movement promoted by the government was divorced from the 
public's real needs, and thus lost its mass appeal.  
The presence of pro-minority economic and political institutions further 
impeded mobilization. Disadvantaged by the pro-minority institutions, the 
lower-class people were more interested in short-term personal interests, rather 
than national revival envisaged by state elites. Furthermore, the pro-minority 
institutions empowered the landlords at the expense of the state and the 
peasants. The landlords wielded their power to appropriate state resources and 
resist government policies, which increased the immediate costs of 
mobilization. Although the government appealed to nationalism and 
traditional culture, the deployment of cultural symbols did not play a 
significant role in facilitating mobilization. The movement did not increase 
state accumulation, but constituted a drain on state-controlled resources.   
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Chapter 4  Sichuan during the Sino-Japanese War：Strong 
Threat Perceptions, Pro-Minority Institutions, and the Limited 
Success of Nationalist Mobilization 
The first shot of the Sino-Japanese War was fired on 7 July 1937 at the Marco 
Polo Bridge. The war lasted for eight years and required the KMT government 
to mobilize enormous material and human resources. This chapter examines 
wartime mobilization in Sichuan. In comparison with the pre-war period, the 
KMT coped with the problem of mobilization relatively well. The outbreak of 
the Sino-Japanese War played an important role in facilitating nationalist 
mobilization. The Japanese invasion of east China and bombing of major cities 
in Sichuan posed a severe threat to civilians. In search of state protection, 
people responded to state mobilization more actively. The Great Retreat at the 
beginning of the war and the evacuations of Sichuan‘s cities in the subsequent 
years greatly enhanced state control over the citizenry.  
Nevertheless, pro-minority economic and political institutions stymied 
mobilization. Their adverse effects were most obvious in rural areas. The 
baojia system constrained the government‘s ability to implement a crucial 
wartime policy—conscription. In addition, pro-minority economic institutions, 
such as the concentration of land in the hands of large landlords, led to peasant 
passivity and hurt agricultural productivity. The public‘s strong threat 
perception and pro-minority institutions together led to a qualified success of 
nationalist mobilization.  
This chapter is divided to five sections. The first section evaluates the 
overall outcome of the wartime mobilization. In the second and third section, I 
examine the two independent variables—the public‘s threat perception and 
domestic institutions—and their effects on mobilization. The fourth section 
discusses competing explanations. The last section concludes this chapter.  
4.1 The Outcome of Nationalist Mobilization: A Limited Success 
Industrial and Agricultural Production The industrial relocation from east 
China to the rear area is often viewed as a major achievement of the KMT 
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government during the Sino-Japanese War. Given the backwardness of 
southwest China in the pre-war period, it is justifiable to say that if this 
relocation had not happened, it would have been impossible for the KMT 
government to wage a modern war. But it did and Sichuan became the most 
important industrial base of wartime China. By the end of 1940, 254 factories 
had moved to Sichuan, or some fifty-five percent of the total relocated 
factories.
229
 According to Weng Wenhao, the then Minister of Economics, in 
1943, about forty-four percent of the entire industry in the rear area was 
located in Sichuan and Chongqing.
230
 
   The provincial data on wartime industrial production is not available. 
Given that Sichuan industry took up almost a half of the entire industry of Free 
China, I use the latter as a proxy to illustrate the outcome of industrial 
mobilization. As Table 4.1 shows, industrial production increased gradually 
from 1940 to 1943, but the rate of increase fell markedly. On average, between 
1940 and 1944, the annual increase rate reached 10.2 percent.  
There is some sporadic evidence showing that Sichuan‘s industrial 
production climbed during the war. For instance, Sichuan‘s coal production 
quadrupled between the early 1930s and 1942. Iron output increased six fold 
between 1934 and 1942.
231
 Salt output at Zigong increased from 379,000 tons 
in the 1930s to about 500,000 tons by 1940. Sugar output at Neijiang climbed 
from about 12 million jin in the late 1930s to 22 million jin in 1940, but 
dropped to 8.3 million by 1945.
232
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Table 4.1 Free China Industrial Production, 1940-44 









1940 14.47 81.01 95.48 — 
1941 28.86 92.77 121.63 27.4 
1942 43.14 95.35 138.49 13.9 
1943 53.59 93.98 147.57 6.5 
1944 49.28 87.98 137.36 -6.9 
Source: Yu-kwei Cheng, Foreign Trade and Industrial Development in China, 
The University Press of Washington, DC, 1956, 110, quo. William C. Kirby, 
―The Chinese War Economy‖, 194 
Note: 3.4 Ch$=1 U.S. $.  
 
Nevertheless, we need to be cautious in assessing the KMT‘s 
achievements in wartime industrial mobilization. First, only a small proportion 
of the industrial sector followed the central government in its retreat to the rear 
areas. For instance, of the 1,279 private factories in Shanghai, only 146 joined 
the state-led retreat.
233
 Moreover, the industrial capacity of Free China paled 
in comparison with that of occupied China. By 1944, the generating capacity 
of Free China‘s electric utility system was 49,000 kilowatts. The capacity of 
the system in occupied China was 642,000 kilowatts.
234
 
Compared with the industrial sector, the performance of the agricultural 
sector was less satisfactory. During the war about 8.4 millions of mu of fertile 
land in Sichuan turned into wasteland during the war.
235
 Table 4.2 shows that 
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grain output in Sichuan during the war years was below pre-war levels. The 
size of animal stock also declined. Regional statistics paint a more sanguine 
picture. Table 4.3 lists the harvests of rice and wheat of four southwest 
provinces. It can be seen that for most of the war years, the yield was above 
the 1936 level. 
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Table 4.2 Output of Grain and Cotton, and Stocks in Sichuan, 1937-44 
Source: For the yield of cotton, see Kaiqing Zhou, Sichuan Jingji Zhi [A Diary of Sichuan Economy], Taiwan 
Commercial Press, 1972, 29-30, For grain output and stocks, see Chris Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic 
Planning: Living Standards and Economic Development in Sichuan since 1931, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 
74-5.  
  
 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Average 
Pre-War 
Level 
Grain     
(million shi dan) 
207.7 224.1 228.2 198.3 181.1 179.2 192.2 197.8 201.1 
235.9   
(1932-36) 
Cotton      
(thousand shi 
dan) 
n.a. 763 1,280 1,129 1,034 586 1,079 825 956 
691      
(1931-37) 
Pigs      
(thousand head) 
9,176 8,307 8,616 8,653 8,712 8,380 8,384 8,166 8,549 




2,106 1,988 1,926 1,875 1,808 1,790 1,761 1,770 1,878 
2,480    
(1935-36) 
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Table 4.3 Grain Harvest and Indices for Four Southwest Provinces (Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi) 







Source: Xun Pan, Kangzhan shiqi xinan houfang shehui bianqian yanjiu [Research on the 
Transition of Society in the Southwest Rear during the Resistance War], Chongqing: Chongqing 
Press, 2011,66.
 Year 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 
Rice
Yield 185,888 200,877 288,555 286,847 225,920 216,497 
Index 100 108 155 154 122 116 
Wheat 
Yield 89,769 64,857 105,561 103,876 99,903 90,947 
Index 100 72 118 116 111 101 
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State Accumulation As was shown in Table 4.1, the role of the state in the 
economy increased significantly during the war. In 1944, state-owned 
enterprises contributed 35.9 percent of total output value of the whole 
industrial sector, rising from 15.2 percent in 1940.
236
 After 1941, the Japanese 
blockade caused a severe shortage of raw materials and difficulties in 
industrial production.
237
 The KMT government increasingly relied on land tax 
to meet the wartime fiscal challenge and feed the army.
238
 In 1941, the central 
government claimed the land tax, which had been preserved by the provincial 
governments.
239
Meanwhile, in response to high inflation, the KMT 
government adopted the policy of ―collecting land tax in kind‖ (tianfu 
zhengshi) to enhance its control over material resources. Instead of paying 
land taxes in cash, people were required to hand over grain to government tax 
collectors. As a supplement to taxation in kind, the government also imposed 
―compulsory purchase‖ and ―compulsory loan‖ of grain on agricultural 
producers. 
Compared with the pre-war period, the KMT government's performance in 
tax collection was significantly improved during the war. On average, from 
1941 to 1945, land tax revenue increased by about eight percent every year 
(see Table 4.4). Moreover, in most of these years, the quantity of grain levied 
in Sichuan (including taxation and compulsory purchase/loan) met and even 
exceeded the quota assigned by the central government.  
Nevertheless, the increase in tax revenue was accompanied by the 
escalation of social tensions. Nationalist propaganda by the government did 
not justify unlimited state extraction. The new land tax policy significantly 
increased the burden of the peasantry, and resulted in peasant uprisings in 
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many provinces, including Guizhou, Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu, and Sichuan, 
sometimes involving up to 50,000 armed peasants.
240
  
Table 4.4 Grain Levied in Sichuan, 1941-45 







Rate    
(%) 
Quota Assigned 
by the Central 
Government 
(QACG) 
GLS as % 
of QACG 
1941 1,378 — 1,200 114.8 % 
1942 1,661 20.5 1,600 103.8% 
1943 1,616 -2.7 1,600 101% 
1944 1,949 20.6 2,000 97.5% 
1945 1,822 -6.5 2,000 91.1% 
Total 8,426 Average: 8.0 8,400 100.3% 
Source: Ancai Xiang, ―Jianjie kangzhan shiqi Sichuan de tianfu zhengshi‖ [A 
Brief Introduction of Sichuan‘s Collecting Land Tax in Kind during the War 
of Resistance], in Chinese Economic History Commission of Sichuan 
Province, ed., Kangzhan shiqi houfang jingji [Economy of the Rear Areas 
during the Resistance War], Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1989, 164. 
 
Conscription The conscription of labor and soldiers was also a crucial 
component of wartime mobilization. The Labor Service Act was enforced 
since 1944. In the same year, more than seven million in Sichuan were 
mobilized to work on various construction projects. About 3,664 kilometers of 
roads and 5.9 million cubic meters water conservancy were built, 5,638 mu of 
land reclaimed, 2,785,240 trees planted, and 16.7 million piculs of food 
transported.
241
 In addition, around 2.5 million people were recruited into the 
army from 1937 to 1945 (see Table 4.5).  
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Although the total number was massive, a close look at the mobilization 
rate reveals that the outcome of mobilization was not satisfactory. The 
wartime Sichuan had a population of 45 million. In addition to the 2.5 million 
conscript soldiers, about 50,000 educated youth had joined the army 
voluntarily and 400,000 Sichuaness were already serving in the army before 
the outbreak of war.
242
 The overall mobilization rate was around 6.7 percent. 
This rate, however, was dwarfed by the mobilization rate of ten percent in the 
United States and fifty percent in Britain during the Second World War.
243
  
   This low rate was not because of weak demand for recruits or Sichuan's 
huge population. As a matter of fact, the provincial government encountered 
grave problem conscripting enough soldiers to meet the central government's 
quota. According to the quota assigned by the central government, between 
1937 and 1945, as many as 3,193,807 soldiers should have been recruited 
from Sichuan.
244
 Yet, the provincial authority accomplished only 80.7 percent 
of the task. I demonstrate below that policy mismanagement by baojia heads 
was the primary cause of the public‘s discontent and hampered wartime 
conscription. Pro-minority institutions prevented state elites from commanding 
human resources more effectively.  
 
Table 4.5 Conscript Soldiers from Sichuan during the Sino-Japanese War 
(Unit: person) 
1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 
103,837 17,145 296,341 266,373 344,610 
1942 1943 1944 1945 Total 
366,625 352,681 391,112 283,086 2,578,810 
Source: Yingqin He, Banian kangzhan zhi jingguo [The Eight-Year Course of 
the Resistance War], Wenhai Press, 1984, Appendix 9. 
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To sum up, during the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT‘s achievements in 
mobilizing human and material resources were notable yet inadequate. 
Industrial production of Free China, albeit increased, paled in comparison with 
that of occupied China. As for agricultural mobilization, the increase in 
uncultivated land indicates that wartime agricultural production did not fulfill 
its potential. The total number of recruits, though massive, did not meet the 
quota assigned by the government.  
4.2 Strong Perception of Foreign Threats and Mass Participation 
4.2.1 The Industrial Relocation at the Onset of the War  
Foreign Threats and State Protection as a Selective Incentive Within a few 
months of the war, the Chinese government lost the eastern provinces. At the 
end of 1937, it announced the relocation of the government to Chongqing. The 
retreat was joined by not only millions of civilians but also hundreds of 
factories. 
The industrial relocation was often depicted as miraculous and heroic. Yu 
Dawei, the architect of the Nationalist arms industry, was surprised to find that 
an entire arsenal was transported from Nanjing to Chongqing within sixteen 
days, and resumed production within one hundred days.
245
 Lin Jiyong, the 
National Resources Committee (NRC) leader in charge of industrial relocation, 
depicted the scenes of the Great Retreat as follows,  
Workers of each factory have risked their lives to dismantle and pack 
machine parts. When the Japanese flights come, they hide on the 
ground near the machine … Seeing their colleagues die, they simply 
move the corpse aside and keep working with tears in eyes. 
246
 
This description might create an impression that workers who responded to 
state mobilization were full of nationalistic passions. However, plenty of 
evidence suggests that participating in the state-led exodus could also be 
self-serving.  
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  As Lu Liu points out, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, people 
living in coastal provinces soon learned that this war was different: fighting 
did not take place on a distant battlefield, and attacks by the enemy made no 
distinction between civilians and soldiers.
247
 Since its onset, the war had 
caused high civilian casualties in coastal provinces. Jiading was a small county 
located in the northwest of Shanghai with a population of 30,000. A 
countywide survey of casualties shows that the Japanese were responsible for 
the deaths of 8,031 Jiading residents in 1937 and 3,720 in 1938. The Japanese 
bombings demolished a third of Jiading‘s buildings.248 
Yet, as the war pushed people to leave the coast, the means of 
transportation became increasingly limited and largely under military 
requisition. It was not easy for people without money or influence to get a 
ticket to the interior. In the Shanghai retreat, refugees had to sit on the top of 
trains. Some were even knocked off when the train passed a tunnel.
249
 In 
Nanjing, the retreat was also chaotic. Thousands of migrants waited on the 
riverbank overnight. When boats arrived, many people ―jumped into the river, 
grabbed mooring ropes or bamboo poles, and crawled on board.‖250  
The high casualty rate of civilians and the limited availability of the means 
of transportation made state assistance in migration an enticing incentive, 
which explains why, despite all kinds of hardship they had to go through on 
their journey to the interior, the industrial workers still found joining the 
state-led exodus a rational choice. For industrial workers, the state-led exodus 
at least provided a way to leave.  
   The stereotyped description of the Great Retreat emphasizes the altruistic 
feelings and nationalist fever that prevailed among ordinary workers. 
Nevertheless, academic research poses challenges to such a description. Lloyd 
Eastman, for instance, writes:  
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When the arsenals were removed, for example, not only machinery, 
raw materials, and workers and their families were shipped, but 
everything owned by the workers, including house-doors and 
windows, was moved. And workers in the arsenals competed 
vigorously with each other for the limited means of transportation, 
sometimes even shooting at each other. 
251
 
After arriving in Chongqing, over a hundred workers at the Jinling arsenal 
signed a petition letter. In the letter, they urged the authority to provide 
economic aids to them, so that their families could leave the occupied areas 
and join them in Chongqing. They wrote:  
Our children in the occupied territory will receive an education of 
enslavement. As descendants of the Yellow Emperor, we are the 
future generations of warriors to reconstruct our country, but how can 
we be used if the talent of youth is buried? ... How can workers have 
enough to save their elders, brothers and sisters from the abyss of 
misery and deliver them inland? We are dedicating our lives to the 




Workers learned to use nationalist rhetoric to justify their material demands. 
When foreign invasion happened, state protection became a kind of 
selective incentives. The KMT government did not establish a national relief 
body and start providing migration assistance to ordinary people until April 
1938.
253
 To a large extent, peasants and many urbanites that did not have the 
skills needed by the government were not granted with any migration 




The industrialists‘ attitudes toward state nationalist mobilization reaffirm 
the instrumentalist proposition that individuals participate in nationalist 
movements to advance personal material interests. Unlike ordinary workers, 
industrialists had money and connections, and therefore were more capable of 
protecting themselves as well as their family members. Consequently, they did 
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not need state assistance in migration as much as the workers did. To attract 
industrialists to move to the interior, the government had to provide more 
lucrative incentives. Some industrialists were promised profits of five to ten 
percent of annual production for a period of five to seven years, low-interest 
loans, and free factory sites.
255
  
To assist the removal of private industry, the Executive Yuan allocated a 
special fund of 560,000 yuan.
256
 Yet, the fund was far from enough. Due to 
fiscal constraint, the government only managed to evacuate a small proportion 
of the industrial sector. Priority was given to the heavy industries, while for 
light industries such as the textile industry, only factories of good size and 
with well-maintained equipment received assistance from the government.
257
 
Consequently, many owners of the light industrial factories chose to stay in 
the International Settlements of Shanghai and Guangdong.
258
 Lin Jiyong 
harshly criticized the self-serving industrialists, writing that ―two decades of 
imperialist invasion barely left any impression in their dreams.‖259 
Effects on Mobilization For people who joined the state-led retreat, as their 
dependence on the state increased, they became more willing to follow the 
state‘s instruction. For the state elites, the war gives them an opportunity to 
strengthen their control over citizens. In April 1938, the KMT government 
eventually established the first national relief body—the Development and 
Relief Commission (DRC). Believing that ―to move one more refugee to the 
western provinces was concomitant with attributing additional force to the 
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In search of state protection, individuals became more willing to endure 
hardship and expected fewer immediate economic payoffs from the state. The 
assistance that the DRC provided to refugees was in fact very basic. It was 
common for an adult refugee to live on a few cents per day.
261
 A DRC staff 
reported:  
[L]imited by fiscal expenditures on relief, most of our hostels are no 
more than shabby rooms with crude equipment. It is quite 
uncomfortable. Refugees passing by regard it as a prison and are 
usually reluctant to stay. Even though some spend nights in a hostel, 
they want to leave as soon as possible.
262
 
Despite this, millions of people followed the government, retreating to the rear 
areas. Due to the huge influx of refugees, the population of Sichuan province 
increased from 43,747,912 in 1936 to 52,085,011 in 1937.
263
 The war enabled 
the state to suppress people‘s demands for welfare and lowered the immediate 
costs of nationalist mobilization. The KMT government would not have 
accomplished so much in relocating human and material resources, if the 
Japanese had not posed such a severe threat to the civilians. 
During the war, the DRC gradually replaced local elites and native place 
associations to become the major relief body.
264
 To increase its control over 
refugees, the DRC began to issue registration cards to refugees and revoked 
ID cards issued by other social groups. The DRC registration cards promised 
refugees access to migration services provided by the government. In return, 
migrants were required to follow the government‘s instructions regarding 
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The control over refugees proved to be conducive to wartime production 
and state accumulation. Once the refugees arrived in Free China, they were 
transformed into a productive force. In Sichuan, the government organized the 
refugees to cultivate wasteland and work in state-owned factories. A Canadian 
observer recorded in the fall of 1939 that a reclamation program sponsored by 
the government had resettled 30,000 refugees, and about 100,000 acres of land 
had been reclaimed.
266
 According to this observer, the reclamation of the 
wasteland in the southwest corner of Sichuan was also in progress. It would 
resettle thousands of refugee families over 200,000 acres of land.
267
 By the 
end of the war, the DRC run twelve farms accommodating 70,000 refugees 
and thirteen factories employing 9,000 workers.
268
 The refugee factories 
produced various articles ranging from Chinese typewriters, paper, water 
pumps, to chemicals, electrical supplies, and automobile parts.
269
 
4.2.2 Life in the Interior: Japanese Bombing and its Effects on Wartime 
Mobilization 
Foreign Threats and State Protection Natives of Sichuan first felt the impacts 
of the war when they saw the streets, hotels, schools, and cinemas that they 
were familiar with were jammed with refugees. During the war, the Japanese 
air raids constantly strengthened the public‘s threat perception. The first attack 
was on 8 November 1938. In the following years, Chengdu, Chongqing, and 
other major cities and towns in Sichuan suffered from intensive bombings. 
According to Chinese official estimates, during the eight-year war, the 
Japanese used at least 7,380 aircraft to attack sixty-six cities and counties in 
Sichuan. A survey of casualties and damage in fifty-eight Sichuan counties 
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shows that the Japanese bombing killed about 22,500 people, destroyed 
233,200 houses and 34,700 dan of grain, and killed 2,100 livestock.
270
  
The presence of a strong and imminent foreign threat facilitated state 
mobilization. Ordinary people, in search of state protection, became more 
responsive to state mobilization, even if they did not receive extra economic 
benefits. For individuals, state mobilization at least guaranteed an organized 
evacuation. In Chengdu, for instance, under the direction of the government, 
about 150,000 Chengdu urbanites moved to the countryside within a single 
week.
271
 Before the air raid on 11 June 1939, as many as 200,000 Chengdu 
residents were evacuated, which significantly reduced the casualties that the 
air raid might have caused.
272
  
Because of the mass participation, the KMT government was able to 
relocate numerous factories and institutes. It is estimated that during the war, 
two-thirds of Chengdu‘s population joined the evacuation, and all of the 
schools, banks and factories were relocated to the suburbs.
273
 Tremendous 
resources were saved from being destroyed by the enemy. Workers in the 
Guangqianhui steel plant, for instance, creatively used hill-shaped net to cover 
the rolling mill and camouflaged smokestacks to make them look like large 
trees or towers.
274
 Valuable machines and useful materials were moved to 
bunkers. Even fruits were well-sheltered.  
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The indiscriminate bombings by the Japanese seemed to provoke altruistic 
spirit and result in a growing national consciousness among the Chinese 
people. In Chongqing, as many as 20,000 citizens joined the Defense Corps 
(fanghu tuan) and took on the responsibilities including controlling fire and 
rescuing the injured after the bombing.
275
 In the hope of assisting the 
government to purchase more combat aircrafts, many people responded to the 
government‘s call for making patriotic donations or buying government bonds. 
Between 26 February and 12 March 1939, citizens of Chongqing donated 
about five million yuan.
276
 In a patriotic donation campaign launched by 




Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate the role played by emotive 
nationalism. It is worth emphasizing that two material conditions were crucial 
to the formation of a national identity. First, the harms inflicted by the 
Japanese on the civilians, rather than abstract pronouncements of belief in 
nationalism, played an important role in impressing upon individuals a 
national identity. As an observer noted, only ―after the air-raids began, and 
continued, the people of Szechwan (Sichuan) developed a personal dislike of 
the Japanese.‖278 
Second, the protection and other services provided by the state laid down 
the foundation on which a national identity could emerge. For instance, Lu 
Liu‘s research demonstrates that during the war, many refugees gradually 
shifted their identity from a regional to a national one.
279
 Lu attributes the 
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change to the fact that the state replaced native place associations and became 
the major provider of the means of survival.
280
  
The war made it clear to the ordinary Chinese people that only the state 
had the capacity to protect them against such a strong foreign enemy. By 1944, 
Chongqing had built enough bunkers to protect as many as 450,000 people.
281
 
In view of the intensity of the air-raids, the KMT government‘s performance 
in delivering protection to the masses was satisfactory. Although Chongqing 
endured over a quarter of all the raids on China during the war, it suffered 
fewer than three percent of civilian casualties nationwide.
282
  
As it became the primary provider of means of survival, the state was able 
to tighten its control over citizens. For instance, all citizens in Chongqing were 
required to collect residence permits from the government, and those who 
refused to follow state instructions would be prohibited from purchasing rice 
at the state-set price.
283
 The evacuees from the southwest cities must also 
report to the baojia registration office of the relocation sites.
284
 The KMT 
government‘s control over the population reached a level unprecedented in the 
prewar period.  
The registration of citizens enabled the KMT government to better 
command domestic labor force and spur production. During the war, it played 
an active role in the labor market, appointing workers to appropriate positions. 
Population and labor controls were imposed. The local governments, for 
instance, were instructed to take measures to limit the number of rickshaw 
pullers, and laborers employed by sectors irrelevant to wartime production. 
The Outlines for Labor Mobilization promulgated in September 1942 
stipulates that ―citizens between sixteen and fifty years of age, except for those 




 Chongqing Municipal Archives and Department of History of the Southwest Normal 
University, eds., Chongqing da hongzha, 1938-1943 [The Big Bombings on Chongqing] 
(Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1990), 35. 
282
 Howard, Workers at War: 128. 
283
 Chongqing da hongzha, 1938-1943, 34. 
284
 Zhang, "Riji hongzha xia de Sichuan chengshi renkou shusan," 170. 
    
112 
 
who lose the ability to work due to illness and handicap, are under an 
obligation to contribute labor to the country.‖285  
At the same time, the government capitalized on the war to suppress the 
socioeconomic demands of the people to the largest possible extent. It, for 
instance, imposed wage control in 1941.
286
 The authority attributed the daily 
hardship to the war and the foreign enemy and encouraged the workers to 
make more sacrifices. As a political tract declared:  
We must increase production, especially military defense production, 
to end our suffering. Replenishing our munitions will accelerate the 
collapse of our enemy. Once our enemy collapses, prices will 
naturally stabilize. Our working lives will be joyful and prosperous 
and the country‘s people will all enjoy prosperity.287  
Due to inflation, the real wages of industrial worker kept declining after 1940. 
By December 1942, industrial workers‘ actual income was only 20 percent of 
its 1937 value.
288
 In fact, workers had to tolerate not only low wages, but also 
long working hours. It was common for workers of the defense industry to 
work for thirteen, sometimes even up to sixteen, hours per day.
289
 
However, as to the question of whether the government had successfully 
suppressed the workers‘ socioeconomic demands without causing the latter‘s 
discontent and passivity, there is mixed evidence. On the one hand, despite the 
low wages, there were signs of productivity improvement. For instance, the 
Chongqing Yufeng Yarn Factory hired 2,800 workers in 1939, with an annual 
production of about 10,000 pieces. In 1942, the number of workers reduced to 
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2,050, while production increased to 12,406 pieces.
290
 Many factories 
continued producing even when the Japanese bombings were going on.
291
  
On the other hand, the fact that the war was going on did not make 
self-centered material interests irrelevant. Joshua Howard‘s study on workers 
at war, for instance, illustrates that although they had a pronounced sense of 
patriotic sacrifice, ―improving their material conditions and avoiding 
conscription was of more lasting importance.‖292 Howard finds that ―mobility‖ 
became a weapon employed by workers. Against the government‘s legal 




The mixed evidence presented above suggests that the ongoing war indeed 
spurred workers to contribute to the nationalist cause. Yet, the war alone did 
not bring about a complete success of nationalist mobilization. The KMT 
government would have done a much better job in mobilizing workers, if it 
had managed to establish institutions that favored the workers‘ interests.  
Pro-majority institutions make the government‘s promise of future payoffs 
more credible, I demonstrate in Chapter 5 that the CCP capitalized on the 
Korean War to mobilize the workers. Meanwhile, the establishment of 
pro-majority institutions, such as the labor insurance system, provided the 
workers with more incentives to make short-term sacrifices for long-term 
gains. In contrast, the KMT government did not introduce labor insurance 
until 1943. When it was initiated, the labor insurance only benefited a small 
segment of the labor force, confined to salt workers in Northern Sichuan. Only 
5,167 workers were covered by the insurance.
294
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In summary, the war posed a strong and imminent threat to the ordinary 
Chinese people. Seeking for state protection, individuals became more willing 
to respond to state mobilization and requested fewer economic payoffs. This 
explains the qualified success the KMT government achieved in mobilizing 
the masses. The next section examines how pro-minority institutions adversely 
affected nationalist mobilization. 
4.3 Pro-Minority Institutions and Their Effects on Nationalist 
Mobilization 
The previous section examines foreign threats and their effects on state 
mobilization with an emphasis on urban dwellers and industrial mobilization. 
This section shifts the focus from the urban areas to the rural areas. After a 
series of military defeats, Sichuan gradually became ―the only place where the 
Nationalists could step up grain collection and recruitment.‖295 In such a 
populous agricultural province, peasants naturally became the most important 
source of military recruits and shouldered the burden of financing the war. 
Nevertheless, unlike the urbanites, peasants in Sichuan suffered less from the 
Japanese air raids. As a result, the adverse effects of the pro-minority 
institutions on nationalist mobilization were even more evident. 
4.3.1  Pro-Minority Economic Institutions 
Economic institutions in wartime Sichuan were characteristically pro-minority.  
First, during the war, the problem of land concentration in Sichuan became 
increasingly severe. In fear of high inflation, bureaucrats, officers, merchants, 
and landlords who retreated from east China to the interior chose to invest in 
land. In 1940, 79.7 percent of the land in Sichuan was owned by landlords, 
who only accounted for 8.6 percent of the population.
296
 In Chengdu County, 
landlords who accounted for 1.1 percent of the population possessed about 
ninety percent of the land.
297
 Meanwhile, the number of tenant peasants in 
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Sichuan increased steadily, while numbers of independent peasants decreased 
(see Table 4.6). 








1937 23.7 20.4 55.9 
1946 20.9 18.1 61.1 
Source: Tonghu Peng, ―Sichuan Agriculture during the War of Resistance‖, in 
ed., Chinese Economic History Commission of Sichuan Province, Economy of 
the Rear Area during the War of Resistance, Sichuan University Press, 1989, 
164.  
 
Second, the distribution of income also favored the interest of landlords. In 
prewar Sichuan, peasants usually handed sixty percent of their harvest to 
landlords as rents. Starting from this high level, rents kept climbing during the 




Additionally, tenants were also required to pay a deposit (ya zu) to 
landlords in advance. Yet, high inflation put hapless peasants in a more 
disadvantageous position. The deposit devalued rapidly and was worth much 
less when the tenancy ended. For instance, in 1944, a peasant in Ba County of 
Sichuan paid the landlord a 10,000 yuan deposit and rented twenty mu of land. 
At that time, the peasant could buy ten chi of cloth with the deposit. The 
landlord terminated the contract one year later. Although the peasant 




4.3.2 Pro-Minority Political Institutions 
The baojia system in Sichuan further enhanced the political position of the 
rich minority, just as it did in Jiangxi in the 1930s. The Plan for Organizing 
Baojia in the Two Provinces of Sichuan and Guizhou issued by the KMT 
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government in January 1938 stipulated that having certain amount of assets 
was a qualification for the position of lianbao chief and baojia head. The Plan 
stated clearly that if the candidate was a peasant, he must be literate and an 
―independent peasant‖ (zi geng nong), which meant that the candidate was 
required to own the land that he tilled.
300
 A roll of baojia cadres of Xinjin 
County shows that twenty-six of the thirty-six bao heads and thirty-four of the 
thirty-six deputy bao heads were ―gentry‖.301 As frequently, it was those with 
close ties to landlords that assumed the position of baojia heads and acted as 
the landlords‘ agents rather than faithful implementers of government policy. 
   During the war, the KMT government took a series of measures to reform 
grassroots political institutions. In September 1939, the KMT government 
proclaimed to build New Counties (xin xian zhi) nationwide. One purpose of 
the reform was to foster self-government at the sub-county level and solicit 
public support. As a part of the reform, the township/town assembly composed 
of representatives elected by the bao assemblies was to be set up. The 
township/town assembly was vested with the power to elect the executive 
chief of the township/town government. Below the township/town level, the 
bao and jia head would also be elected by bao people's assembly and the 
council of family heads, respectively.
302
  
   In theory, the representative bodies would serve as a check on the arbitrary 
use of power by local tyrants and evil gentry. In reality, however, the 
representative institutions existed largely on paper. By 1942, only 53 of the 
142 counties and cities in Sichuan established township/town assemblies.
303
 
In areas where voting took place, electoral results were often manipulated by 
the landlords. For instance, a journalist reported that in a bao head election, a 
candidate who won more than sixty votes lost out to the other candidate who 
won only thirty votes. The only reason was that the latter was backed by 
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 As Elisabeth Perry and Merle Goldman contend, 
―the baojia system seriously undermined self-government efforts and 
eventually replaced the nascent self-government system.‖ 305  In a word, 
despite the efforts on the part of the KMT government, the pro-minority nature 
of the grassroots political institution remained throughout the Republican era.  
4.3.3 Effects on Mobilization 
Pro-minority economic institutions led to producer passivity. Due to high rents 
and heavy taxes, many peasants were forced to sell or abandon their land. To 
promote agricultural production and reduce wasteland, the KMT government 
appealed to coercive measures. The Outlines for the Preparation and 
Establishment of Refugee Reclamation Region enacted by the Executive Yuan 
in 1939 required owners of wasteland to cultivate their land within a 
prescribed time. Otherwise, their land would be rented out, purchased, or 
expropriated by the government.
306
 However, the Outlines were not effective 




   Indeed, the government provided some positive incentives to the peasants. 
For instance, the KMT government set up an experimental district in Beibei, a 
satellite town of Chongqing. To support independent peasants, the government 
purchased land from original owners and distributed it to peasants. Meanwhile, 
peasants received loans from state-owned banks so that they could buy the 
land that they received.
308
 However, the official estimation shows that only 
eighty peasant households benefited from this program.
309
 The small number 
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of beneficiaries indicates that whatever good accomplished by the experiment 
was too minuscule in scope. More importantly, this support scheme, albeit 
limited in scale, was extremely expensive. Land purchasing cost the 
government as much as two million yuan.
310
 It was simply impossible to 
apply the scheme nationwide. The CCP expropriated the landlords‘ land and 
distributed the land among the peasants to facilitate mobilization, while the 
KMT did not find an effective way to reduce the immediate costs of mass 
mobilization.  
The crippling effects of pro-minority political institutions on mobilization 
were best illustrated by their influence on wartime conscription. Instead of 
enhancing state control over citizens, the baojia system provided an 
autonomous source of power to local elites, who wielded their power to 
advance private interests. During the war, it was common for bao heads to 
send militiamen to the countryside to round up those without money or power. 
Using the pretext of recruitment, some bao heads seized more men than 
government quota demanded and asked their families to pay ransom money. A 
writer once noted that for bao heads, ―conscription is only a good opportunity 
to make money.‖311 
   Although the government imposed universal military service in 1933, in 
practice, conscription weighed unequally on the poor. Bao heads routinely 
fabricated official records and sold exemptions to the rich. To guarantee 
fairness in the process of conscription, the government introduced a lottery. 
Yet, fraud by bao heads was a prevalent practice. Those who were drafted 
were always from peasant families, while sons of the landlords often turned 
out to be the lucky ones.  
Despite that the conscription law exempted the ill, only children, and the 
breadwinners of peasant families from being drafted, these people were often 
forcibly seized by bao heads. It was even better for bao heads if the man was 
the only child of his family, so that bao heads could extort more ransom 
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 According to Governor Chang Ch‘un's estimates, only 28.9 percent 
of Sichuan‘s draftees met the medical standards required for military 
service.
313
 A military officer once reported that in a company of recruits, only 




Pro-minority institutions alienated the masses. To evade conscription, 
many peasants fled into mountainous areas to join bandit gangs.
315
 Desertion 
was also rife. Frequently, only half of the draftees would ever reach the base 
camps.
316
 To reduce desertion, the army avoided recruiting local people and 
had to go to enormous trouble of transporting recruits over long distance to the 
front.
317
 The lack of public consent significantly raised the costs of nationalist 
mobilization.  
Even worse, bao heads' malpractices made army recruitment a primary 
source of social upheavals. For instance, a series of strikes by salt miners took 
place in north Sichuan between 1939 and 1940. A government official who 
conducted an investigation at the salt mines reported that although the KMT 
government's conscription policy excused salt miners from military service, 
bao heads illegally exempted their relatives by fabricating the roll of salt 
miners, and seized real miners to fill the vacancies. The official concluded that 




   The economic benefits offered by the KMT government played a crucial 
role in facilitating conscription of soldiers and laborers. In provinces where 
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family support stipends were made available to recruits, recruitment proceeded 
smoothly and sometimes even exceeded the quota assigned by the central 
government.
319
 However, mobilizing the masses by providing participants 
with immediate economic payoffs proved to be too costly for the government. 
Due to fiscal pressures, the government had to cut army pay by twenty percent 
soon after the war broke out.
320
 
   The appropriation of state resources by bao heads further increased the 
immediate costs of mobilization. It was common for bao heads to embezzle 
stipends that the government offered to the draftees‘ families and conscript 
peasant laborers.
321
 A contemporary writer recorded that the government 
offered each conscript laborer a boarding fee of 0.3 yuan per day. Yet, liabao 
and bao heads pocketed the bulk of the government funds. As a result, each 
conscript laborer only received 0.1 yuan, and sometimes nothing. Many 
laborers were required to prepare their own meals. The writer concluded that 
the corruption of lianbao and bao heads was the major cause of ordinary 
people‘s passivity in terms of nationalist participation.322  
   In summary, the negative effects of the pro-minority institutions on 
nationalist mobilization were patent. On the one hand, the baojia system 
provided an autonomous source of power to the landlords, who in turn wielded 
their political power to exploit the poor majority and appropriate state 
resources. On the other hand, disadvantaged by the pro-minority institutions, 
peasants remained passive in the face of state-led nationalist mobilization. For 
the state, the resistance from a powerful minority and the passivity of a poor 
majority raised the immediate costs of nationalist mobilization. 
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4.4 Alternative Explanations 
4.4.1 Central-Local Relations and Mobilization Implementation 
The conflicts between the central government and provincial militarists had 
been a chronic problem for the KMT regime. Before 1935, the dominant 
features of Sichuan politics had been the continuous struggle among provincial 
militarists, who divided Sichuan‘s territories into many garrison areas (fangqu) 
and wielded power within their territories. Although these provincial armies 
accepted unit designations by the Nanjing government, the latter‘s control 
over the former was nominal. As Robert Kapp recorded, during this period, no 
central government troops were stationed in Sichuan. In 1934, taxes levied in 




   Nevertheless, poor central-local relations and the lack of policy 
implementation do not provide sufficient explanation for the limited success of 
wartime mobilization. As a matter of fact, the central government was able to 
enhance its control over Sichuan gradually before the Sino-Japanese War 
erupted. The CCP‘s Long March starting in the end of 1934 gave the Nanjing 
government a good opportunity to extend its control over the provinces of 
south and west China. A possible Communist incursion to Sichuan raised the 
concerns of Sichuan provincial militarists. Facing the increasing threat posed 
by the CCP, Liu Xiang—a prominent Sichuan militarist—met Chiang 
Kai-shek in Nanjing in November 1934 and requested more substantive 
assistance from the central government in dealing with the Communists. 




With the backing of the central government, Liu Xiang abolished the 
garrison areas and unified the provincial politics. A new provincial 
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government was established in 1935.
325
 Although the tensions between Liu 
Xiang and Chiang Kai-shek kept escalating between 1935 and 1937, the 
competition between the two figures did not hamper the implementation of 
mobilization, but facilitated it.  
In fact, the organization of baojia in Sichuan started as early as 1935.
326
 
Competing for power, both the provincial and central factions intended to 
enhance control over grassroots offices and attached great importance to the 
construction of baojia. Liu Xiang set up seven kinds of personnel training 
institutes for baojia cadres, and personally assumed the position of the director 
of the Sichuan Provincial Training Class for Baojia Cadres.
327
 From October 
1936 to July 1937, more than 4,000 baojia cadres took training sessions in the 
Provincial Training Class.
328
 In fear of losing out to the provincial 
government, the central government also employed its own agent to 
implement grassroots reform in Sichuan. The Special Movement Corps, which 
played an important role in organizing baojia in Jiangxi, settled in Sichuan in 
1935 to continue their task.
329
  
In a word, the inadequacy of wartime mobilization cannot be attributed to 
the lack of implementation of mobilization by local officials. Competition 
between the central and provincial government sped up the establishment of 
the baojia system. By 1939, the KMT government had completed the 
organization of baojia in Sichuan. In 135 counties and two cities in Sichuan, 
4,508 lianbao, 71,947 bao, and 741,746 jia were established.
330
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Liu Xiang‘s sudden death in January 1938 placed the central government 
in an advantageous position vis-à-vis other local militarists. As Robert Kapp 
notes,  
Liu Hsiang (Liu Xiang) had been the single most important 
provincial figure in Szechwanese (Sichuanese) resistance to outside 
intrusions … Liu‘s death removed the head from a body of military 
officers whose main connection with one another had been their 
common connection with Liu.
331
 
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the central government further 
weakened the provincial factions by sending Sichuanese troops to the front. 
Resistance from local militarists had been drastically reduced and was not the 
major factor that impeded wartime mobilization.  
4.4.2 Ethnic Animosities 
Some may attribute the KMT government‘s achievements in mobilizing 
domestic society during the Sino-Japanese War to the atrocities committed by 
the Japanese and the Chinese people‘s hatred towards the Japanese. A 
hypothesis derived from this proposition is: The more atrocities foreign troops 
commit, the more likely that people would participate in nationalist resistance. 
Moreover, this line of argument tends to emphasize the lasting effects of 
hatred. Students of nationalism, for instance, often attribute present-day 
violence to historic grievances.
332
 
Different from the hatred argument, the instrumentalist explanation 
suggests that individuals participate in nationalist movements if participation 
maximizes the likelihood of survival. Sustained high-level mobilization 
requires a lasting foreign threat. If foreign enemies cease to pose a direct threat 
to the people, mobilization is likely to slow down.  
   Empirical evidence lends more support to the instrumentalist explanation. 
As was demonstrated above, the initial stage of the war caused high civilian 
casualties in the lower Yangtze region. In Nanjing, hundreds of thousands of 
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people perished in the Nanjing Massacre.
333
 Nevertheless, the city soon 
witnessed a pronounced increase in urban population after the killing had 
stopped. Tens of thousands of people arrived each day to acquire Loyal 
Subject Identification from the Japanese occupiers.
334
 Many came to the city 
looking for jobs that reconstruction brought. The city‘s population climbed 
from the 458,940 in the beginning of 1939 to 576,347 by the end of the year 
(see Table 4.7). In Jiading, a great number of people came back to the city 
once the bombing stopped. By the end of January 1938, 16,541 people held 




Table 4.7 The Population of Nanjing 
(Unit: person) 
January February March April May June 
458,940 466,153 486,208 507,718 517,422 507,843 
July August September October November December 
510,177 524,054 544,047 552,278 569,039 576,347 
Source: Mark Eykholt, Living the Limits of Occupation in Nanjing, China, 
1937-1945, Ph.D. Dissertation, the University of Michigan, 1999, 120. 
 
   Some refugees who arrived in Free China found life difficult. Those who 
could not endure the hardship chose to return home in the occupied areas. In 
fear of losing more human and material resources to the Japanese occupiers, 
the KMT government had to impose censorship on postal communication and 
destroy letters that might temp refugees to return home.
336
  
It is useful here to draw a parallel between north China and the lower 
Yangtze region. Both areas were under the Japanese occupation during the war. 
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However, the Japanese occupiers pursued different policies in these two areas.  
Chalmers Johnson‘s seminal work on peasant nationalism demonstrates that in 
north China, the Japanese appealed to the mopping-up campaigns and reprisals 
against the civilian population to maintain their occupation. In Johnson‘s 
words, ―The threat of terror and devastation was a constant ingredient in 
Chinese rural life for seven years.‖ 337 The Japanese policy of ―kill all, burn 
all, destroy all‖ drove peasants into the rank of resistance force and 
accelerated the CCP‘s mobilization.338 
In contrast, the Japanese occupation of the lower Yangtze region was more 
successful. The Japanese troops quickly drove guerrilla units out of the region, 
which eliminated the need to carry out reprisals against civilians. The 
moderate occupying policy undermined nationalist mobilization by the 
Communists. By the late 1943, the Japanese occupiers had established several 
Model Peace Zones in the Yangtze Delta.
339
 This comparison lends support 
the instrumentalist explanation: individuals participate in nationalist 
movements to maximize likelihood of survival. Sustained high-level 
mobilization requires a lasting foreign threat.  
4.5 Conclusion 
The Sino-Japanese War presented the KMT government with a rare 
opportunity to strengthen its control over citizens. The Japanese invasion 
posed a direct threat to the physical security of the ordinary Chinese, who 
turned to the state for protection. The success that the KMT government 
achieved in industrial relocation and the evacuation of the populace, to a large 
extent, can be attributed to the war.  
Nevertheless, the pro-minority political and economic institutions 
alienated the vast majority of the population. Disadvantaged by domestic 
institutions, the lower-classes expected immediate economic payoffs for their 
contributions to the national cause. Despite that the government appealed to 
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nationalism and called for self-sacrifice, ordinary people were more concerned 
with their own material conditions: workers changed jobs against government 
regulations seeking for better wages; peasants abandoned land. Some people 
even rose up in revolt. Furthermore, pro-minority institutions provided the rich 
minority with an autonomous source of power. The landlords appropriated 
resources that the state devoted to nationalist mobilization. In a word, 
pro-minority institutions raised the immediate costs of nationalist mobilization. 
The wartime mobilization led by the KMT government achieved limited 
success.  
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Chapter 5  The Lower Yangtze Region during the Korean War: 
Strong Threat Perceptions, Pro-Majority Institutions, and 
Successful Nationalist Mobilization 
Between 1950 and 1951, the Communist regime appealed to nationalism and 
launched a series of political campaigns, including the Resist America and Aid 
Korea Campaign, land reform, and the Campaign to Suppress 
Counterrevolutionaries.
340
 The achievements were remarkable. The new 
regime mobilized substantial resources, which it devoted to waging the 
Korean War. Moreover, these political campaigns assisted the CCP to wipe 
out domestic contenders—the so-called ―counterrevolutionaries‖. When the 
Korean War ended in July 1953, the Chinese society was completely different 
from when the war began. Yet, none of these accomplishments would have 
been possible if there had been no mass participation. What, then, explains the 
Communist regime‘s success in rousing the masses to collective action?  
   A strong and imminent foreign threat and the establishment of 
pro-majority institutions are the key to the success of state nationalist 
mobilization. The former increases ordinary people‘s reliance on the state for 
protection. Individuals lend support to state-led nationalist mobilization 
provided that the state is capable of delivering effective protection. The latter 
lowers the immediate costs of nationalist mobilization by encouraging 
participants to exchange short-term gains for long-term gains. State elites are 
able to mobilize the masses by promising them future economic payoffs. 
Moreover, pro-majority institutions deprive social elites of an autonomous 
power sources and leave social elites, such as the landlords, with little room to 
maneuver and resist government policy. As a result, the cost of nationalist 
mobilization is reduced.  
The lower Yangtze region during the Korean War provides a case that can 
be used to test my hypotheses. First, although the battle field was on the 
faraway Korean Peninsular, the threat of war was directly felt by people living 
in the lower Yangtze region. As a major industrial and commercial center of 
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China, the region‘s strategic value heightened the risks of foreign attacks. 
Meanwhile, the assaults by the KMT and the presence of the U.S. Navy in the 
Taiwan Strait further enhanced people‘s threat perception. Second, a set of 
pro-majority institutions, including the labor insurance system and the Peasant 
Association, was set up between 1950 and 1953. The two factors account for 
the success of nationalist mobilization.  
This chapter is divided to five sections. First, I evaluate the outcome of the 
nationalist mobilization. I demonstrate that the period between 1950 and 1953 
witnessed a remarkable increase in agricultural and industrial production. 
Consequently, the state was able to extract substantial resources and wage the 
Korean War. The second and third section demonstrate how foreign threats 
and pro-majority institutions affected nationalist mobilization. The fourth 
section examines competing accounts for the outcome of the mobilization. I 
maintain that existing answers do not provide sufficient explanation. The last 
section is a conclusion.  
5.1 The Outcomes of Wartime Mobilization 
The period between 1950 and 1953 witnessed a rapid restoration of domestic 
production, a significant increase in state accumulation, as well as the 
enhancement of state control over citizens. As Jian Chen notes, when the 
Korean War ended:  
[T]he reactionary resistance to the new regime had been destroyed; 
land had been redistributed and the landlord class had disappeared; 
the Communist cadres who were believed to have lost their 
revolutionary momentum had been either ―reeducated‖ or removed 
from leading positions; the national bourgeoisie was under the tight 
control of the Communist state, and the ―petty-bourgeoisie‖ 




Restoration of Domestic Production Any victory achieved by the CCP on 
the battlefield presupposed that the new regime could raise substantial 
resources from domestic society. At home, the Sino-Japanese War and the 
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Civil War had severely disrupted production. Compared with pre-liberation 
peak, agricultural output fell by more than fourty percent, and the declines in 
hogs, sheep, and fertilizer reached eighty to ninety percent.
342
 Industrial 
production also plummeted. The coal output in 1949 was 50.1 percent of its 
1942 level, and the pig iron production 13.6 percent of the 1943 level.
343
 
Production, however, was soon restored.
 
It is worth emphasizing that the 
economic success that the Communist government achieved after 1949 was 
more than a mere standard recovery after war. Historically, the arrival of peace 
was not necessarily accompanied by economic recovery.
344
 Table 5.1 
captures the increase in the gross output value of agriculture and industry of 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu between 1949 and 1953. The national 
statistics also support the claim that agricultural and industrial production 
experienced a rapid recovery (see Table 5.2).  
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for the lower Yangtze region. As a matter of fact, the flame of the civil war did not spread to 
the region until late 1948. To a large extent, the economic depression could be attributed to 
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Table 5.1 Gross Output Value of Agricultural and Industry in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai 
(Unit: 100 million yuan) 
Notes: ⍋ At current prices; ⍒ At 1952 constant prices; * Average annual growth rate.  
Sources: Zhejiang Statistics Bureau, ed., Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook (1989), China Statistics Press, 1989, 25; Jiangsu Statistics 
Bureau, ed., Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook (1989), China Statistics Press, 1989, 115, 164; Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau, 
ed., Shanghai Statistical Yearbook, 1983, People‘s Press, 1983, 44. 
Year Gross Output Value of Industry Gross Output Value of Agriculture 





























Rate         
(%) 
1949 4.05 — 15.89 — 35.06 — 13.92 — 22.59 — 2.27 — 
1950 5.13 26.7 19.00 19.6 36.17 3.2 15.91 14.2 — — 2.74 20.7 
1951 7.46 45.4 22.55 18.7 55.69 54.0 18.59 16.8 — — 2.94 7.3 
1952 8.24 10.5 25.53 13.2 68.06 22.2 21.77 17.1 31.87 13.7 * 3.43 16.7 
1953 11.71 42.1 29.81 16.8 93.16 36.9 22.01 1.1 —  3.76 9.6 
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1949 326 – 140 – 
1950 384 17.8 191 36.4 
1951 429 11.7 264 38.2 
1952 461 7.5 349 32.2 
1953 510 10.6 450 28.9 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Zhongguo nongcun jingji tongji daquan, 
1949-86 [Compendium of Rural Economic Statistics for China, 1949-86], 
Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1989, 46-7. 
 
Some scholars claim that official data are unreliable and contain upward 
biases. Kang Chao, for instance, attempts to correct these biases and compiles 
an index of Chinese industrial output (see Table 5.3). According to Chao‘s 
index, production of factories and handicrafts doubled between 1949 and 
1952.
345
 In another work on China‘s agricultural production, Chao suggests 
that the official figure for the 1949 food grains yield is an underestimation, as 
a consequence of which increase in agricultural production is exaggerated. 
Table 5.4 compares official data with Chao‘s estimates. It can be seen that 
although Chao pushes up the 1949 yield, the increase in agricultural output 
between 1949 and 1953 is still significant. In sum, regardless whether official 
data or Chao‘s estimates are used, China‘s industrial and agricultural 
development between 1949 and 1953 are remarkable.   
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Table 5.3 Kang Chao's Indexes of Industrial Production in China, 
1949-53 
Year 
Production of Factories 
Production of Factories and 
Handicrafts 
Index 





1949 44.3 – 50.5 – 
1950 57.7 30.3 63.6 26.6 
1951 77.0 33.5 81.2 28.4 
1952 100.0 29.8 100.0 23.1 
1953 124.7 24.7 122.1 22.1 
Source: Kang Chao, The Rate and Pattern of Industrial Growth in Communist 
China, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965, 88 
 
Table 5.4 Food Grain Yields for Zhejiang and Jiangsu, 1949-53 
(Unit: 100 million jin) 
Year 
Zhejiang Jiangsu 








1949 84 105.8 133 197.5 
1950 103.4 116.6 168 213.5 
1951 124 128.0 198.8 250.3 
1952 140.8 140.8 201 256.1 
1953 143 143.0 235 294.2 
Source: Kang Chao, Agricultural Production in Communist China, 1949-1965, 
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970, 302-4. 
 
Increase in State Accumulation The recovery of production made it 
possible for the government to extract resources from society. Table 5.5 
demonstrates the budgetary revenue and expenditure of the local government 
of Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai. The increase in the state‘s accumulation 
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of resources during this period is reflected by the fact that government 
revenues exceeded government expenditure. In the case of Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu, the local government budgetary expenditure only equated to between 
twenty and thirty-five percent of revenue (see Table 5.5). At the national level, 
government revenue increased from 6,217 million yuan in 1950 to 21,324 
million yuan in 1953.
346
 
Because of the rapid increase in government revenue, the new regime 
acquired resources to pursue its strategic goal—waging the Korean War. In 
1950, China‘s defense spending reached 2.8 billion yuan, accounting for 41.1 
percent of the total central government expenditure (CGE). The number 
further increased to 5.2 billion yuan in 1951, 5.7 billion yuan in 1952, and 7.5 
billion yuan in 1953, which accounted for 43.0 percent, 32.9 percent, and 34.2 
percent of the CGE respectively.
347
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Budgetary Expenditure as % 
of Budgetary Revenue (%) 
Zhejiang 
1950 1.69 0.35 20.7 
1951 2.86 0.75 26.2 
1952 3.88 1.10 28.3 
1953 4.10 1.42 34.6 
Jiangsu 
1952 6.80 2.10 30.9 
1953 7.78 2.50 32.1 
Shanghai 
1950 1.09 0.8 73.4 
1951 1.45 1.48 100.2 
1952 2.55 2.1 82.3 
1953 1.99 1.87 94.0 
Sources: For figures for Zhejiang, see Zhejiang Statistics Bureau, ed., Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook (1989), Beijing: 
China Statistics Press, 1989, 265-6; for figures for Jiangsu, see Jiangsu Statistics Bureau, ed., Jiangsu Statistical 
Yearbook (1989), China Statistics Press, 1989, 115, 164; for figures for Shanghai, see Department of Comprehensive 
Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics, China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 
2005. 
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I admit that successful mobilization was not the sole factor that contributes 
to the increase in state revenues. The improvement of state extractive capacity 
also led to the rise in government revenue.
348
 Nevertheless, I emphasize that 
mass mobilization played an important role in enhancing the state‘s extractive 
capacity. The Communist government applied the ―mass line‖ to tax collection, 
and the participation of the lower-classes significantly enhanced the coercive 
capacity of the state.  
Specifically, the authority encouraged private-sector workers to cooperate 
with the government and inform the government about tax falsification and 
evasion by entrepreneurs.
349
 Businessmen were required by the government to 
attend the mass accusations meetings, sign the patriotic convention, and 
promise to stabilize prices and not to evade taxes. Consider the financial sector 
of Shanghai. The authority received 3,975 letters of accusation from 
employees in 1952. In fear of mass accusation, more than 400 capitalists 
confessed their crimes.
350
 In Jiading, a county in the suburb of Shanghai, 749 
out of 750 private business owners paid the gross receipts tax, and 300 paid 
off tax arrears.
351
 Businesses that could not afford heavy fines imposed by the 
government were forced to sell stock to the state, creating joint public-private 
enterprises and placing the firms under state cadres‘ control.352 
State Control over Citizens Apart from restoring domestic production and 
increasing state accumulation, another objective of mass mobilization was to 
discipline domestic society and enhance the state‘s control over citizens. In 
1950, the CCP still lacked mass support in the lower Yangtze region. In fact, a 
large proportion of the lower Yangtze region was ―New Liberated Areas‖. As 
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Frederick Teiwes points out, victory in the new liberated areas came by 
―unexpectedly prompt military conquest, rather than protracted revolutionary 
struggle‖. As a result, the CCP did not have sufficient time to develop the 
grassroots organizations as it had done in the old liberated areas of northern 
China.
353
 When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, land reform in some 
new liberated areas had just started.
354
 The landlords could still wield their 
power to challenge the new regime. In addition, there were also KMT security 
agents acting within the region.
355
  
Nevertheless, the new regime successfully wiped out its domestic enemies 
and won over the ―middle elements‖ whose commitment to New China was 
uncertain through the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries.
356
 
Estimates on the number of prosecuted counterrevolutionaries range from one 
million to five million.
357
 Table 5.6 lists the number of arrested 
counterrevolutionaries in different areas. In North Jiangsu alone, 44,193 
counterrevolutionaries were arrested, 12,035 sentenced to death. The numbers 
below give the reader a sense about the intensity of the campaign.  
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Nanjing 9,233 785 
Shanghai 16,292 
(From Jan to Apr 1951) 
2,916 
(From Feb to Dec 1951) 
Sources: For the figures for South Jiangsu, see Dejun Liu, Jiangsu ―sanfan‖ 
yundong yanjiu [A Study on the Three Antis Campaign in Jiangsu], Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Nanjing University, 2008. 19; For the figures for Shanghai, see 
Party History Research Office of the Party Committee of Shanghai 
Municipality and Shanghai Municipal Archives eds., Shanghai jiefang chuqi 
de shehui gaizao [Social Transformation in Newly Liberated Shangha], 
History of the Communist Party of China Press, 1999, 525. 
 
5.2 Strong Perception of Foreign Threats and Mass Participation  
5.2.1 The Public’s Perception of Threats 
Although the battlefield was in the faraway Korean Peninsular, the threat 
posed by the American and the KMT was directly felt by people in the lower 
Yangtze provinces. Several factors, including the ongoing war, the intensity of 
the war, the region‘s strategic value, its historical experience, and government 
propaganda, contributed to the formation of the threat perception among the 
public.  
   The fact that China was engaging the world‘s most powerful country on 
the battlefield concerned the public. For people in the lower Yangtze region, 
the assaults by the KMT troops further enhanced their threat perception. From 
1949, constant assaults by the KMT endangered the security of China‘s coast 
and caused civilian casualties. On 6 February 1950, the KMT planes bombed 
Shanghai and caused severe damage—about 500 fatalities, 600 injuries, and 





 In addition, the Dachen island group, located about twenty 
miles off the coast of Zhejiang, was occupied by the KMT.
359
 The struggle 
over the offshore islands did not end until 1955.
360
 After the outbreak of the 
Korean War, President Truman promptly sent the Seventh Fleet to neutralize 
the Taiwan Strait, an act that dramatically changed the scenario of the 
confrontation between the CCP and KMT regime.
361
 According to the 
estimate of the Chinese government, in 1950 alone, the KMT troops landed on 
and assaulted the southeast coastal areas for 309 times, organized 770 
―counterrevolutionary‖ revolts, forcefully seized more than 10 million jin of 
grain, and killed about 1000 CCP cadres.
362
  
Additionally, the high strategic value of the lower Yangtze provinces 
incurred risks of American bombings and KMT attacks. There is no doubt that 
the region was one of the most important industrial, commercial and 
transportation centers of China. The public had sufficient reason to believe 
that once the war escalated, the region was likely to suffer from military 
attacks first. In August 1950, American aircraft attacked the border region of 
northeastern China and shot twenty-four persons. Various social groups in 
Jiangsu soon telegraphed the Security Council of the United Nations to protest 
against the American attack,
363
 which reflected the public‘s concerns over its 
physical security. 
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Historical experience also proved that the region was a potential target of 
foreign attacks. Historically, it had never been easy for China to defend its 
coast. During the 1930s, Shanghai was bombarded by the Japanese twice. For 
people in the lower Yangtze region, what happened during the Sino-Japanese 
War was still fresh in their memory—the region was occupied by the Japanese 
within a couple of months after the war erupted. It is no surprise that the U.S. 
entry to the Korean War led to rumors in the region, such as ―The Third World 
War is going to break out‖, ―The heaven (refers to the authority) will change‖, 
and ―The government is going to retreat to the interior‖.364 
At the same time, government propaganda also played an important role in 
shaping the public‘s threat perception. In retrospect, one may preclude the 
possibility of a U.S. atomic attack on Chinese civilians and reach the 
conclusion that the Communist government exaggerated the threat deliberately 
to facilitate mass mobilization.
365
 Evidence, however, suggests that for the 
Chinese national leaders the nuclear threat was real, and that they indeed took 
atomic attacks into serious consideration. General Nie Rongzhen, for instance, 
once noted that atomic attacks might kill ―a few million people.‖366  
The top leaders‘ perception of threat was passed on to the public. Reports 
by People’s Daily, for instance, provided graphic eye-witness accounts of the 
Hiroshima bombing and measures for protection against atomic blasts. As 
Allen Whiting contends, ―amidst the exhortations to ‗volunteer‘ (the Chinese 
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People‘s Volunteer Army) were relatively frank statements of the uncertainties 
ahead ...‖ 367  
Indeed, government propaganda might be an exaggeration of the real 
threats. Yet, real events, such as the previous air raids by the KMT and the 
presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, constituted the ―tangible 
elements‖ of the threat and lent government propaganda credibility. 
Furthermore, alternative sources of information verified the Communist 
government‘s propaganda. For instance, reports from the CCP Hangzhou 
Committee on Middle School Affairs indicated that many school teachers in 
Hangzhou learned that a large U.S. force had landed at Inchon from the Voice 
of America.
368
 Rumors that the landlords and the KMT security agents spread 
also raised public concerns.
369
 
5.2.2 Effects on Mobilization 
Seeking state protection, individuals became more inclined to respond to state 
mobilization. This is best exemplified by the Patriotic Health Campaign 
launched by the government in the spring of 1952. Slogans, such as ―killing a 
fly is equivalent to killing an American bandit‖, were raised to rouse the 
public to action. Believing that the Americans might use biological weapons, 
citizens responded to state-led mobilization and acted to clean streets and 
public toilets, killing flies, rats, and mosquitoes. In Jiangsu province alone, 




Additionally, with the atmosphere of war prevailing, average citizens 
became more vigilant of domestic enemies. Due to mass participation, the 
state‘s coercive capacity and control over citizens were greatly enhanced. For 
instance, members of residents committees were called on to carry out 
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―patriotic spying‖ on their neighbors.371 By December 1951, there had been 
2,084 residents committees with a membership of 24,862 in Shanghai.
372
 
Meanwhile, there was a pronounced increase in militias. In February 1950, 
there were only 109 militias in Shanghai.
373
 Yet, by the end of 1950, 
Shanghai citizens had organized 742 Winter Defense Service Teams staffed by 
29,691 members. Up to April 1951, the number of Service Team reached 
2,020 with a membership of 174,846.
374
  
The government also appealed to nationalism to encourage production. 
People were told that ―Knitting one more towel (is equivalent to) killing an 
American soldier‖, ―Planting one mu of cotton (is equivalent to) killing an 
American soldier‖.375 According to the local government‘s report, at the 
Huaibei Salt Mine, North Jiangsu, the salt output for the first six months of 
1951 exceeded the annual production quota by twenty-five percent. Inspired 
by the slogan of ―Producing one more trolley of coal is adding a force to the 
Resist America and Aid Korea (Campaign)‖, a coal miner in Xuzhou by the 
name of Li Junting created a record of mining 258 tons of coal per day.
376
  
Workers and staff initiated various patriotic campaigns, such as setting up 
―Patriotic Donation Labor Day‖.377 Completing tasks of production ahead of 
time, saving raw materials, reducing waste, and improving productive 
technologies all related to the nationalist cause.
378
 In the countryside, peasants 
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were encouraged to pay ―patriotic grain‖ (jiao aiguo liang) to the government. 
The local government of South Jiangsu accomplished the task of levying 1.3 
billion jin of grain within half a month.
379
  
In a word, the threat of war was directly felt by people living in the lower 
Yangtze region. Such a perception of foreign threats facilitated state 
mobilization. As Frederic Wakeman writes, the Korean War ―stimulated a 
series of political and social revolutions in China that would have been 
otherwise inconceivable during the early stage of the new republic.‖380 
5.3 Pro-Majority Institutions and Mass Participation 
The presence of an imminent foreign threat made the public‘s demand for state 
protection more pressing, and thus facilitated nationalist mobilization. The 
establishment of pro-majority economic and political institutions gave workers 
and peasants a stake in the new regime and united individual interests with 
collective interests. In urban areas, the inauguration of labor insurance system 
and a wage reform tipped the income distribution in favor of the workers. In 
the countryside, the land reform greatly reduced property-based inequalities. 
This section explores how the establishment of pro-majority institutions 
affected the mobilization.  
5.3.1 Mobilizing the Urban Population  
An important component of the pro-majority institutions was the labor 
insurance system. The Labor Insurance Regulations (known colloquially as 
laobao) was first announced in November 1950, and took effect on 26 
February 1951. According to the Regulations:  
Any covered worker whose earning power is interrupted or 
terminated because of an accident (either work-connected or not), 
who becomes sick (whether or not the illness is due to working 
conditions), or who losses his working power because of old age, is 
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guaranteed a percentage of his salary and, under certain conditions, 
free medical care. 
381
 
Workers covered by the insurance program were those: 
employed in state-operated, joint state-privately operated, privately 
operated, or cooperative factories and mines, including their 
respective administrative organs and subordinate units, and in 
enterprises and their subordinate units involved in railways, 
navigation operations, and postal and telecommunications 
organizations that employed more than 100 workers and staff. 
382
 
   It is worth pointing out that the Labor Insurance Regulations were not 
applied to the entire labor force. It privileged industrial workers and 
state-sector workers. Under the Regulations, temporary, seasonal, and 
probationary workers and staff were ineligible to receive labor insurance.
383
 
Andre Walder characterizes the employment structure of the Communist 
China as a ―dualistic pattern‖.384 Elisabeth Perry estimates that in 1952, a 
―mere seven percent of the work force was covered by its (the new labor 
insurance system) generous provisions.‖385  
Nevertheless, the labor insurance system was characteristically 
pro-majority in the sense that it favored the interests of the labor. Moreover, a 
careful examination reveals that Perry‘s seven percent estimate underrates the 
benefits brought about by the labor insurance system. I suggest that to measure 
the benefits that the system brought about and assess its effects on industrial 
mobilization, the ratio of workers covered by the insurance program to the 
urban labor force or the number of industrial workers is a better indicator than 
the ratio of workers covered by the insurance program to the entire labor force. 
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This is because although rural laborers did not benefit from the labor insurance 
system, they received other institutional benefits from land reform.  
In 1952, although the entire labor force mounted to 207 million, more than 
182 million were rural laborers (see Table 5.7). There were only 16 million 
urban staff members and workers (zhigong). Industrial workers were even 
fewer, 4.939 million in 1952 and 6.188 million in 1953.
386
 In 1952, between 
3.0 and 3.3 million workers were covered by the labor insurance program. The 




Table 5.7 Social Labor Force, 1952-53 












1952 207.29 16.03 8.83 182.43 
1953 213.64 18.56 8.98 186.10 
Source: The Social Statistics Department of National Bureau of Statistics and 
The Comprehensive Plan Bureau of the Ministry of Labor, eds., Yearbook of 
Labor Statistics of China, Beijing: China Labor Press, 1993, 13. 
 
Moreover, those who benefited from the insurance system included not 
only state-sector workers but also their dependents. For instance, according to 
the Labor Insurance Regulations, dependents of workers were guaranteed 
medical care at half-cost and a pension upon the death of the breadwinner.
388
 
A survey conducted by the State Statistical Bureau in 1957 in forty-six 
municipalities shows that on average each employed person had 3.38 
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 Some estimates that in 1952, about 10 million workers and 
their dependents were covered by the labor insurance program.
390
 
Although disparity still existed, the improving trend that people were 
experiencing reassured them that more changes were going to happen. Before 
1949, labor insurance was non-existent. Workers were often fired because of 
economic fluctuations, and the turnover rate was high.
391
 It was common for 
factories to hire labor on a day-to-day basis.
392
 In comparison with the past, 
welfare services enjoyed by ordinary workers under the Communist regime 
were much improved.  
Furthermore, witnessing that people with the same social class background 
benefited from the new institutions, those who had not received any benefits 
were likely to believe that they would become one of the beneficiaries in the 
future. As a matter of fact, such a perception was not an illusion. The coverage 
of the labor insurance system expanded rapidly. According to the State 
Statistical Bureau, in 1951, 3,927 factories and mines participated in the 
program, while the number of factories and mines climbed to 4,862 in 1952 
and 5,145 in 1953.
393
 In 1953, the government further revised the Regulations. 
Not only was the range of enterprises that could participate in the labor 




In addition to the labor insurance system, the new regime adopted other 
measures to protect the interests of labor. For example, the government 
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initiated a job-introduction program, which made job opportunities more 
widely available to the ordinary people. In 1949, the unemployment rate was 
as high as 23.6 percent. In the following eight years, 16.7 million jobs were 
created, and one-third of these job opportunities were introduced by the 
government. The unemployment rate was lowered to 5.9 percent.
395
 In 
Shanghai, registered unemployed persons reached 170,000 in 1950, while the 
number was reduced to 46,000 by mid-1951.
396
 Moreover, the CCP also 
launched a nation-wide wage reform in 1950, which drastically reduced the 
wage differentials between workers and office staff.
397
  
5.3.2 Mobilizing the Rural Population 
The land reform carried out in the lower Yangtze region between 1950 and 
1952 reduced property-based inequalities and established a land ownership 
system favorable to the lower strata of the peasantry. In 1949, land reform in 
the old liberated areas—mainly concentrated in Northeast China and North 
China—was completed. In the lower Yangtze region, about four million 
peasants in North Jiangsu, around twenty percent of the region‘s rural 
population, had experienced the land reform before 1949.
398
 Reform needed 
to be implemented in areas including some parts of North Jiangsu, South 




Initially, the land reform pursued a relatively moderate line. The Agrarian 
Reform Law that was put in to effect on 30 June 1950 stipulated: the objective 
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of the reform was to ―set free the rural productive forces, develop agricultural 
production and thus pave the way for New China‘s industrialization.‖400 The 
moderates, including Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Rao Shushi (the Chairman 
of the East China Administrative Area), believed that the rich peasants‘ 
interests should be protected from infringement.
401
 In contrast, the radicals, 
such as Deng Zihui (the Chairman of the Central-South China) argued that if 
the reform left rich peasants‘ land untouched, there might not be enough land 
to be distributed to poor peasants.
402
 Despite the debates, the final agreement 
achieved by the Chinese leadership followed the moderate line. According to 
the 1950 Law, only land owned by landlords would be confiscated.
403
 
Nevertheless, land reform was sped up and radicalized in the second half 
of 1950. Two factors might contribute to the prevalence of the radical line. 
One was the outbreak of the Korean War. For the new regime, the Korean War 
endowed land reform with a new task: furthering the CCP‘s alliance with poor 
peasants and destroying the KMT‘s social base. On 17 November 1950, Mao 
Zedong telegraphed Chen Yi and Rao Shushi, ordering them to arrange all the 
work on the premise of an imagined scenario that American and Chiang 
Kai-shek‘s troops might land at East China.404 
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Under Mao‘s instruction, the regional authority of East China soon 
changed the guide line of land reform from ―Be careful and discreet, going 
further steadily (Xiaoxin jinshen, wenbu qianjin) to ―Give a free hand to 
mobilize the masses, carry out the movement fearlessly (Fangshou fadong 
qunzhong, dadan kaizhan yundong).‖405 The official statements emphasized 
that ―inside and outside the country counter-revolutionary elements are 
intensifying their subversive activities,‖ and that only by accelerating land 
reform could the achievements be consolidated.
406
 
The other factor that contributed to the change of policy was the resistance 
from the landlords.
407
 I argued in Chapter 2, mobilization succeeds not 
because local resistance does not exist, but state elites manage to counter the 
resistance and demolish traditional networks of authority in the process of 
mobilization. In its initial stage, the land reform encountered resistance from 
the landlords.
408
 The Communist regime‘s response to such resistance was to 
increase its reliance on the peasantry and smash the landlords completely and 
rapidly. Emphasis was given to mass campaigns. The Peasant Associations 
were set up to implement land reform. Meanwhile, poor peasants were 
recruited to form militias, which worked closely with Peasant Associations to 
enforce the reform. According to John Wong, in the New Liberated Area, 




By the spring of 1952, land reform in the Lower Yangtze region had been 
completed. The changes brought by the reform were tremendous. Before 1949, 
land ownership in the lower Yangtze region was unequal. In South Jiangsu, for 
instance, the landlords who comprised two percent of the total population 
owned forty percent of the land, and rents usually absorbed between forty and 
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fifty percent of a tenant‘s annual production.410 During the land reform, 
landlords‘ land and properties were confiscated and distributed to poor 
peasants. 
Table 5.8 lists land and other properties confiscated and requisitioned from 
the landlords in the lower Yangtze region. The reform favored the middle and 
poor peasants, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the rural 
population. After the completion of the land reform, landlords in East China 
owned less land than poor peasants (see Table 5.9). Taking Zhejiang province 
as an example, on average, every middle peasant household and poor peasant 
household received 3.58 and 4.02 mu of arable land in the land reform, 
respectively.
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As % of Arable 















22,059,754 42.23 1,025,203 57,471 361,813 165,225,931 
South 
Jiangsu 
10,418,260 43.06 711,052 33,700 1,768,638 133,099,085 
Zhejiang 10,895,096 39.75 657,335 65,737 4,429,752 73,040,862 
Nanjing 307,816 46.73 4,108 613 44,969 1,166,286 
Shanghai 167,583 30.83 9,328 141 15,143 348,851 
Source: Huadong tudi gaige chengguo tongji, 1952, 6. 
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Table 5.9 Land Owned by Different Social Classes after the Land Reform in East China 
Social Class Population as % of Total 
Population 
Land Owned by the Social Class 
as % of Total Arable Land 
Land Per Capita                        
(mu) 
Landlord 3.48 2.76 2.12 
Rich Peasant of a 
Semi-Landlord Type 
0.29 0.35 3.15 
Rich Peasant 2.84 4.08 3.82 
Industrialist 0.22 0.02 0.28 
Small Land Lender 0.09 0.87 2.59 
Middle Peasant 39.92 45.01 3.00 
Poor Peasant 47.08 42.35 2.39 
Hired Agricultural Laborer 2.15 1.94 2.40 
Rural Handicraftsman 0.34 0.16 1.21 
Other Classes 2.80 0.95 0.90 
Public Land —— 1.51 —— 
Total 100 100 —— 
Source: Huadong tudi gaige chengguo tongji, 1952, 6.
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Pro-majority institutions were established not only in the economic but 
also the political arena. The Peasant Association was organized and given the 
responsibility to carry out the land reform below the county level.
411
 As was 
demonstrated in Chapter 3 and 4, the KMT government relied on the baojia 
system for administration at the grassroots level. The most fundamental 
difference between the Peasant Association and the baojia system was that the 
former empowered the poor majority of the rural population. To become a bao 
head, the candidate had to be at least an independent peasant.
412
 In other 
words, there was a property qualification for holding the position. On the 
contrary, the Peasant Association excluded the landlords and the rich peasants 
from participation. Its membership was only open to the lower strata of the 
peasantry, including middle peasants, poor peasants, hired agricultural 
laborers, and rural handicraftsmen.
413
 The reversed property qualification 
effectively prevented the landlords and the rich peasants from appropriating 
leading positions, and guaranteed the implementation of land reform at the 
grassroots level. 
5.3.3 The Effects on Mobilization  
The establishment of pro-majority institutions proved to be effective in 
overcoming individual passivity. For instance, in South Jiangsu, it was 
common for peasants to use river silt as fertilizer. In 1950, only fifty percent 
of households dredged river silt. In 1951, after the land reform was carried out, 
eighty percent of households were dredging river silt.
414
 In Danyang, South 
Jiangsu, more than 6,000 peasants participated in the construction of a river 
embankment. Some peasants carried bamboo baskets to the building site every 
day, so they could pick up dog droppings on their way home, which could be 
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used as fertilizer. A peasant told the interviewer: ―The land is ours. We will 
build an embankment well and apply more fertilizer to the land, so we can 
increase the output.‖ Another peasant said: ―There are more people picking up 
dog droppings than dog droppings.‖415  
Land reform boosted peasants‘ enthusiasm. I demonstrated in Chapter 3 
and 4 that due to unfavorable land policy, during the NLM and the 
Sino-Japanese War, many peasants abandoned their land and migrated to cities, 
becoming coolies and peddlers. Consequently, the uncultivated land increased. 
In contrast, between 1949 and 1953, the sown area in the lower Yangtze 
region expanded gradually. In Zhejiang, the sown area increased from 
41,150,000 mu in 1949 to 42,350,000 mu in 1953.
416
 The increase in 
productivity was also patent. According to Kang Chao‘s estimation, in 
Zhejiang, the food grain yield per mu rose from 257 jin in 1949 to 304 jin in 
1951. In Jiangsu, yield per mu was 172 jin in 1949 and 218 jin in 1951.
417
  
 In cities, pro-majority institutions generated mass support for the patriotic 
cause too. Some factories deliberately linked workers‘ performance in the 
Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries to their registration for labor 
insurance.
418
 As a consequence, there was a positive relationship between the 
institutional benefits that the state provided and the intensity of the Campaign. 
In state-owned factories where workers participated fully in the insurance 
program, mobilization was carried out with a greater intensity. The state sector 
yielded a disproportionate share of counterrevolutionaries. In Shanghai, at the 
end of 1950, there were only 145 state-owned factories in contrast to 1,264 
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The establishment of pro-majority institutions weakened the power basis of 
social elites, who in turn became less capable of resisting government policy. 
Moreover, the dispossession of the landlords and the entrepreneurs also 
generated ―revolutionary surplus‖ for the state and thus contributed to state 
accumulation. John Dixon, for instance, argues that: 
Trade union cadres quickly recognized that workers‘ welfare was a 
convenient stick with which to beat private enterprise. On the one 
hand it provided a most effective means by which the workers‘ 
support could be obtained, at little or no cost to the state. On the other 
hand it was…―an instrument of exploitation‖ used to force private 
enterprise to ―the brink of bankruptcy‖ and so prepare them for the 
inevitable ―voluntary takeover‖ by the state. 420 
The distribution of institutional incentives, instead of immediate economic 
payoffs, significantly lowered the immediate costs of nationalist mobilization. 
On the one hand, with the cradle-to-grave welfare provisions, the Communist 
government was able to keep worker‘s average wage at a low level without 
causing too much discontent. On the other hand, the welfare provisions did not 
generate unbearable costs for the state. After all, sick and disabled workers 
only constituted a small proportion of the industrial work force. Likewise, in 
the early 1950s, there were few retired workers. A worker once told an 
interviewer, ―Workers are generally very young … I myself have only seen 
one retiring worker.‖421  
In a word, pro-majority institutions lowered the immediate costs of 
mobilization. On the one hand, they encouraged the masses to exchange 
short-term gains for long-term advantages. On the other hand, pro-majority 
institutions weakened the power base of the rich minority and prevented the 
latter from appropriating political offices as well as state resources. 
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Meanwhile, the dispossession of the rich minority generated revolutionary 
surplus for the state.  
5.4 Alternative Explanations 
Existing literature attributes the Communist regime‘s success in mobilizing 
the masses to two factors: nationalist sentiments that prevailed among the 
Chinese populace and coercion employed by the government. This section 
demonstrates that neither of these two explanations proves sufficient. 
Empirical evidence poses a direct challenge to these propositions and 
necessitates more theory-building efforts.  
5.4.1 Emotive Nationalism and Animosities toward Foreign Enemies 
The instrumentalist explanation proposed by this study suggests that 
individuals participate in state-led nationalist movements in search of state 
protection. If the state fails to deliver effective protection, mass participation is 
less likely to materialize. On the contrary, propositions that emphasize the role 
of emotive nationalism may predict that the presence of a foreign enemy alone 
will provoke nationalist sentiments among a country‘s population, and rouse 
the people to collective action. I demonstrate below that empirical evidence 
lends more support to the instrumentalist proposition.  
In the first few months of the Korean War, the presence of a strong and 
imminent foreign threat generated fear among the public, but did not boost 
domestic morale and rally popular support behind the Communist regime. 
People had no idea whether the new regime had the resolve and capability to 
defend the country against the world‘s most powerful country. As a matter of 
fact, the Chinese People‘s Volunteer Army (CPVA) crossed the Yalu River in 
mid-October under strict secrecy.
422
 Until the end of October, no news of the 
CPVA appeared in the media.
423
 Only on November 2—after Chinese troops 
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For the public, in the first few months of the Korean War, the 
government‘s response was limited to verbal efforts. The government‘s lack of 
military action undermined mobilization. Knowing that the U.S had landed at 
Incheon, peasants in Jiangsu sold the land they just received during land 
reform. Some even returned it to the original landlords and began to pay 
rents.
425
 For fear of American bombing, many intellectuals requested their 
working units to allow them to work in the countryside. Businessmen 
deliberately avoided showing up in public together with CCP cadres and 
believed that it would be better for them to keep their ―gray color‖ (keep 
political position unclear).
426
 Those who just joined the CCP resigned from 
the Party.
427
 Xia Chengtao, a modern literary historian, wrote on 30 October 
1950 in his diary: ―Since the American troops achieved victory in Korea, 
rumors prevailed in Shanghai. In offices, people who used to wear a 
Lenin-style suit changed to a Western-style suit.‖428  
Mass participation in state-led nationalist movements did not materialize 
until the Communist regime demonstrated its resolve and capability of 
defending the country. In October 1958, the Chinese government officially 
launched the Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign. The fact that the 
CPVA had crossed the Yalu River and won its first battle was also revealed to 
the public. The CPVA‘s early campaigns proved to be very successful. It soon 
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pushed back the UN troops back to the 38th parallel. For the Chinese public, 
the government eventually backed its words with action.  
For the CCP, the later development on the battlefield was conducive to 
domestic mobilization. Despite that the truce talks were initiated in July 1951, 
fighting in Korea did not stop completely until 1953. The prolonged limited 
war enabled the Chinese government to maintain the wartime atmosphere at 
home and justify its call for short-term sacrifices. Meanwhile, In April 1951, 
President Truman relieved General Douglas A. MacArthur. Being the primary 
advocate of the expanding of the war, MacArthur‘s leave eliminated the 
possibility of an all-out war. The Communist regime was able to claim that it 
had effectively defended the country without having its defense capacity gone 
through a tough test, which might take the form of U.S. attacks against 
China‘s coastal provinces. 
In certain sense, just as foreign threats, whether the protection delivered by 
the state was ―effective‖ was also a matter of perception. The Chinese troops 
suffered great losses on the battlefield. Nevertheless, people at home were told 
that the CPVA had achieved a brilliant victory in Korea and successfully 
defended the country. Since the end of 1950, the communist government 
tightened its control over ―enemy radio‖. In Hangzhou, shortwave radio sets 
had to be registered with the Residents‘ Committees, and their owners had to 
pledge not to listen to VOA.
429
 As James Gao reports:  
[T]here was only one version of war (or other) news—the 
government‘s—and all posters, cartoons, exhibitions, and public talks 
repeated the same story. Any non-government rumor about the war 
would be subjected to intensive investigation and would definitely 
create lots of trouble for the people who spread it.
430
 
The perception that the new regime successfully defended the country 
encouraged people to give consent to the government. As a matter of fact, the 
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Another limitation of the emotive-nationalism proposition is that it tends to 
take popular nationalist sentiments as a given. Yet, ample evidence suggests 
that animosities against the American ―imperialists‖ were not pre-existing in 
Chinese society. Before the Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign, many 
Chinese people had held a neutral attitude toward the Americans. When the 
campaign was first launched, many people told CCP cadres that they had not 
generally suffered from American oppression and so could not force 
themselves to hate Americans.
432
 Reports from Zhejiang University indicated 
that in a regular meeting held on 19 August 1950, the university‘s board of 
trustees discussed how to strengthen ties with the American Presbyterian 
Church and passed a resolution requiring the church to allocate new funds for 
the construction of university buildings.
433
  
In a word, the fact that mass participation in the state-led nationalist 
movement did not materialize until the state demonstrated the capability of 
defending the country furnishes the instrumentalist argument with a 
remarkable confirmation. Individuals participate in state-led nationalist 
movements in search of state protection. Popular nationalist sentiments are 
sometimes an outcome, rather than the cause, of successful mobilization. 
5.4.2 State Coercion  
Some scholars underscore the use of coercion in their explanation of the 
CCP‘s success in mobilizing the masses. Julia Strauss, for instance, finds that 
levels of coercion and violence were extremely high in the early 1950s.
434
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There is an element of truth in this account. However, it does not provide 
sufficient explanation for successful mobilization for two reasons.  
First, this line of argument overlooks the difference between state coercion 
and mass coercion. The former refers to the coercion deployed by the state 
apparatus. It constitutes a drain on state resources and increases the immediate 
costs of mobilization. On the contrary, the latter is deployed by ordinary 
people with the sanction of the state.  
In the case of successful mobilization, the state elites rely less on state 
coercion and more on mass coercion. They invite the majority of the 
population to implement terror against the minority. The task of disciplining 
domestic society, to a large extent, was accomplished by the masses. The 
deployment of mass coercion is exemplified by the Suppress 
Counterrevolutionaries Campaign. In fact, Strauss also acknowledges that 
during the campaign, between forty and forty-five percent of the workers in 
Shanghai informed the authority on counterrevolutionaries.
435
  
Not all attempts at deploying mass coercion succeeded. I demonstrated in 
Chapter 3 that the New Life authority encountered problems building the 
vanguard force. This was exemplified by the slow expansion of the Youth 
Vacation Service Corps. This comparison in fact reformulates, rather than 
answers, the question. Why are some state elites able to rely on the masses to 
implement terror, while others fail?  
Second, coercion might explain the absence of active resistance, but it 
does not account for people‘s consent. Terrified by state coercion, participants 
might passively engage in state-led nationalist movements and employ 
―weapons of the weak‖ to resist government policy.436 Their passivity would 
in turn hurt productivity. Yet, as was demonstrated above, between 1950 and 
1953, there was a patent increase in producer enthusiasm and domestic 
production. Evidence as such indicates that in the early 1950s, peasants and 
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industrial workers were more inspired than terrified. As Martin Whyte 
maintains: 
[I]n spite of the fact that coercive measures were applied on a 
sweeping scale during these years, many urbanites still saw the 
period as relatively optimistic and even benign. They felt that much 
of the coercion was acceptable and even laudable, and that abuses 




Although the outbreak of the Korean War posed a severe challenge to the new 
Communist regime, it also gave the CCP an opportunity to solicit support 
from the Chinese people. The threat of the war facilitated mobilization by 
creating the demand for state protection among the public. Once the state 
demonstrated the capacity to defend the country, people became responsive to 
the state‘s nationalist mobilization.  
In addition, the CCP managed to establish a variety of pro-majority 
institutions. The labor insurance program and the land reform furthered the 
CCP‘s alliance with the lower classes. Such institutions enabled the CCP to 
mobilize the masses by promising them future payoffs, and thus lowered the 
immediate costs of nationalist mobilization. Moreover, these new institutions 
deprived the rich minority of the roots of their power. As a result, they became 
less able to resist the government policy and appropriate state resources. The 
public‘s strong threat perception and pro-majority institutions led to the 
success of nationalist mobilization. We see high-level state accumulation 
during the Korean War.   
                                           
437
 Martin King Whyte, "Urban Life in the People's Republic," in The Cambridge History of 
China, ed. Roderick MacFarguhar and John King Fairbank (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), 703. 
    
161 
 
Chapter 6  The Great Leap Forward in Sichuan: Weak Threat 
Perceptions, Hybrid Institutions, and the Mixed Outcomes of 
Mobilization 
In November 1957, during his visit to Moscow, Mao Zedong announced that 
China would overtake Britain in the production of steel and other products 
within the next fifteen years.
438
 Mao‘s announcement marked the launch of 
the Great Leap Forward (GLF). In the winter of 1957-58, the Chinese 
government initiated a mass water conservancy campaign. The population was 
mobilized to contribute labor to water conservancy schemes and various 
construction projects. The GLF further gathered momentum after the Beidaihe 
conference held in August 1958. It was here that the Chinese leadership made 
the decision to merge cooperatives into the people‘s communes to organize 
human and other resources on a larger scale.  
Another important decision Mao made at the Beidaihe conference was to 
shell the islands of Jinmen and Matsu. Mao believed that international tensions 
would create a wartime atmosphere and speed up domestic mobilization.
439
 At 
home, hundreds of millions people responded to state mobilization under the 
slogan of ―Every One a Soldier‖ and joined the militia. For the Chinese 
leadership, the establishment of militia would not only enhance the country‘s 




The GLF resulted in one of the worst famines in human history. Both 
agricultural and industrial production plummeted in 1959. Nevertheless, I 
contend that it would be misleading to label the outcome of the mobilization 
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as a ―complete failure‖. This is not only because the initial stage of the 
mobilization (from November 1957 to the end of 1958) proved to be relatively 
successful, but also because extraction of resources by the state was carried 
out effectively. State accumulation of resources continued to increase while 
people were starving. In the first section, I evaluate the outcome of 
mobilization and demonstrate that for the state, the outcomes of mobilization 
were mixed.  
The second section demonstrates that the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis did 
not alter the Chinese people‘s perception of threat. The crisis played a limited 
role in accelerating domestic mobilization. In the absence of a strong and 
imminent foreign threat, people who participated in the nationalist movement 
were primarily motivated by immediate economic payoffs.  
The third section examines the institutional change starting from 1952. I 
maintain that the initial collectivization actually favored the interests of the 
poorer strata of the peasantry. Institutions only gained pro-state features after 
people‘s communes were set up nationwide after August 1958. The 
institutional change accounts for the initial success of the mobilization and its 
failure later on. The fourth section discusses alternative accounts for the 
outcome of mobilization. I suggest that existing literature only provides partial 
or misleading answers regarding the mixed results of the GLF. The last section 
concludes this chapter.  
6.1 Evaluating the Outcome of Mobilization 
Agricultural Production The losses of agricultural sector during the GLF were 
serious. Yet, the drastic drop in agricultural production did not happen until 
1959. Table 6.1 shows that grain output in Sichuan increased by 4.8 percent in 
1958, and reduced by 26.6 percent in 1959.  
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1957 1,531 – 6.6 – 
1958 1,605 4.8 7.25 9.8 
1959 1,177.6 -26.6 9.52 31.3 
1960 972.4 -17.4 4.04 -57.6 
Source: Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of 
Statistics, ed. China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004. Beijing: China 
Statistics Press, 2005. 
 
State Accumulation Despite the decline of agricultural production after 
1958, state accumulation continued to increase. According to Liao 
Zhigao—the Party secretary of Sichuan between 1965 and 1971—the central 
government‘s grain procurement from Sichuan kept increasing during the GLF. 
Between 1953 and 1957, 3.2 billion jin of grain was transferred from this 
province to the central government every year. In 1958, the central 
government‘s procurement increased to 3.96 billion jin. Since 1959, grain 
output plummeted, but the central government‘s procurement continued to 
increase, reaching 4.9 billion jin in 1959 and 6.84 billion jin in 1960.
441
  
This trend is further confirmed by Robert Ash. From 1953 to 1957, the 
total output of grain in Sichuan was 19.88 million tons, 23 percent of which 
were procured by the state. In contrast, between 1958 and 1962, the total 
output of grain in Sichuan dropped to 15.51 million tons. The net state 
procurement rate was lifted to 25.52 percent however. Consequently, grain 
available to Sichuan peasants reduced from 15.31 million tons between 1953 
and 1957 to 11.59 million tons between 1958 and 1962.
442
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At the national level, state net grain procurement peaked in 1959 (see 
Table 6.2). Excessive procurement cut into peasant rations and was one of the 
primary causes of the Great Leap Famine.
443
 The increase in state 
accumulation was also reflected by the central government‘s budgetary 
revenue. As Table 6.3 shows, the central government‘s budgetary revenue 
increased steadily between 1957 and 1960. Nevertheless, given the fall in 
agricultural production, the growth in government revenue was not sustainable. 
State budgetary revenue started to fall in 1961. 
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Table 6.2 Grain Production, State Procurement, and Rural Grain Supplies 
(million tons) 
Year Total Grain Output 
Gross 
Procurement 






1953 166.83 47.46 11.58 35.88 130.95 
1954 169.52 51.81 20.23 31.58 137.94 
1955 183.94 50.75 14.57 36.18 147.76 
1956 192.75 45.44 16.74 28.70 164.05 
1957 195.05 48.04 14.17 33.87 161.18 
1958 197.05 58.76 17.04 41.72 155.93 
1959 169.68 67.41 19.84 47.57 122.11 
1960 143.85 51.05 20.16 30.89 112.96 
Source: Robert Ash, "Squeezing the Peasants: Grain Extraction, Food Consumption and Rural Living 
Standards in Mao's China," in The History of the PRC (1949-1976), ed. Julia C. Strauss, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, 116. 
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Taxes on Industry 
and Commerce 
Receipts from State-Owned 
Enterprises 
Total 
Receipts from Industrial 
Enterprises 
1956 28.74 2.97 10.10 13.43 5.26 
1957 31.02 2.97 11.31 14.42 5.93 
1958 38.76 3.26 14.18 18.92 9.41 
1959 48.71 3.30 15.70 27.91 15.44 
1960 57.23 2.8 16.06 36.58 21.58 
1961 35.61 2.17 12.05 19.13 8.04 
Source: Katharine Huang Hsiao, The Government Budget and Fiscal Policy in Mainland China, 
Taipei: Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, 1987. 10, 17, 20. 
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Using resources squeezed out of the agricultural sector, state elites actively 
pursued their strategic goal—rapid industrialization. In 1957, government 
expenditure on agricultural sector only accounted for 19.16 percent of the tax 
revenue from this source.
444
 In contrast, heavy industry absorbed a large 
proportion of the fiscal resources. The share of total capital construction 
investment going to heavy industry rose from 46.5 percent before 1957 to 57 
percent in 1958, 56.7 percent in 1959, and 55.3 percent in 1960.
445
  
As a result of massive state investment, industrial output increased sharply. 
According to Kang Chao‘s estimation, the production of factories increased 
39.2 percent in 1958 and 36.3 percent in 1959. T. C. Liu and K. C. Yeh give 
an estimate of 21.2 percent in 1958 and 29.1 percent in 1959.
446
 It is true that 
―much output was of too low quality to be used‖ and industrial output 
plummeted after 1960.
447
 Yet, the failure of the industrial sector was because 
of ill-conceived developmental strategy, not because state elites had failed to 
mobilize enough domestic resources to invest in the sector.  
Small Industries and Construction Projects Apart from the mobilization of 
material resources, the government also demonstrated the capability to control 
citizens and command human resources. The rural population, for instance, 
was encouraged to participate in industrial production and capital construction. 
The people‘s communes set up their own small factories. Official statistics 




The achievements of the mobilization were also embodied by the mass 
water conservancy campaign initiated in the winter of 1957-58 and various 
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construction projects (see Table 6.4). More than 100 million peasants 
participated in the water conservation projects.
449
 According to the 
communiqué issued by the Ministry of Agriculture in October 1958, irrigated 
land area increased by 480 million mu between October 1957 and the end of 
September 1958.
450
 The transfer of labor from agriculture to industry was so 
effective that it even caused an acute labor shortage in the rural sector and 
contributed to the drop of agricultural output.
451
 The agricultural labor force 
declined by about 41 million persons between 1957 and 1958.
452
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Table 6.4 Construction of Railways and Water Conservation Projects, 1957-60 
 Railways Volume of Earth and Stone Work 
Completed on Water Conservation 
Projects 
(millions of cubic meters) 
Total Route Length 
in Operation     
(kilometers) 
New Construction of 
Trunk and Branch Lines 
(kilometers) 
1957 29,862 1,166 2,974 
1958 31,192 2,376 7,984 
1959 32,500 3,136 n.a. 
1960 35,000 6,000 n.a. 
Source: Kang Chao, Capital Formation in Mainland China, 1952-1965, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1974, 54.
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Due to bad management, the mobilization of the peasantry was often a 
waste of efforts. Consider Sichuan‘s Pengxi County. A steel brigade composed 
of 44,901 peasants was organized within one month and sent to a mining area 
which was thousands miles away from Pengxi. Yet, only after the 
―iron-and-steel brigade‖ reached the mining area did they find out that this area 
lacked mineral resources. As a result, the brigade had to be divided and 
transferred to other mining areas.
453
 Such effort, albeit fruitless, does not deny 
the government‘s capability of commanding citizens. Within a few months 
after the Beidaihe conference, about 800,000 to 900,000 people in Sichuan 




In sum, the outcomes of the GLF mobilization were mixed. Although the 
mobilization failed on some dimensions, it achieved success on others. As was 
illustrated above: (1) The initial stage (before the fall of 1958) of the GLF was 
more successful than the later stage; (2) Despite the drastic decline of 
agricultural production, the state acquired resources that could be devoted to its 
strategic plan—speeding up industrialization; (3) Although the 
mismanagement and unscientific methods of production resulted in waste of 
efforts, the state demonstrated remarkable capability of directing the populace 
according to its will.  
6.2 Weak Threat Perceptions and Their Effects on Mobilization 
6.2.1 The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Anti-American Campaign 
On 25 August 1958, the People‘s Liberation Army began a shelling of the 
islands of Jinmen and Matsu, which were under the KMT‘s control. At home, 
the CCP leadership capitalized on international tensions to facilitate the 
mobilization of the population. The government launched the ―Everyone a 
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Soldier‖ campaign and encouraged people to join militias. Supposedly, such 
military organization would promote productivity and accelerate 
communization. By the end of 1958, about 220 million people, accounting for 
thirty-five percent of the total population, had joined the militia.
455
  
Moreover, the government appealed to nationalism to justify its call for 
increasing production. Through the broadcasting system, Chairman Mao‘s 
words were passed on to people living in remote villages in Sichuan. Villagers 
were told that ―Wait until we‘ve made thirty million tons of steel … and 
three-and-a-half billion catties (jin) of grain … When we‘ve achieved this, 
then we shall be able to negotiate with the Americans with a bit more 
spirit.‖456 
Many scholars agree that Mao manipulated foreign crisis to facilitate 
domestic mobilization. Christensen, for instance, argues that:  
He (Mao) wanted to use these tensions to replicate the spirit of public 
sacrifice found in the CCP base areas during the anti-Japanese and 
civil war periods. This popular fervor would help Mao implement his 
new grand strategy: the radical drive for self-sufficient industrial 
growth and nuclear weapons development launched under the banner 
of the Great Leap Forward.
457
 
This insight enables us to better understand how domestic considerations 
might influence foreign policy-making. Nevertheless, it is worth asking 
whether the threats manufactured by state elites roused the masses to 
nationalist behavior. Given that domestic mobilization between November 
1957 and August 1958 was more successful than mobilization after August 
1958, the role of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in mobilizing the masses 
seems to be negligible.  
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In 1958, the Chinese leadership, especially Mao, might perceive the threat 
posed by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
458
 Yet, this threat perception 
might not be shared by the people. Through a thorough survey of academic 
works, documents authorized for publication by the CCP, and memoirs, I find 
that there is a striking discrepancy between the elite-centered scholarship and 
the scholarship based on non-elite sources regarding the relations between the 
GLF and the international crisis.  
On the one hand, the elite-centered scholarship highlights the dynamics 
between the international and domestic policy realm. On the other hand, few 
academic works that examine the GLF from a grassroots perspective discuss 
the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and its role in speeding up domestic 
mobilization. As was demonstrated in Chapter 5, empirical evidence suggests 
that the American intervention in the Korean War caused panic in the lower 
Yangtze region. In contrast, in the case of the GLF, such evidence is absent. In 
fact, few people mentioned the crisis when they looked back upon their 
experience during the GLF.
459
   
As I suggest in the Chapter 1, a strong and imminent foreign threat must 
contain some tangible elements, which can be measured by the time frame 
(whether war/military conflict is impending or going on), the intensity of war, 
and the strategic value of the region under study. In the case of the GLF, the 
fact that conflicts over the Taiwan Strait were going on suggests that the threat 
was immediate. However, the threat did not meet the threshold that this study 
sets for a ―strong and imminent threat‖ for two reasons.  
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First, in comparison with the Korean War, the intensity of the Second 
Taiwan Strait Crisis was less. The shelling of Jinmen and Matsu was at its 
most intense in the first few weeks. Tensions were soon eased by the 
resumption of direct talks between China and the U.S. in September 1958. 
460
 
On 6 October, Chinese Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai declared a unilateral 
ceasefire. After the announcement of ceasefire, the shelling continued only on 
odd-numbered days and became rather symbolic.
461
 In fact, from the outset of 
the crisis, the Chinese government had been cautious in preventing the crisis 
from escalating.
462
 As Christensen suggests, Mao wanted ―conflict short of 
war.‖463 The limited conflicts over the Taiwan Strait, however, were not 
enough to create a wartime atmosphere within domestic society and thus 
adversely affected the mobilization. 
Second, even if conflicts at the Taiwan Strait escalated, the likelihood of 
Sichuan being attacked was limited. Indeed, during the Sino-Japanese War, 
Sichuan, suffered from Japanese bombings. This is because the province was 
the industrial center of wartime China, and Chongqing the wartime capital. As 
the central government left Sichuan after the war ended, the province had lost 
its strategic value. In the late 1950s, Sichuan was only an inland agricultural 
province. Its strategic value was much lower in comparison with other 
industrial, commercial, and political centers, such as the lower Yangtze region. 
As for China‘s relationship with the other superpower, the Soviet Union, 
although tensions began to accumulate since the mid-1950, the Chinese 
government did not reveal the disputes to the public until 1960.
464
 The 
publishing of an article titled ―Long Live Leninism‖ in April 1960 opened the 
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 And the withdrawal of Soviet specialists in July 1960 
made the deterioration of bilateral relations widely known among ordinary 
people. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union had not constituted a military threat to 
China by then.  
In sum, Mao raised international tensions by shelling the islands of Jinmen 
and Matsu. However, the manufactured threat lacked a tangible element. The 
threat perceived by Sichuan people in late 1950s was much weaker than that 
during the Sino-Japanese War. In next section, I demonstrate that in the 
absence of a strong and imminent foreign threat, people expected more 
immediate economic payoffs in exchange for their contribution to the 
nationalist cause.  
6.2.2 Effects on Mobilization 
In the atmosphere of vehement anti-Americanism and a vigorous 
communization movement, it was difficult for individuals to reveal their true 
feelings, especially their negative views on government policy. Nevertheless, 
it is still possible to speculate on what motivated individuals to participate in 
the nationalist movement by examining what people praised. I demonstrate 
below that instead of talking about their obligations to the anti-imperialist 
campaign, many people who participated in various construction projects 
praised the free supply of food. It was the free supply of food that let them 
taste the sweetness of socialism. Evidence supports my proposition that in the 
absence of an imminent and strong foreign threat, individuals are more 
concerned about immediate economic payoffs. For the state, the provision of 
immediate economic payoffs increased the costs of mobilization.  
   From the winter 1957-58, the GLF began flowing to villages and cities in 
wave-like progression. Initially, it was the launch of Mass Water Conservancy 
Campaign (daban shuili), and later the establishment of the people‘s commune 
and the initiation of Mass Steel and Iron Campaign (daban gangtie). Peasants 
were called upon to contribute labor to various construction projects, erecting 
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backyard furnaces, searching for iron ore in mountainous areas, and building 
railways.  
The provision of free food and extra income greatly facilitated the 
mobilization and bolstered the morale. According to a party cadre of Shifang 
County, Sichuan, peasants who participated in construction projects not only 
had their work points recorded at home and obtain their share of grain and 
cash, but also received a subsidy of several yuan per month.
466
 At MaGaoqiao, 
Sichuan, peasants were organized by the commune to mine iron in mountains. 
When these peasants returned to their village, they all wore new clothes.
467
 
The establishment of public mess halls and nurseries freed women from 
housekeeping. As a result, women could participate in agricultural production 
and receive wages just as their husbands. A woman recalled, ―Our slogan was 
‗Long live the public canteen‘ … I was the happiest I‘d ever been.‖468 The 
production team leader of MaGaoqiao candidly admitted, ―When food was 
free and the commune members had pork and there was a holiday, then the 
members liked it (the commune).‖469  
The Chinese leadership, especially Mao, expected that international 
tensions would encourage the spirit of self-sacrifice.
470
 However, nationalist 
rhetoric adopted by the government did not succeed in persuading ordinary 
people to make short-term self-sacrifices and reduce consumption. Instead, 
consumption increased. Even worse, the free supply of food resulted in 
unnecessary waste. Ordinary people seemed to be careless about group or 
national interests.  
Wang Xiaoxun was a student living in Sichuan when the GLF was 
launched. He remembered that there was a steel factory in Jiangyou, and many 
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people walked to Jiangyou to assist the factory to produce more steel. ―For a 
while, we found that there was discarded rice and piles of corn pancakes on 
the sides of the road. They were thrown away by the steel brigade heading for 
Jiangyou. If people could get free food wherever they went, why would they 
bother to carry their own?‖ Wang and his classmates were also organized by 
their school to assist different production teams. The production teams 
provided them with free food, usually sweet potatoes. Wang recalled that his 
classmates and himself would only eat the middle part of a sweet potato and 
use the rest to feed pigs. As a result, each person could consume 3.5 to 4 
kilogram of sweet potatoes for one meal.
471
 
The mobilization of masses came at a high price. Taking the Red Flag 
Commune of Sichuan as an example, 5,400 peasants were sent into the 
mountain areas to search for ore. In return, each peasant received 45 jin of rice 
per month from the commune. The Mass Steel and Iron Campaign alone cost 
the commune 660,000 jin of rice. Meanwhile, the commune had to provide 
peasants who worked in the field with one additional meal. As a consequence, 
grain consumed within two months exceeded the normal consumption by 
around 1.6 million jin.
472
 The high costs made mobilization unsustainable. By 
the winter 1958-1959, many communes had run out of food.  
In a word, although the Chinese leadership led by Mao attempted to stir 
international tensions and capitalize on the tensions to mobilize domestic 
society, the threat was not intense enough, and the populace did not directly 
felt the threat. In the initial stage of the mobilization, the provision of 
immediate economic payoffs played an important role in bolstering up morale. 
However, the immediate costs of the mobilization were too high. As the 
supply of food reduced, morale also dropped. So did the agricultural output.  
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6.3 Domestic Institutions and Their Effects on Mobilization  
6.3.1 Institutional Change: From Pro-Majority Institutions to Pro-State 
Institutions 
I argued in Chapter 1, pro-majority institutions favor the interests of the lower 
strata of society. Pro-majority economic institutions allow individuals to 
accumulate personal property. Nevertheless, they limit property-based 
inequality and reduce concentration of wealth. With respect to income 
distribution, pro-majority institutions favor the interests of labor, rather than 
capitalists and landowners. In contrast, pro-state institutions are manifested by 
state ownership. Such institutions trample on the personal property rights of all 
social classes and facilitate state extraction. It is misleading to claim that all 
variants of collective institution favored the interests of the state and hurt 
peasant initiative.
473
 The following paragraphs explain why the elementary 
cooperative and the advanced cooperative are classified as pro-majority 
institutions. 
The mutual-aid team, the elementary and advanced cooperatives had 
emerged long before 1958.
474
 In the mutual-aid team, households only pooled 
their tools, draft animals, and labor for the peak seasons.
475
 In the elementary 
cooperative, households pooled land, draft animals, and tools in a long-term 
scheme. Yet, the means of production were still owned by individual member 
households. The income of an elementary cooperative was distributed not only 
according to each member‘s work performance, but also according to his or her 
contribution in terms of the means of production.
476
 In this sense, the 
elementary cooperative allowed extra profits to the owners of land and tools. 
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The advanced cooperative went one step further. All agricultural land, tools, 
and draft animals became cooperative property. With regard to income 
distribution, labor contribution was the single yardstick. To a large extent, the 
income gap resulted by pre-existing property-based inequality was eliminated. 
Nevertheless, private ownership of the means of living was maintained. 
Peasants were able to build up a family fortune by working harder. Table 6.5 
summarizes the features of different rural institutions. 
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Table 6.5 Characterizing Rural Collective Institutions 






Means of Production  
(Land, Tools, and Draft 
Animals) 
Private Ownership Private Ownership Collective Ownership 
Ownership by the 
Whole People 
Other Property 
(Houses, Clothes, Bank 
Deposits etc.) 
Private Ownership Private Ownership Private Ownership ―Communist Wind‖ 
Distribution of Income -- 
Labor & Dividends to 
the Shareholders 
Labor 
Free Supply & 
Monthly Wage 
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The poorer strata of the peasantry deemed the elementary and advanced 
cooperative to be favorable to their interests. Frequently, it was the poor 
peasants and the lower middle peasants that joined cooperatives first.
477
 The 
cooperative allowed those who owned small pieces of land and lacked tools to 
achieve the economy of scale.
478
 More importantly, it enabled poorer peasants 
to catch up with the rich and prosperous middle peasants.  
First, the cooperative exerted leveling effects on the peasantry by 
restricting the private economic opportunities of the richer peasants and 
prevented them from making profits from the capital that they owned.
479
 For 
instance, before collectivization, it was the richer peasants who control the 
market in the rural sector, and the poor peasants always complained about the 
price manipulation.
480
As collectivization progressed, the Supply and Marketing 
Cooperative was set up in every town/township, competed with private 
merchants and enjoyed initial support from poor peasants.
481
 
Second, with the government‘s backing, poorer peasants who joined the 
cooperatives enjoyed various privileges. A member of cooperative recalled 
that:  
Those outside (the cooperative) had money and could buy a buffalo, 
but their money could not buy water. Because the poor and new 
lower middle peasants held the political power we in the co-op 
controlled the water supply. First we irrigated the fields of the 
co-operative and if water remained they could have it. But if not then 
they couldn‘t plant their rice. The same with the fertilizer; when it 
was available the co-operative had priority in buying it from the 
Supply and Marketing Co-operative. Their grain was sometimes 
turned down as still damp or of poor quality by the grain collecting 
                                           
477
 Endicott, Red Earth: 40. Robert Ash‘s study also shows that farmers in poorer areas were 
more enthusiastic for cooperatives than those in richer areas, and that richer peasants were 
those who withdrew from cooperatives first once they were allowed to do so. Robert Ash, 
"The High Tide in Jiangsu: A Perspective from Local Sources of the Time," The China 
Quarterly 187(Sep. 2006): 52; Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: 27. 
478
 Chao, Agricultural Production: 51. 
479
 Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: 27. 
480
 Endicott, Red Earth: 34. 
481
 Ibid., 35. 
    
181 
 
station and then they had to carry it all the way home again and bring 
it back another day. It was the kind of trick landlords used to play on 
up poor tenants. So we sometimes exerted that pressure on them.
482
 
It is true that in the advanced cooperative, land became collective property. 
However, collective ownership favored the interests of poorer peasants. Since 
the completion of land reform in 1953, property-based inequalities between the 
rich peasants and the poor peasants had increased steadily. For instance, a 
number of village surveys in North China indicated that within three years of 
the completion of land redistribution, between twenty and twenty-five percent 
of the peasant households that did not have draft animals and tools were forced 
to sell some of their land.
483
  
In Sichuan, the polarization between the rich and the poor was also a 
problem. According to Endicott‘s record, before the collectivization started, 
some peasant households had already pawned its field or sold their crops to 
rich peasants in advance at a heavy discount because they were short of food 
before the harvest. For the poorer strata of the peasantry, collectivization raised 
hopes for a fresh start. 
The people‘s commune differed fundamentally from the elementary and the 
advanced cooperative by undermining the poorer peasants‘ property rights. By 
establishing the advanced cooperative, the state had actually allied with the 
poor peasants against the rich peasants.
484
 However, the people‘s commune 
trampled on the property rights of the poor peasants. Under the people‘s 
commune, peasants, no matter how rich or poor, were stripped of all they 
owned. Rewards did not compensate for the efforts that individuals made. 
Instead, state extraction took the largest share in harvest distribution.  
The people commune was deemed the ―sprout of communism‖: its 
establishment marked that the transition from ―collective ownership‖ to 
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―ownership by the whole people‖ had begun.485 In the people‘s commune, not 
only were private plots, draft animals, and tools expropriated, but also other 
property, such as houses, furniture, and cooking utensils.
486
 Such practices 
were known as the ―Communist Wind‖: transferring property and labor from 
households and teams to brigades and communes with no compensation.  
Initially, the central government promoted communization. The People‘s 
Daily published many articles praising communism.
487
 It took some time for 
Mao to realize the problem of communism. In the winter of 1958-59, the 
leadership introduced a series of policies to alleviate the problems caused by 
various radical practices. Mao criticized that the commune had accumulated 
too much capital and emphasized that the ―communization‖ of all kinds of 
property was not permitted.
488
 On 23 March 1959, Mao wrote again: ―Don‘t 
talk about the transition from socialism to communism for at least twenty years. 
It can‘t be possibly to go that quickly.‖489  
Nevertheless, at the provincial and lower administrative levels, the ―leftist‖ 
guideline was not completely abandoned. After the 1958 Lushan conference, a 
campaign against the ―right opportunists‖ unfolded and the GLF further 
radicalized. Local cadres resumed their rash toward communism.
490
 A cadre of 
Sichuan Party committee by the name of Zhang Rulan admitted that the 
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correction of the ―Communist Wind‖ did not begin in Sichuan until 1961.491 In 
Sichuan‘s Pengxi County, to increase the investment in the Mass Steel and Iron 
Campaign, the county government ―transfer‖ resources worth about 7.83 




As the ―Communist Wind‖ blew to every corner of the country, peasants 
were stripped of all they owned. It became impossible for peasants to build up 
a family fortune. Peasants‘ houses were expropriated by the commune and 
changed to commune mess halls. In Jianyang, Sichuan, the commune forced 
every family to contribute four to five yuan for the construction of two mess 
halls, while the daily wage for a laborer was only twenty cents.
493
 More 
houses were demolished because local cadres believed that the mud of the 
old-fashioned houses was good fertilizer and that communal living promoted 
production efficiency.
494
 At Sichuan‘s Changshan Commune, 1,133 of 2,870 
households were forced to leave their houses and live in collective living 
quarters. Some peasant said: ―Only one pair of chopsticks and one bowl belong 
to me.‖495 In some places, even peasants‘ bank deposits were confiscated by 
overenthusiastic cadres and transferred to the commune‘s investment fund. 
Local cadres believed that peasants should not need too much money, since 
their subsistence needs had been met by free supplies.
496
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The people‘s commune greatly enhanced the state‘s extractive capacity. It 
was much easier for the state to deal with a relatively small number of 
communes than with more than ten million individual households. With regard 
to the distribution of harvest, the commune was responsible for paying taxes 
and delivering compulsory procurement to the state. This institutional setting 
guaranteed that taxes and state procurement would take absolute precedence, 
and that only the residual income would be distributed among commune 
members.
497
 Moreover, the price for all commodities exchanged between the 
state and the communes was set by the state, usually lower than the market 
price.
498
 During the GLF, peasants often received nothing for the grain that 
they handed over to the state.
499
 
Before the creation of the people‘s commune, it was a prevalent practice 
for cadres at the village level to conceal production and distribute harvest to 
cooperative members. Records regarding the concealment and private 
distribution of grain were found in many provinces, such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Jiangxi, Hubei, Henan, Shandong, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Anhui, and 
Sichuan.
500
 However, after the establishment of the people‘s commune in late 
1958, it had become increasingly difficult and risky for lower-level cadres to 
conceal production. A peasant recalled, ―Our village only concealed production 
once in 1958. We had never dared conceal production since 1959.‖501  
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6.3.2 Effects on Mobilization  
Changes in agricultural productivity were correlated with institutional changes. 
The central government made the decision to set up people‘s communes 
nationwide at the Beidaihe Conference, which was convened in August 1958. 
To a large extent, agricultural production in 1958 was not affected by the 
establishment of the people‘s commune. Table 6.6 lists five estimates of 
agricultural factor productivity. Estimate (1), (2), (4), and (5) agree that the 
collectivization between 1955 and 1958 resulted in a mild increase in factor 
productivity, while productivity dropped significantly in 1959.  
Table 6.6 Indices of Total Factor Productivity of the Agricultural Sector 
Year 
Tang    
(1) 
Wen    
(2) 




Chow      
(5) 
1952 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1953 100 99.6 99.5 98.7 100.0 
1954 100 99.0 98.4 97.3 99.0 
1955 104 103.8 103.0 103.2 104.0 
1956 102 104.1 101.7 104.3 105.0 
1957 103 102.4 100.3 98.5 102.9 
1958 102 104.7 97.0 100.7 109.0 
1959 85 94.3 89.1 91.0 94.9 
1960 74 78.4 73.4 78.6 79.7 
Sources: col. 1: Anthony M. Tang, An Analytical and Empirical Investigation 
of Agriculture in Mainland China, 1952-1980. Taipei: Chung-Hua Inst. Econ. 
Res., 1984, 95-97; col. 2: Guanzhong Wen, "The Current Land Tenure System 
and Its Impact on Long Term Performance of Farming Sector: The Case of 
Modern China." Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. Chicago, 1989, 123; col. 3: Thomas 
B. Wiens, "Technological Change." in Randolph Barker and Radha Sinha. eds., 
The Chinese Agricultural Economy, Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982; Yujiro 
Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International 
Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1985, 151; col. 5: Gregory 
C. Chow, The Chinese Economy. New York: Harper & Row, 1985. Cited by 
Justin Lin, "Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis in 1959-61." 
Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 6 (1990), 1245.  
 
Pro-state institutions alienated the peasantry and led to individual passivity. 
Fieldwork conducted by the Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of 
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Sciences in Changli Country, Hebei, indicated that peasants reported to work 
but put little effort into it because they believed that they would not profit from 
their labor.
502
 In Sichuan‘s Red Flag Commune, the delay to the harvest led to 
huge losses of grain, ranging from 30 to 80 jin per mu. A large amount of grain 
went moldy due to careless conservation.
503
 Wang Yanni reports that 
demolishing peasants‘ houses and forcing them to live together decreased, 
rather than improved, labor efficiency.
504
 Some peasants expressed their 
discontent by wasting food in the mess halls.
505
 
Admittedly, apart from pro-state institutions, famine that started to spread 
in winter 1958-69 was also an important cause of individual passivity. It is 
difficult to assess the relative shares of the blame. Nevertheless, ample 
evidence suggests that pro-state institutions shortened peasants‘ time horizon. 
Not allowed to keep private property, peasants chose to eat more and better. 
As Sichuan officials reported, peasants believed that ―only the clothes that you 
put on and the food you swallowed are yours.‖506  
Free supply resulted in excessive food consumption and waste, which also 
contributed to the famine.
507
 When the mess halls were first established and 
the food was plenty, peasants all choose to eat rice rather than sweet potatoes 
even if they were cooked.
508
 In Sichuan‘s Red Flag Commune, each person 
on average consumed 57 jin (28.5 kg) of rice per month.
509
 Facing excessive 
state extraction, peasants became more concerned about immediate economic 
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payoffs. Few thought about possible hardship ahead. A peasant who normally 
used to eat four bowls of rice had six instead when the supply was free. He 
said, ―I can eat as much as I want for this meal. Can I do the same thing for the 
next meal? So I‘d better eat more now.‖510  
Although pro-state institutions alienated peasants, unlike pro-minority 
institutions, they prevented social elites from appropriating state resources and 
resisting government policies, and thus increased the efficiency of state 
extraction. Indeed, during the GLF, local cadres also wield their power to 
advance their personal interests. As Yang Jisheng describes, ―commune 
members starved while local cadres feasted.‖511 Yet, different from social 
elites, local cadres‘ interests also lay in implementing government policies, 
since their personal fortunes depended on whether they could outshine their 
peers. Avery Goldstein characterizes the political system in pre-Cultural 
Revolution China as ―bandwagon polity.‖ He contends that ―the payoffs in the 
bandwagon polity for being identified as an activist political element were a 
strong lure‖, and that ―performance was to be evaluated not just as an 
indication of administrative competence but, more important, as an indication 
of political commitment and loyalty.‖512  
As the anti-rightist campaign unfolded in the fall of 1959, local cadres 
faced increasing pressures from the party-state.
513
 The abuse of peasants 
became a widespread practice. Taking the Yong County of Sichuan as an 
example, the county received a duty of extracting 1.2 million yuan. To meet 
the quotas assigned by superiors, local cadres seized peasants‘ chickens, ducks, 
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clothing, and even quilts. The slogan of some commune was that ―Pay taxes 
even if you have to sell you sons and daughters.‖514  
As the people‘s commune deprived peasants of personal property and 
monopolized the supply of food, the state‘s direct control over citizens was 
enhanced. It was common that commune members were punished and had 
meals withheld for leaving the village without permission, failing to report to 
work, or not attend meetings.
515
 The state‘s control over the means of living 
also explains why the state was so effective in commanding the populace and 
waging various construction projects. Ralph Thaxton reports that:  
By working above and beyond the call of duty in the collective fields, 
many of them (the peasants) hoped to solidify their right to the daily 
grain ration or to be given a larger-than-average grain ration for 
participating in far-flung, labor intensive development projects …516 
   In summary, the institutional change accounts for the mixed outcomes of 
the GLF mobilization. The initial success can be attributed to the institutions 
that favored the interests of the poor peasants. But the establishment of 
pro-state institutions after 1958 resulted in the fall of productivity. 
Nevertheless, pro-state institutions enhanced the state‘s extractive capacity. 
Therefore, state accumulation of resources continued to increase while people 
were starving. Under pro-state institutional settings, mobilization proved to be 
unsustainable. 
6.4 Alternative Explanations 
Existing literature provides different explanations for the outcome of the GLF. 
Some scholars emphasize the disincentive effects of collectivization, while 
others blame bad management. Although there are certain elements of truth in 
these accounts, they only provide partial explanation for the mixed outcomes. 
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6.4.1 The Disincentive Effects of the Collectivization 
A line of argument emphasizes the disincentive effects of collectivization. 
According to this proposition, collectivization that was initiated in 1952 
contained the seeds of the disaster.
517
 Such a proposition, however, is not 
consistent with empirical evidence, which suggests that the initial stages of the 
collectivization won the support from the pooper strata of the peasantry. 
Estimates by different economists agree that agricultural productivity was 
improved between 1955 and 1958 in comparison with the 1952 level.
518
 
The discrepancy between the collectivization thesis and the empirical 
evidence indicates that we should examine the variants of collective 
institutions more carefully and explore their different effects on agricultural 
productivity. It is misleading to say in general that collectivization led to 
peasant passivity. In fact, collective institutions, such as the elementary and 
advanced cooperative, exerted leveling effects on the rural society. Such 
institutions hurt the interests of the well-to-do peasants, while favored the 
poorer peasants‘ interests. I maintain that rural institutions only became 
pro-state after people‘s communes were set up nationwide in the fall of 1958.  
6.4.2 The One-Time Game Thesis 
In his seminal article published in 1990, Justin Lin attributes the failure of 
agricultural mobilization to the collapse of the ―self-enforcing agreement.‖ He 
argues that before the establishment of the people‘s commune, the principle of 
voluntarism was followed. Peasants could withdraw their membership and 
their assets from the cooperative if they decided to do so. The principle of 
voluntarism guaranteed that in the collective each peasant worked as hard as on 
the household farm, since peasants were aware that otherwise other members 
in the collective would withdraw from the collectives. However, when 
participation in the collective became compulsory, the nature of the collective 
changed from a repeated game to a one-time game. Consequently, the 
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self-enforcing agreement could not be sustained.
519
According to Lin, 
agricultural productivity did not plummet until 1959. He believes that the 
collectivization before 1959 was ―voluntary collectivization‖, while the 
collectivization between 1959 and 1978 was ―compulsory‖.520  
However, evidence indicates that between 1955 and 1958, the principle of 
voluntarism was frequently violated by local cadres. Even if the principle of 
voluntarism was embraced officially, the well-to-do peasants who refused to 
join the cooperatives faced pressures exerted by local cadres.
521
 By the spring 
of 1958, all peasant households had joined the advanced agricultural 
cooperative.
522
 Participation in cooperatives could hardly be deemed voluntary. 
The one-time game thesis encounters problems in explaining why agricultural 
productivity still maintained at a relatively high level in 1958. Unlike the 
one-time game thesis, the explanation I propose suggests that people‘s 
communes that were set up nationwide in late 1958 deprived the peasants of 
private property and thus exerted disincentive effects on the peasantry.  
6.4.3 Unscientific Methods of Agricultural Production 
Many scholars attribute the collapse of agricultural production to 
mismanagement. Chen Yixin, for instance, contends that state-mandated 
agricultural practices, such as ―sparrow control‖, resulted in the increase in 
pests and thus crop damage.
523
 Yang Jisheng points out that deep-plowing 
mandated by the government was detrimental to the soil, and that 
close-planting left rice seedlings with insufficient sunlight.
524
 Moreover, as 
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peasants were mobilized to participate in industrial production, the rural sector 
also suffered from labor shortage.
525
   
Bad management did contribute to the fall of agricultural production. 
However, the mismanagement thesis tends to overlook one issue: How did the 
state manage to force the peasants to practice these unscientific methods? And 
how did the state succeed in transferring labor out of the agricultural sector? 
The practice of unscientific methods and the excessive transfer of labor 
actually in fact reflect the success achieved by the state in directing the 
population.  
Again, the outcome of GLF mobilization should be assessed on multiple 
dimensions. I contend that in the initial stage of the GLF, the free-supply of 
food and the provision of other immediate payoffs let the mass participants 
taste the sweetness of socialism and greatly facilitated the mobilization. After 
the establishment of the people‘s commune, the state monopolized the supply 
of food and became the only provider of the means of survival. The provision 
of immediate economic payoffs and the presence of the pro-state institutions 
enhanced the state‘s direct control over citizens. 
6.4.4  Egalitarianism 
Amongst the most popular explanations for the drop of agricultural output and 
productivity are those emphasizing the incentive issue. This line of arguments 
suggests that the people‘s commune promoted absolute equality of income, and 
that the disassociation of reward from efforts undermine the incentive to raise 
productivity.
526
 In Sichuan, for instance, free supply of food and other goods 
and services constituted about fifty percent of peasants‘ income.527 For the 
part of income that was distributed according to work, monthly wages replaced 
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 If extra efforts would not be rewarded, why would 
peasants work harder?  
This argument is convincing. It explains not only why productivity dropped 
after 1958, but also why productivity continued to stagnate till the late 1970s. 
Nevertheless, the egalitarianism thesis fails on two accounts. First, it does not 
explain why despite peasant passivity, at the aggregate level, state 
accumulation continued to increase. Second, egalitarianism was only one 
factor that undermined peasants‘ incentives. Ample evidence suggests that the 
―Communist wind‖—expropriation of peasants‘ property by the 
commune—was another factor that explains why peasants had little incentive 
to work. More importantly, it was the public ownership of the means of 
production and the means of living that shortened peasants‘ time horizon. As 
was demonstrated above, not allowed to accumulate a family fortune, peasants 
chose to eat more and better in the mess halls, even if they were aware that 
over-consumption would lead to future food shortages. The waste of food was 
an important cause of the subsequent famine. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that the GLF mobilization achieved mixed outcomes. 
The initial stage of the mobilization was relatively successful. Despite the drop 
in agricultural production, the state acquired the resources, so that state elites 
could invest in their strategic plan. At the same time, the state was effective in 
directing the population, even if its policies were ill-designed. 
I attribute the mixed outcomes to the public‘s weak threat perception and 
hybrid domestic institutions. Although the leadership attempted to facilitate 
domestic mobilization by stirring up international tensions, foreign threats 
were not directly felt by the people. Instead, the masses expected more material 
benefits as compensation for their contribution to the nationalist cause.  
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Moreover, the institutional change explains the initial success of the 
mobilization as well as the failure later. The elementary and advanced 
cooperative established before 1958 favored the interests of the poorer strata of 
the peasantry. In contrast, the people‘s commune was, characteristically, 
pro-state. It undermined peasants‘ initiative and shortened their time horizon. 
Nevertheless, pro-state institutions enhanced the state‘s control over citizens 
and material resources. As a result, state accumulation continued to increase 
even as production fell.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion  
This chapter reviews the major argument made in previous chapters. After 
summarizing the findings, I proceed to discuss this research‘s implications for 
the study of present-day Chinese nationalism. For that purpose, I introduce 
two additional minor cases in this section, Germany before WWI and Spain 
during the Spanish-American War. I suggest that although many draw 
parallel between present-day China and Wilhelmina Germany, the case of 
Spain tends to shed more lights on the future development of Chinese 
nationalism. It is because the class structure of China is more similar to Spain 
than Germany.  
The last section offers some suggestions for future research. I emphasize 
that domestic institutions play a crucial role in determining whether state 
elites can successfully mobilize society behind strategic plans. However, the 
prevalent practice of focusing on regime types proves to be inadequate for the 
understanding of nationalist mobilization. I suggest that it is necessary to 
further broaden our conceptualization of domestic institutions. 
7.1 A Summary of Argument 
State-led nationalist mobilization is more likely to succeed when the public 
feels that its physical security is under foreign threats and when domestic 
institutions are pro-majority. Although nationalism encourages self-sacrifice, 
material self-interests are critical in determining the choice made by 
individuals facing state-led nationalist mobilization. Individuals participate in 
nationalist movements to acquire state protection, immediate economic payoffs, 
and future economic payoffs.  
Nevertheless, if participants are motivated primarily by immediate 
economic payoffs, state-led nationalist mobilization is likely to fail. It is 
because the ultimate goal of nationalist mobilization is to increase human and 
material resources under state control in a relatively short time period. Yet, the 
provision of economic incentives constitutes an economic drain on the state. 
Consequently, state elites are left with fewer resources to invest in their 
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strategic objectives, such as waging war. On the contrary, if participants in a 
nationalist movement care less about immediate economic payoffs, it becomes 
easier for the state to accumulate resources. State nationalist mobilization is 
more likely to succeed. 
Two factors—strong perception of foreign threats and pro-majority 
institutions—encourage individuals to make short-term sacrifices to the 
nationalist cause. Perceiving a strong foreign threat, individuals are more likely 
to lend support to state-led nationalist movements in order to acquire state 
protection. In contrast, in the absence of a strong foreign threat, individuals‘ 
security concerns would be less severe. Consequently, they expect the state to 
provide immediate economic payoffs or other forms of welfare service as 
compensations for the contributions they made to the nationalist cause.  
Pro-majority institutions affect individuals‘ time horizon. In pro-majority 
institutional settings, although the state increases extraction during the 
mobilization, the masses tend to believe that the hardship is temporary and thus 
more likely to give consent to the state. Compared with pro-majority 
institutions, pro-state institutions and pro-minority institutions dull individual 
initiative and thus inhibit state mobilization. Pro-minority institutions are even 
more inimical to nationalist mobilization than pro-state institutions, since the 
former not only alienate the masses, but also empower the social elites at the 
expense of the state. In a pro-minority institutional setting, social elites wield 
their power to appropriate government offices and state resources and resist 
government policies that are against their interests. This study illustrates the 
above propositions with four historical cases of state-led nationalist movements 
in China. I have greater confidence in my theoretical framework with the 
support from these empirical findings.  
7.2 Additional Minor Cases 
This study has implications for the research on present-day Chinese 
nationalism and China‘s foreign policy behavior. Popular nationalism in China 
has been on the rise since the early 1990s and occasionally fueled violent 
protests. Many observers and scholars draw a parallel between China and 
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Germany and suggest that the party elites in China may play the nationalist 
card to rally popular support in the face of political instability. Jack Snyder, for 
instance, notes:  
In contemplating a future threat from Chinese nationalism … it is not 
tensions between Han Chinese and Tibetans that are the main worry 




David Shambaugh also suggests that intense nationalism in China gives 
historical comparison between China and Germany contemporary currency.
530
 
To address the question of whether China will be another Germany, I 
introduce two minor cases: Germany before WWI and Spain in the late 
nineteenth century. The framework put forward in this dissertation suggests 
that individuals are more susceptible to nationalist mobilization by the ruling 
elites when existing domestic institutions favored their interests. The case of 
Germany furnishes this proposition with a confirmation. Evidence shows that 
the middle classes were the most important constituency for the German 
government‘s nationalist agenda.  
More importantly, I highlight that a crucial reason why the ruling elites in 
Germany appealed to nationalism to solicit support from the electorate is that 
there was a relatively large middle class, whose support enabled the ruling elite 
to counterbalance the electoral weight of the working class. In today‘s China, 
such a sturdy constituency for nationalist agenda may not exist. Therefore, 
playing the nationalist card and appealing to the masses may not be a viable 
strategy for the ruling elites.  
For those who contemplate a future threat from Chinese nationalism, the 
case of Spain might be of greater heuristic importance. Compared with 
Germany before WWI, domestic institutions under the Spanish Restoration 
Regime were more pro-minority. For the Spanish ruling elites, a mass 
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nationalist movement would awaken the politically illiterate population. 
Instead, an apolitical population best served their interests. Therefore, it was 
not surprising that the ruling elites refrained from mobilizing domestic society 
through nationalism. Although the war with the United States eventually broke 
out, Spanish nationalism turned out to be more benign than German 
nationalism. Spain‘s pro-minority domestic institutions exerted substantial 
crippling effects on nationalist mobilization. Popular nationalist sentiments 
soon subsided. Consequently, it became possible and necessary for the Spanish 
rulers to negotiate a peace.  
7.2.1 The Nationalist Mobilization in Germany before WWI 
Before WWI, the ruling elites in Germany frequently played the nationalist 
card to win elections and maintain their rule. In the elections of 1874, 1878, 
1887, 1893 and 1907, the government dissolved the Reichstag and appealed to 
nationalism to influence the public opinion.
531
 Consider the 1887 elections, 
which are deemed as the climax of government-made election. The issue that 
dominated the electoral campaign was the call for an increase in the armed 
forces. The right-wing Kartell parties, including the Conservatives, Free 
Conservatives, and the National Liberals, accused the opposition of 
jeopardizing Germany‘s national security by refusing to support the military 
build-up.
532
 The nationalist campaign played an important role in mobilizing 
the non-voters. The voter turnout leaped to 77.5 percent in 1887. The Kartell 
parties were the biggest winners of the nationalist mobilization. Their share of 
the vote climbed from 39.6 percent in 1884 to 47.0 percent in 1887.
533
 In other 
words, about 36.4 percent of the eligible voters voted for the nationalist Kartell 
parties in the 1887 elections.  
                                           
531
 Brett Fairbairn, "Interpreting Wilhelmine Elections: National Issues, Fairness Issues, and 
Electoral Mobilization," in Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany, 
ed. Larry Eugene Jones and James N. Retallack (Washington, D.C.; Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 22-3. 
532
 Jonathan Sperber, The Kaiser's Voters: Electors and Elections in Imperial Germany  
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 193-5. 
533
 Fairbairn, "Interpreting Wilhelmine Elections: National Issues, Fairness Issues, and 
Electoral Mobilization," 23-4; Snyder, From Voting to Violence: 108-10. 
    
198 
 
However, the support for the Kartell parties and their nationalist campaign 
stemmed primarily from the middle classes—the beneficiaries of the 
established domestic institutions. Germany‘s imperialist agenda served the 
interests of the middle classes in many ways. For instance, many middle-class 
males sought to enhance their social standing by becoming officers. They 
joined nationalist pressure groups, such as the Navy League and the Defense 
League, clamoring for a fleet or a bigger army.
534
  
In contrast, the workers who were disadvantaged by the domestic 
institutional settings appeared to be aloof from, or even hostile to, the 
government‘s nationalist mobilization. Unlike the middle classes who were 
mobilized around the national issues, the workers were mobilized around the 
―fairness‖ issues, such as the indirect taxes that hit the poor disproportionately, 
the three-class Prussian franchise, the high price of food exacted by the 
agrarians, and the wasteful military spending.
535
 The Social Democrats (SPD) 
campaigned against the fleet. An SPD pamphlet raised doubts over the tariffs 
and taxes, shouting: ―What will all the millions from tariffs and taxes be 
applied to? Are they perhaps to the benefit of the people? Oh, no! They serve 
primarily to cover the costs which the army and fleet require.‖536 
It is true that the nationalist campaign enabled the Kartell parties to win 
some elections. However, the corrosive effects of domestic fairness issue on 
nationalist mobilization were patent.
537
 Neither Bismarck nor his successors 
succeeded drawing working-class voters away from the SPD through 
nationalist appeals.
538
 The early electoral success of the Kartell parties to a 
large extent can be attributed to the mobilization of the nationalist middle class 
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and the poor organization of the working class. The period between 1878 and 
1912 in fact witnessed the decline of the nationalist Kartell parties and the rise 
of the SPD. The former‘s share of vote declined from 49.6 percent in 1878 to 
47 percent in 1887, 32.1 percent in 1893, and 28 percent in 1907.
539
 On the 
contrary, the SPD‘s share of vote kept increasing. By the 1912 elections, SPD 
had become the strongest party.
540
 
This brief discussion of Germany before the First World War serves two 
purposes. First, it lends more support to my theoretical framework by 
demonstrating that social groups are more susceptible to nationalist 
mobilization by the ruling elites when existing domestic institutions favor their 
interests. In contrast, for those who are disadvantaged by domestic institutions, 
nationalist agenda promoted by the ruling elites tends to be less appealing.  
Second, this case illustrates that the size of the middle class and its attitude 
toward nationalist agendas are crucial in determining whether the ruling elites 
would appeal to nationalism to mobilize mass support. In Wilhelmine 
Germany, the ruling elites relied on the support from the nationalist middle 
class to counterbalance the electoral weight of the workers.
541
 In contrast, in a 
more oligarchic, polarized society, mass mobilization is more likely to be a 
self-defeating strategy for the ruling elites. I substantiate this claim using the 
case of Spain during the Spanish-American War, in which the rulers shied 
away from nationalist mobilization.  
Before I proceed further, it is necessary to make an excursion and clarify 
that although the support from the middle class enabled the Kartell parties to 
win some elections, it would be misleading to classify domestic institutions of 
Wilhelmine Germany as pro-majority. As was demonstrated above, the 
electoral victory achieved by the Kartell parties is attributed to the 
                                           
539
 Fairbairn, "Interpreting Wilhelmine Elections: National Issues, Fairness Issues, and 
Electoral Mobilization," 24. 
540
 Peter G. J. Pulzer, Germany, 1870-1945: Politics, State Formation, and War  (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). x. 
541
 Snyder, From Voting to Violence: 93-115. 
    
200 
 
poor-organized and politically illiterate lower classes. More importantly, 
historical research has demonstrated that during WWI the Wilhelmine 
Germany encountered grave problems mobilizing the masses. 
542
 
7.2.2  Spain in the Late Nineteenth Century 
Spain in the late nineteenth century appeared to have a set of domestic 
institutions that were even more pro-minority than those of Wilhelmine 
Germany. Compared with their counterparts in Germany, the Spanish ruling 
elites had a slenderer power base. Despite that universal male suffrage was 
introduced in 1890, Spain‘s political system is often labeled as 
caciquismo—the domination of local affairs and elections by district bosses.543 
These local caciques enjoyed overwhelming influence over the rural 
population. Given that Spain was still an illiterate peasant society at the turn of 
the century,
544
 it is no surprise that instead of founding mass parties, political 
figures relied on the local caciques to win elections.
545
 As Manuel Tuñón de 
Lara notes, in Spain, ―a small number of families controlled large tracts of 
Spanish land, invested in finance and even industry, and through intermarriage 
co-opted rising stars in the fields of the military and politics.‖546  
For the ruling elites in Spain, the best strategy to maintain their rule was to 
demobilize the populace—preventing the populace from political 
participation—rather than to mobilize the populace through nationalism. The 
Liberal and the Conservative administrations made little efforts to promote 
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Spanish nationalism. As Angel Smith observes, the authority even failed to 
devise a national anthem during the nineteenth century. Consequently, the 
Marcha de Cádiz, a pasodoble with no words had to be pressed into service 
when the Spanish-American war erupted.
547
 
   The second Cuban War of Independence began in 1895. The crisis taking 
place between 1895 and 1898 (when the war with the United States broke out) 
witnessed a series of spontaneous nationalist demonstrations in Spain. Yet, the 
liberal conservative authorities refrained from capitalizing on the bottom-up 
mobilization of the population to launch a state-led nationalist movement, 
building up the military, and rescuing the empire from decline. Instead, they 
appealed to repression to keep popular nationalism in check.
548
 This is 
probably because the ruling elites were aware that in a mass nationalist 
movement, citizens who were called upon to make concrete sacrifice to the 
patriotic cause were likely to make other socioeconomic demands that the 
rulers could not satisfy. It was entirely possible that the ruling elites were 
outbid by the opposition parties, who wove together the national issue with 
appeals for domestic institutional reforms into a single campaign.  
This study emphasizes the necessity to distinguish nationalist sentiments 
from nationalist behavior. I highlight that popular nationalist sentiments do not 
necessarily sustain wartime mobilization by the state.
549
 Spain before and 
during the Spanish-American War provides an apt case to illustrate this 
proposition. Although popular nationalism was on the rise in pre-war Spain, it 
soon diminished after the outbreak of the war. Right after the Spanish Navy‘s 
defeat by the United States on 1 May 1898, escapism started to prevail among 
the public.
550
 Surprised by the populace‘s passive reaction to Spain‘s defeat, 
the Republican leader Alejandro Lerroux railed out ―a docile, exaggerated 
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docile people.‖551 Even worse, bread riots erupted in many places of Spain on 
2 May. Angry crowds attacked tax booths, shouting the slogans ―Death to the 
rich‖, ―Death with the consumos‖, and ―Death to the bourgeoisie!‖552 
My theoretical framework provides an explanation for the rapid change of 
public opinions. First, for the general public of Spain, the threat posed by the 
United States was by no means strong and imminent. The battlefield was in a 
faraway colony and the home country was not directly affected by the war. 
Moreover, at least on paper the power disparity between Spain and the United 
States was not obvious. Spanish troops even outnumbered American troops.
553
 
It was unlikely that invasion by the Americans would happen.  
Second, pro-minority domestic institutions further impeded mobilization. 
The negative effects of pro-minority institutions on mobilization were best 
manifested by the conscription of soldiers. Although the rich and the middle 
class who benefited from imperialist expansion constantly pressured the 
government to take a more assertive stance in defending the empire, they were 
able to buy their way out when they were called upon to serve in the 
military.
554
 Consequently, the burden of the war fell disproportionally on the 
shoulder of the poor. The unfair conscription generated growing discontent 
among the lower classes, becoming a primary cause of social unrests.
555
 
During the war, many lower-class people chose to emigrate illegally to evade 
conscription. The desertion rate rose to thirteen percent of the call-up in some 
bordering regions.
556
 When domestic popular nationalism diminished, it 
became possible for the Spanish ruling elites to negotiate a peace with the 
United States. 
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7.2.3 A Discussion  
I introduced two minor cases in this section. The comparison between 
Germany before WWI and Spain in the late nineteenth century illustrates that 
the ruling elites are more likely to play the nationalist card and appeal to the 
masses when there is a sturdy constituency for nationalist agenda. Otherwise, 
the ruling elites prefer repression to mobilization. Additionally, my theoretical 
framework suggests that the constituency for nationalist agenda is likely to be 
the social groups whose interests are favored by the existing domestic 
institutions. In the case of Germany, it was the middle classes who found the 
government‘s imperial agenda appealing.  
People who draw parallel between China and Wilhelmine Germany worry 
that once democratic transition takes place, threatened party elites may appeal 
to nationalism to mobilize the masses. However, there is one question worth 
asking: Is there a similar constituency for nationalist agenda in China as the 
middle class in Wilhelmine Germany? The answer might be no.  
Consider the middle class first. The size of the Chinese middle class is 
relatively small. Estimates range from 4.1 percent to 25 percent of the 
population.
557
 This implies that the middle class may not provide sufficient 
support to any political elites who attempt to win the elections. More 
importantly, empirical research shows that the Chinese middle class tends to 




Is the poor majority a possible constituency for expansionist foreign policy? 
According to the result of this study, the poor majority tends to be less 
susceptible to the nationalist mobilization by the ruling elites. It is not only 
because the poor and powerless will not benefit as much as the rich and 
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powerful from imperialist expansion, but also because the former are more 
likely to shed blood in the event of war.  
Indeed, it is usually the lower classes that participate in violent nationalist 
protests. However, this does not mean that these people would support a policy 
that required concrete personal sacrifice, such as paying more taxes. In fact, 
many lower-class protesters view nationalist protests as an opportunity to vent 
their anger caused by socioeconomic grievances. Frequently, Japanese made 
cars and Japanese restaurants—the epitome of upper-middle-class life 
style—became the targets of collective violence. Some people actually jumped 
on the bandwagon spontaneously and can hardly be labeled as ―nationalists.‖ 
For instance, Li Zhiwei participated in the 2012 anti-Japanese protests and was 
detained for violent behavior. He once revealed to an interviewer that he 




I argued above that for those who speculate on a future threat from Chinese 
nationalism, the case of Spain might be of more heuristic importance. First of 
all, it illustrates that in a polarized society, the ruling elites prefer repression to 
nationalist mobilization. In fact, some empirical research on China has already 
demonstrated that the Chinese government is willing to incur damage to its 
nationalist credentials by putting popular patriotic favor in check and pursuing 
a restrained foreign policy.
560
  
Second, the case of Spain demonstrates that in pro-minority institutional 
settings, the burden of the war usually falls on the shoulder of the poor 
majority. At the same time, disadvantaged by domestic institutions, the poor 
majority is less likely to believe that they will benefit from imperialist 
expansion. As the costs of war rise, domestic discontent increases, and popular 
nationalist sentiments diminish. For the ruling elites, it becomes possible and 
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necessary to negotiate a peace with foreign countries. In other words, domestic 
weaknesses limit external expansion.   
Similarly, contemporary Chinese nationalism may be more benign than 
many tend to think. China‘s climbing Gini coefficient, to some extent, reflects 
the inequality that domestic institutions incur. According to the official report, 
Gini coefficient peaked in 2008, reaching 0.491.
561
 Although the government 
claims that Gini coefficient has dropped since 2008, this estimate is thrown 
into doubt. Some research institute reports that the coefficient in fact has 
increased to 0.61 for 2010.
562
 Meanwhile, political institutions seem to provide 
insufficient protection to the poor. A survey carried out by Global Times—a 
Chinese newspaper attracting a nationalist readership—shows that 27,419 of 
28,354 respondents believed that they belonged to the ―vulnerable groups 
(ruoshi qunti).‖563 This study suggests that in the existing institutional settings, 
nationalist mobilization by the state is likely to falter in the event of war.  
7.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
An issue that interests many students of international relations and comparative 
politics is how regime type affects a country‘s foreign policy behavior. 
Scholars debate on whether democracies or autocracies are more likely to play 
the nationalist card and dispatch troops abroad for diversionary purposes.
564
 
The debate has not reached a conclusion. Instead, many speculate on why 
existing literature produces contradictory results, which as some suggest can be 
attributed to the narrow conceptualization of regime type. Jeffery Pickering and 
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Emizet Kisangani, for instance, distinguish consolidated democracies and 
autocracies from consolidating variants of these regimes.
565
 Edward Mansfield 




The attempt to broaden the conceptualization of domestic institutions along 
the line of regime type is necessary, but inadequate. Apart from political 
institutions, economic institutions determine whether diversionary use of force 
is a viable strategy for the ruling elites. As I contended above, in pro-minority 
economic institutional settings, nationalist mobilization could be a 
self-defeating strategy for the ruling elites. The mobilization of the masses may 
provide a fertile ground for recruitment by the opposition parties. In contrast, 
when economic institutions are pro-majority, nationalist mobilization may 
achieve huge success even if political institutions are nondemocratic. Consider 
China during the Korean War. Pro-majority economic institutions furthered the 
CCP‘s alliance with the lower classes and overcame individual passivity. 
Mario Ferrero, for instance, also observes that in the market for nationalism, 
socialist nationalism tends to attract more followers and drive out bourgeois 
nationalism as a solution to the national question, since the former distribute 
material benefits in a broader constituency.
567
 
This study demonstrates that pro-majority economic institutions do not 
necessarily coexist with democratic political institutions. As Victoria Hui 
points out, socioeconomic rights, such as the rights to subsistence and 
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development, can serve as substitutes for political rights and civil liberties.
568
 
Therefore, conceptualizing domestic institutions along the line of regime type 
has limitations. For those who are interested in the issue under what conditions 
the ruling elites are more likely to appeal to nationalism to mobilize the masses 
or use force abroad for diversionary purposes, domestic economic institutions 
may be an explanatory variable that needs to be taken into consideration. 
Apart from the question of whether democracies or autocracies are more 
likely to play the nationalist card, another question provoking debate is which 
regime type is more capable of mobilizing domestic resources and pursuing 
strategic goals, such as waging war.
569
 This research shows that to understand 
a country‘s strategic capability, it is inadequate to focus on overarching 
political institutions—whether the regime is democratic or not. Instead, 
grassroots political institutions are equally important. On the one hand, 
grassroots political institutions directly affect the populace‘s attitudes toward 
state-led nationalist mobilization. On the other hand, they determine to what 
extent social elites can wield their power to resist government policy and thus 
affect the outcome of mobilization by the state.  
This study broadly categorizes the population as the poor majority and the 
rich minority. The former refers to the workers and the peasants, while the 
latter includes the landlords and the capitalist. This categorization is a 
simplification of reality. For instance, this study deemphasizes the role played 
by the middle class. Nevertheless, I trade off nuances for two reasons. First, if 
the middle class is defined as people who achieve tertiary education and hold 
professional qualifications, a large middle class has never existed in the history 
of modern China. In the 1950s, for instance, people in China enjoyed high 
degree of economic equality. Yet, the workers and peasants can hardly be 
regarded as the middle class. Second, a middle class that accounts for the 
majority of the population indicates the presence of pro-majority institutions. 
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My theoretical framework will predict that state-led nationalist mobilization is 
more likely to succeed in a middle-class society.  
This study also identifies three types of domestic institutions—pro-state, 
pro-majority and pro-minority institutions. I acknowledge that domestic 
institutions are often hybrids of the three ideal types. On the one hand, 
institutions vary across time. An example in point is the institutional changes 
during the GLF. On the other hand, in a country as large as China, domestic 
institutions may vary across regions. For instance, the problem of large 
landholdings might be more serious in some provinces than others. I trade off 
nuances by categorizing domestic institutions according to their dominant 
features.  
Additionally, although I develop a set of indicators for various institutions, 
I admit that these indicators do not readily generalize to other historical and 
social contexts. For the ordinary people, some institutions carry more 
importance than others, and their views on which institutions are more 
important tend to change over time. Specifically, this study attaches attention 
to land ownership. The peasantry might deem redistribution of land huge 
institutional incentives several decades ago. Yet, nowadays a similar reform 
may not be much appreciated. As industrialization and urbanization progress, 
more and more peasants are uprooted. The uprooted peasants may value other 
social resources, such as education opportunities, more than land. 
Correspondingly, institutions that determine the distribution of these resources 
affect the outcome of future nationalist mobilization.  
As I contended at the outset, the theory I propose is not a general theory of 
the origins of nationalism or nationalist movements, but a theory of nationalist 
mobilization carried out by the state elites whose goal is to extract as much 
resources as possible from society. This theoretic framework of nationalist 
mobilization focuses on the interaction between the ruling elites and the mass 
participants, but does not incorporate domestic contenders, such as opposition 
parties or ethnic minorities. 
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Domestic contenders will affect the outcome of nationalist mobilization. 
For state elites, when there are strong opposition parties, the worst outcome of 
nationalist mobilization may not be failing to levy tax revenues, but losing the 
office. For instance, the KMT was overthrown by the CCP in a broadly defined 
nationalist movement taking place between 1937 and 1949. The CCP 
capitalized on the threat posed by the Japanese and domestic economic 
discontent to build up its ranks, and successfully toppled the KMT regime.  
Apart from opposition parties, state elites also face challenges posed by 
ethnic minorities. Mobilization by the state is accompanied by the increase in 
state extraction. In a multi-ethnic country, excessive state extraction may 
provoke ethnic minorities to resist the central government. The rise of ethnic 
nationalism undermines state-led nationalist mobilization, and may even result 
in the implosion of a multi-ethnic country. This is what happened to the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire during the WWI, and also a scenario that the 
present-day Chinese government wants to avoid. A theoretical framework that 
incorporates domestic contenders will better illustrate the constraints faced by 
state elites when they appeal to nationalism to mobilize the masses.  
In summary, this study demystifies nationalism. Nationalism is not a 
mysterious force that encourages irrational behavior. In contrast, individuals 
participate in nationalist movements to advance personal, material interests. At 
the aggregate level, nationalist mobilization by the state elites is more likely to 
succeed when the public perceives a foreign threat and when domestic 
institutions are pro-majority.  
The theoretical framework that this study proposes can facilitate the 
understanding of contemporary Chinese nationalism. Although popular 
nationalism occasionally fuels violent demonstrations in China, it may not 
sustain an expensive expansionist war. Domestic fairness issue will inhibit 
nationalist mobilization by the state. In this sense, this study serves to alleviate 
the concerns about a threat from Chinese nationalism.   
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